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Forward

This issue of *Canadian-American Theological Review* features select articles originally presented at the interdisciplinary theology conference, "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," which was jointly sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, and held in Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017. The article entitled, "Eve Christology: Embodiment, Gender, and Salvation," by Allison M. Quient, won the Jack and Phyllis Middleton Memorial Award for Excellence in Bible and Theology, awarded to the best paper by a graduate student or non-tenured professor.

Christopher Zoccali, editor-in-chief

Ecclesiological Developments in Canadian Evangelical Theology[1]

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Abstract

Recent years have marked the publication of several significant monographs engaging with ecclesiological themes by a new generation of Canadian theologians. This paper will probe three such recently published monographs in the attempt to discern signs of an emerging ecclesiological consensus within Canadian evangelical theology. The works considered include: *Participating Witness: An Anabaptist Theology of Baptism and the Sacramental Character of the Church* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013) by Anthony G. Siegrist; *Division, Diversity, and Unity: A Theology of Ecclesial Charisms* (New York: Peter Lang, 2015) by James E. Pedlar; and *Being Human, Being Church: The Significance of Theological Anthropology for Ecclesiology* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2016), by Patrick S. Franklin. Through engaging these works by authors representing the emerging generation of theological scholarship in Canada, this paper provides an orientation to the state of the contemporary ecclesiological conversation in Canadian evangelical theology and aspires to contribute to the renewal of theology and the church in Canada.

Introduction

Ecclesiology has long been recognized as a thorn in the side of evangelical theology.[2] In recent years, ecclesiological issues have come to occupy center stage in

1 This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the interdisciplinary theology conference, "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, held at Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017.

2 Recent works that have acknowledged and attempted to make a contribution towards remedying this situation include: John G. Stackhouse, ed., *Evangelical Ecclesiology: Reality or Illusion?* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003); Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier, eds., *The Community of the Word: Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology* (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2005); Brad Harper and Paul Louis Metzger, *Exploring Ecclesiology: An Evangelical and Ecumenical Introduction* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009).

the work of a new generation of Canadian evangelical theologians. This paper will engage with three recently published theological monographs representative of this ecclesiological ferment in the attempt to discern some of the emerging ecclesiological themes in Canadian evangelical theology. The three works to be considered include: Anthony Siegrist's *Participating Witness: An Anabaptist Theology of Baptism and the Sacramental Character of the Church* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013); James Pedlar's *Division, Diversity, and Unity: A Theology of Ecclesial Charisms* (New York: Peter Lang, 2015); and Patrick Franklin's *Being Human, Being Church: The Significance of Theological Anthropology for Ecclesiology* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2016).

Some may wonder on what grounds these three works can be considered as representative of contemporary Canadian evangelical theology. This is a fair question, but not an easy one to answer. Recent debates in North America surrounding the continuing usefulness of the term "evangelical" have served as a reminder of how notoriously difficult it is to answer the questions "Who is an evangelical?" and "What is evangelicalism?" Kimlyn Bender has observed that the attempt to define evangelicalism usually takes one of two forms: "a narrative history that traces its genetic development" or "a list of key convictions that seeks to capture its essential nature."[3]

Beginning with an idealist conception of evangelicalism—perhaps something akin to Bebbington's famous quadrilateral[4]—seemed like an untenable proposition for the current project, as it would seemingly necessitate an extensive prolegomena, or perhaps even an essay unto itself, to demonstrate how the three works measure up to the selected canons of evangelicalism. While there may be a place for such a project, it does not resonate with my stated interest of examining ecclesiological trends in Canadian evangelical theology, nor do I have any interest in establishing myself as gatekeeper of the evangelical tradition. Such an approach also seems to pose the distinct danger that it will introduce a degree of unhelpful, or even vicious, circularity into the investigation. If a work must measure up in advance to an essentialist construal of evangelicalism in order to count as an exemplar of evangelical theology, then there is a good chance that what one discovers in the works will have been already determined at the outset by the criteria one has employed. In the desire to avoid these methodological quagmires, and out

3 Kimlyn J. Bender, "The Church in Karl Barth and Evangelicalism: Conversations across the Aisle," in *Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism*, ed. Bruce L. McCormack and Clifford B. Anderson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 180. For a hybrid model that attempts to bring together both streams, see Timothy Larsen, "Defining and Locating Evangelicalism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Evangelical Theology*, ed. Timothy Larsen and Daniel J. Treier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–14.

4 David W. Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 1–19.

of the recognition that evangelicalism is not a disincarnate set of ideas but first and foremost a movement,[5] I have opted to classify these works as representatives of evangelical theology on the basis of the authors' situatedness within the evangelical movement in Canada as represented by their involvement with significant Canadian evangelical academic institutions.

While Franklin is the only one who explicitly identifies himself as standing within the evangelical tradition (11),[6] there is little doubt that each of their academic institutional pedigrees are distinctly evangelical. All three works under consideration emerged from doctoral dissertations written at Canadian schools associated with the evangelical tradition. All three theologians teach or have taught at self-identified "evangelical" educational institutions in Canada. All three of the authors stand in some sort of relation to the Canadian-American Theological Association (formerly the Canadian Evangelical Theological Association), having published articles in *Canadian-American Theological Review* (or its predecessor *Canadian Theological Review*) or presented papers at CATA sponsored conferences.[7] These sets of institutional relationships, of course, are no guarantee that the theological content of the books is distinctly evangelical. However, they do seem to provide a reasonable warrant for placing these works of theology within the orbit of the evangelical movement in Canada.

In what follows, I will provide an orientation to each book before drawing a few tentative conclusions about some potential trajectories in Canadian evangelical ecclesiology that have surfaced in these works.

Anthony Siegrist's *Participating Witness*

The origins of *Participating Witness: An Anabaptist Theology of Baptism and the Sacramental Character of the Church* can be traced to Anthony Siegrist's doctoral dissertation written at Wycliffe College at the University of Toronto under the supervision of Joseph Mangina. Following his doctoral work, Siegrist served as Assistant Professor of Theology at Prairie Bible College in Three Hills, Alberta. He is

5 This is not to deny the importance of the ideational, only to stress its socially embodied character. Bender strikes a fine balance when he describes evangelicalism as "a movement that coalesced around a set of convictions and issues shared across communions and denominations" ("The Church in Karl Barth and Evangelicalism," 182).

6 However, Pedlar does reveal in a parenthetical remark on p. 1 of his book that he has a Salvationist heritage.

7 James E. Pedlar, "'His Mercy Is Over All His Works': John Wesley's Mature Vision of New Creation," *Canadian Theological Review* 2.2 (2013): 45–56; Anthony G. Siegrist, "Moral Formation and Christian Doctrine: 'The Conjunction against Which We Must Now Struggle,'" *Canadian Theological Review* 2.2 (2013): 70–82; Patrick S. Franklin, "Understanding the Beginning in Light of the End: Eschatological Reflections on Making Theological Sense of Evolution," paper presented at the Canadian Evangelical Theological Association meeting, Rochester, NY, October 19, 2013; "The God Who Sends is The God Who Loves: Mission as Participating in the Ecstatic Love of the Triune God," paper presented at the Canadian Evangelical Theological Association meeting, Rochester, NY, March, 2016.

currently the Lead Minister of Ottawa Mennonite Church. *Participating Witness* is a work of confessional theology rooted in the Anabaptist tradition which argues for the importance of recovering a sacramental understanding of believer's baptism for the sake of supporting a robust conception of the nature and mission of the church.

Siegrist begins by observing that the practice of baptism has fallen into confusion and neglect within the Anabaptist tradition, with the result that children are now routinely baptized. Siegrist suggests this development is symptomatic of theological confusion brought about by the uncritical adoption of the pietistic sensibilities of revivalism by Anabaptist communities. Turning to the confessional statements of five contemporary North American Anabaptist denominations, Siegrist discovers two broad, common features that leave the practice of baptism vulnerable to redefinition in pietist or even spiritualist terms. "First," Siegrist observes, "baptism, a practice central to the Anabaptist tradition, is presented as theologically non-essential to the Christian life" (23). "The second common feature," he observes, "is that the visible church, another central aspect of the Anabaptist tradition, exists in a sort of second class relationship to the individual believer's relationship with God" (24). This eclipse of the church and erosion of the practice of baptism becomes the backdrop for his constructive argument.

Siegrist begins to lay out his case for a theological understanding of baptism as a "participating witness" by observing that the idea of ecclesial mediation is not completely foreign to the Anabaptist tradition. Siegrist shows that Anabaptist confessional documents across the centuries have not shied away from "the interweaving of the actions of the church and the actions of God" when it comes to church discipline (30). However, Siegrist observes that apart from church discipline Anabaptist confessional documents tend to avoid speaking of God's activity through the church and devolve into what he terms "rational-humanist" and "spiritual-pietist" modes of speaking. Both "lack a concrete account of God's ongoing activity and presence in the world" (41) and, therefore, lack the necessary spiritual and theological resources to sustain a life of vigorous discipleship and end up feeding into a virtual semi-Pelagianism (57).[8] Siegrist suggests that Anabaptist theologians have much to learn at this point from Karl Barth, who points the way towards a robust, non-competitive account of divine and human agency, even as Siegrist acknowledges that Barth's bifurcating of Spirit and water baptism leaves something to be desired (42–50).

Siegrist then turns to a consideration of the work of the twentieth century Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the sixteenth century Anabaptist leader Pilgram Marpeck, whom he proposes provide a set of rich and complementary resources for developing a sacramental understanding of the church. In

8 John Howard Yoder comes under criticism on this score for providing a sociologically reductive account of church practices (54).

seeking to explicate the sacramental character of the church, Siegrist is not proposing that Anabaptists carefully delineate the number of rituals that could be considered to be sacraments, rather he is urging his brethren to recognize that "as the church is in Christ it constitutes the ongoing presence of God in the world in an objective though always subordinate sense" (65). The church does not mediate the presence of God in the world in a mechanical or magical way, but "only in the extent to which congregations take the form of Christ and rightly steward the memory of his ministry" (102). Siegrist's proposal for understanding baptism as a "participating witness" is properly understood, then, as the obvious outworking of his commitment to ground ecclesiology in the life of the triune God.

If the church truly is the body of Christ, what then are to make of the ecclesial divisions and even violence that consumed the church in the sixteenth century? Siegrist suggests that this original context of ecclesial persecution has resulted in a pneumatologically underdeveloped view of the church in Anabaptist contexts. The original martyrological literature, as exemplified in *The Martyr's Mirror*, tended to respond to this ecclesiological crisis by simply de-churching the violent persecutors. Siegrist suggest that such a triumphalistic narration of church history is unbecoming for followers of the crucified lamb and, furthermore, is increasingly untenable following the ecumenical developments of the twentieth century. The challenge Siegrist discerns as standing before the Anabaptist theologian is to provide "a thoroughgoing account of the church that upholds the Spirit's accompaniment of it through time while remaining conscious of its fratricidal past" (131). Siegrist suggests such an account will attend to certain key markers of the Spirit's activity in the world, which he discusses under the headings, "conversion," "unity," and "promise."

First, the persecution of the early Anabaptists at the hands of other Christians signals the dangers inherent to cheapening expectations of conversion and neglecting the Spirit's work of drawing the people of God into conformity with their crucified Lord. Second, the Spirit's work of "the unification of the believers in love" (139), opens the door to understanding the outbreaks of violence in the sixteenth century not as the Spirit's abandonment of the church but rather as the Spirit's judgment of the church, which is nothing other than the form that the Spirit's faithfulness takes when it encounters the church's unfaithfulness. This recognition should lead to a penitential, rather than trimphalistic, narration of church history—for we are all in it together. Finally, an understanding of the Spirit's role as the "promise of the fulfillment of God's reign" (143) encourages patience and relativizes the ecclesial divisions of the past by situating them in the light of the "feast of friends," the eschatological banquet to come. Understood in this way, the history of fratricide and ongoing ecclesial divisions, though deeply regrettable, need not

invalidate the claim of the Spirit's continuing faithfulness to the church upon which an understanding of baptism as "participating witness" depends.

Siegrist rounds off the book by presenting a proposal that draws upon ancient and ecumenical sources in the attempt to bring the liturgical enactment of baptism into conformity with his theologically-nuanced presentation of baptism as "participating witness." The rationale for this final chapter is actually quite simple. Namely, since "God's grace is actually at work through church *visibly* [in baptism]—then surely how it is done matters" (154). A baptismal liturgy must, therefore, encompass the vertical, horizontal, and eschatological planes so that the form of the sacrament may be congruent with the theological reality that it mediates. For in the waters of baptism the people of God do offer their testimony, but it is a testimony to the saving presence of the living Lord who is forever in their midst.

James Pedlar's *Division, Diversity, and Unity*

James Pedlar currently serves as Donald N. and Kathleen G. Bastian Chair of Wesley Studies and Associate Professor of Theology at Tyndale Seminary in Toronto. Although his PhD was ultimately awarded by St. Michael's College, Pedlar was enrolled at Wycliffe College at the University of Toronto and his book, *Division, Diversity and Unity: A Theology of Ecclesial Charisms*, is based upon the doctoral dissertation he wrote under the supervision of Wycliffe professor Ephraim Radner. *Division, Diversity, and Unity* aims to contribute to ecumenical theology through exploring how a theology of ecclesial charisms could be of use in "interpreting the conflicted history of specialized movements in the church" (235). Of particular concern to Pedlar is the way that distinctive charisms and vocations have been used by some movements as a rationale for underwriting church division. Central to Pedlar's line of inquiry is the insistence that the church is "the visible, historical people of God" (7). This conviction bars the door against a retreat into idealistic, ahistorical ecclesiologies, and necessitates the engagement in "thick" historical description of charismatic movements within the concrete, historical life of the church.

Pedlar begins his book by sketching a biblical theology of charisms for the purpose of coming to an understanding of whether and how it might be appropriate to apply the language of charisms to ecclesial bodies. Drawing upon the deployment of the term in the Pauline corpus, Pedlar fills in the traditional understanding of charisms as "*diverse gifts of grace given to the church*" (15) by emphasizing, among other things, their vocational orientation towards the upbuilding of the church, their subjection to discernment and oversight, and their interdependent character.

While a popular way of narrating the story of renewal and reforming movements has been to posit a fundamental opposition between institution and charism in the life of the church, Pedlar argues that the tension between renewal

movements and established churches is best understood "as a *tension between different types of ecclesial institutions*, both of which are charismatic" (42). The discussion that follows provides a necessary corrective to the knee-jerk anti-institutionalism that plagues much of contemporary evangelicalism. An institution, Pedlar explains, is "simply a stable pattern of social interaction" (53). Since the church is a concrete historical community existing across time, it is necessarily institutional. Charisms are always received in an institutional context and these ecclesial institutions, Pedlar writes, "exist *as means of grace* which are taken up and used by the Spirit in order that charisms might be received, discerned, cultivated, and exercised for the good of the church as a whole" (67). Through drawing upon the Wesleyan terminology of "means of grace" to discuss the character of ecclesial institutions, Pedlar hopes to avoid the twin pitfalls of a kind of "enthusiasm" that sets the charismatic in opposition to the institutional, on the one hand, and a kind on "formalism," on the other, that presumes upon God's grace by making the charismatic captive to the institutional (62).

Charisms are bestowed for the vocational purpose of building up the body of Christ. Since charismatic movements are organized around a single charism reflecting a distinctive calling (i.e., Isaac Hecker's vocation of an evangelist to America or William Booth's vocation of an evangelist to the neglected), rather than the full diversity of charisms intended to function interdependently within the church, a theology of charisms cannot be used to justify the existence of a diversity of separated churches. Pedlar argues that when a specialized vocational movement separates from the larger body of the church, the nurture and exercise of its particular charism will inevitably be hindered, as the new ecclesial body is now forced to take on all of the functions of a local church. This separation also contributes to the impoverishment of the church universal, as the larger body now lacks the full charismatic and vocational contribution of those who have left. On the other hand, remaining in communion with the larger church does not guarantee that a movement's charism will be exercised in its fullness. The exercise of the charism can be hampered, "if the charism is misapprehended by those in oversight" (119). However, in neither case does the movement cease to be part of the people of God. Reflecting the "Israel-like" ecclesiology of George Lindbeck and the typological reading of the Church's pilgrimage through time advanced by his supervisor Ephraim Radner,[9] Pedlar maintains that these movements within the church continue to bear witness to the faithfulness of God which takes the form of both judgment and mercy in the midst of his people.

According to the logic of his own argument surrounding the visible historicity

9 See, for example, George A. Lindbeck, *The Church in a Postliberal Age*, ed. James J. Buckley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); Ephraim Radner, *The End of the Church: A Pneumatology of Christian Division in the West* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).

of the church, a theology of charisms is only significant to the extent that it allows the church to make sense of the often conflicted and convoluted histories of real charismatic movements. To this end, Pedlar devotes the second half of his book to providing thick readings of the founding and histories of the Paulist Fathers and Salvation Army. These two movements prove to be congenial subjects for study, as their founders, Isaac Hecker and William Booth, shared similar evangelistic charisms. However, the shape of their respective histories allows the two movements to stand as case studies of a misapprehended movement (the Paulists) and a separated ecclesial movement (the Salvation Army). While Pedlar's detailed reading of the histories of these movements succeeds in demonstrating the usefulness of his theology of charisms and is fascinating in its own right, I can do little more in this context than commend it to the reader.

Pedlar's theology of charisms allows for the recognition of the divine impetus in birthing charismatic movements without that divine mandate serving as a blank cheque that can be used to underwrite all aspects of the movement's existence. As a result, movements must carefully attend to the identity of their charism and churches must be open to recognizing the bestowal of new charisms. Furthermore, all must be willing to repent wherever sinful misappropriation of charisms have contributed to the rending of the body of Christ. Pedlar, therefore, concludes his study by reasserting that "the only kind of diversity that is justified by an appeal to ecclesial charisms is *vocational* diversity" (250). Pedlar's work urges us to remember that the Lord has graciously bestowed charisms upon the church for its strengthening, not its destruction.

Patrick Franklin's *Being Human, Being Church*

Patrick Franklin's *Being Human, Being Church: The Significance of Theological Anthropology for Ecclesiology* is a work of systematic theology that makes frequent forays into theological ethics and spiritual theology. The book is based upon the doctoral dissertation Franklin wrote at McMaster Divinity College under the supervision of James C. Peterson. At the time of publication, Franklin served on the faculty at Providence Theological Seminary in Otterburne, Manitoba. He now serves as Associate Professor of Theology at Tyndale Seminary in Toronto.

Franklin's project is grounded in the conviction that how one conceives of the human person informs how one understands Christian community.[10] This

10 At this point, one could ask whether the ordering of the doctrines of anthropology and ecclesiology should be reversed, as it is from the experience of the reconstituted humanity in Christ made present in the church through the Spirit that we are granted an understanding of the human person. Bonhoeffer seems to signal in such a direction when he suggests that it would be good if systematic theology were to begin with the doctrine of the church. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of Sociology of the Church,* ed. Clifford J Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens, vol. 1, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress,

conviction is accompanied by the concern that contemporary church life is being shaped, perhaps unwittingly, by distinctly untheological anthropologies. In Part I of his book, Franklin lays out the challenge of the "anthropological agnosticism" that stands before the church today (16). He observes that confusion about what it means to be human has contributed to the cultural erosion of the foundations for community and human rights. Franklin suggests the various anthropologies on offer in Western culture present problems in that they are inevitably reductionist and lead to polarization and false dualisms. Franklin concludes the first part of the book by providing a brief, but highly suggestive account of how these competing anthropological types have influenced contemporary churches and movements.[11]

In Part II, Franklin develops his constructive theological anthropology. Franklin draws upon the three historically prominent ways of understanding the *imago Dei* within the Christian theological tradition—namely, the *imago Dei* as relational reality, rational capacity, and vocation—as the organizing motifs for chapters 3–5. Reflecting the systematic character of the work, Franklin situates the anthropology of each chapter in a Trinitarian framework, associated with a specific theological virtue, a characteristic understanding of sin, and a particular understanding of the human telos, as represented in the table below.[12]

Table 1: Summary of "Part II: Theological Anthropology in Trinitarian Perspective" in Frankin's *Being Human: Being Church*

Human Person as:	**Relational**	**Rational**	**Eschatological**
Trinitarian Basis:	Ecstatic Communion	Divine Conversation	*missio Dei*
Constitutive Virtue:	Love	Faith	Hope
Sin as:	Alienation	Falsehood	Rebellion
Teleological Orientation:	Communion	Wisdom	Vocation

Arguing that the relational interpretation takes theological precedence, Franklin begins his constructive anthropology by considering the human person as a relational creature constituted by the love of the triune God. The second strand of Franklin's threefold anthropological cord can be summarized by his assertion that:

1998), 134. Franklin, for his part, does acknowledge the dialogical character of the relationship between anthropology and ecclesiology, even as he remains committed to his ordering (9).

11 For example, he partners social contract anthropologies with attractional church models, and existentialism with the emerging church (78).

12 The ordering of the loci within such a systematized presentation of the Christian faith is always open to debate. While things could be organized in a different fashion, Franklin's presentation does display its own winsome, inner logic.

"Human beings are rational creatures whom God invites to participate in the divine *conversation* of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by drawing them to share in the wisdom and *Logos* of God" (111). In the fifth and final chapter of this part of the book, Franklin argues that "human beings are eschatological creatures, invited to participate in the divine *commission* or vocation by sharing in the reign of God" (144).

In the third part of his book, Franklin utilizes the theological anthropology developed in Part II as a hermeneutical lens for considering the church as the new humanity. Reflecting the organization of the anthropological chapters, Franklin treats the church as relational communities of love, rational communities of faith, and eschatological communities of hope. Each chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, Franklin explores the inner community life of the church by elucidating an ecclesiological metaphor for each chapter and discussing distinctive ministries and formational practices associated with the chapter's theme. The second section of each chapter presents a discussion of the church's engagement with the world organized around the church's participation in one facet of Christ's own ministry, a suggestive Christological model for this engagement, and a discussion of appropriate means of engagement. Following this organizational structure, the contents of chapters 6–8 can be depicted in table form as follows.

Table 2: Summary of "Part III: The Church as Communities of the New Humanity" in Franklin's *Being Human, Being Church*

Church as:	**Relational Communities of Love**	**Rational Communities of Faith**	**Eschatological Communities of Hope**
Ecclesiological Metaphor:	Body of Christ	People of God	Temple of Holy Spirit
Ministries & Practices:	Reconciliation Mutual edification Bearing burdens	Theological formation	Kingdom character formation
Participating in Christ's Ministry:	Priestly (Ambassadors)	Prophetic (Witnesses)	Kingly (Heralds)
Engagement Model:	Cross	Incarnation	Resurrection
Means of Engagement:	Discerning God at work Sharing burdens of local community Partnerships	Finding common ground Affirming whatever is beautiful, true, & good	Undergoing continual reformation Advocacy Planting mustard seeds

Franklin's understanding of the church as God's new humanity being formed by the Spirit to reflect the image of Christ, on display in the third part of the book and in the concluding chapter, allows him to overcome the dualisms which often plague contemporary church life. Both the inward aspect of the church's life together and the outward aspect of its engagement with the world are seen, in Franklin's presentation, to coinhere in the believer's union with Christ and correspondingly flow from the church's participation in the life of the triune God. Franklin suggests this understanding stands as a corrective to the ambiguity surrounding ecclesial significance in various evangelical understandings, because the church is then properly seen "not just as an instrumental means or an external aid to salvation but is itself a dimension of the salvific experience" (268). Franklin also suggests that his grounding of the church in the love and ecstatic character of God provides a necessary revision to the functionalism endemic to some missional understandings of the church (277–81). "Being missional," Franklin suggests, "means being a church that exists for others, not merely in the sense of being outward-focused or outreach-driven, but more foundationally in the sense of being *essentially* a relational, ecstatic entity" (283). It is in the church that we discover our true humanity.

Conclusion

Before venturing some concluding thoughts on the ecclesiological themes emerging from these works, it seems appropriate to briefly reflect upon how the Canadian context may have influenced their production. On the surface, it appears that the Canadian context made very little difference, as there are few explicit references to Canada in any of the books.[13] Now, I suppose it could be argued that the refusal to attribute any significance to Canada is in itself a characteristically Canadian thing to do. However, I am inclined to take it as evidence that all three theologians recognize that Canada, or any nation-state for that matter, is not properly a theological category. While Canada may not be a doctrinal loci, it is important to reflect theologically upon the cultural realities of the Canadian context. Franklin acknowledges this reality at the very end of his book, when he warns readers, "Neither the United States nor England can provide settled models for the work of the church in Canada."[14]

While Canada may not be an explicit topic of discussion, the influence of the Canadian context upon the authors may perhaps be evident in other ways, which include the frequent engagement with theologians working in Canada and the

13 Siegrist's reading of Anabaptist Confessional Statements does include the statements from two Canadian denominations. Franklin includes a brief discussion of Brian Stiller's advice surrounding Christian political engagement in Canada found in his book *From the Tower of Babel to Parliament Hill*.

14 Franklin, *Being Human, Being Church*, 283.

deeply ecumenical character of each book.[15] While perhaps borne of conviction, this ecumenism is also reinforced by the current Canadian cultural realities. To put it simply, theologians in a relatively sparsely populated, geographically expansive country like Canada, increasingly confronted by the realities of an emerging post-Christendom culture, simply do not have the luxury of shutting themselves up in the type of theological siloes that often characterize evangelical theological discourse in the United States. Canadian evangelical theology is ecumenical by conviction *and* by necessity.

With respect to emerging ecclesiological themes, we could say at the most basic level that all three authors are united by the fundamental conviction that the church matters and as a result they are deeply concerned about church matters. Contra the Gnosticizing impulse that has characterized much of modern Protestantism,[16] exhibited perhaps most prominently in the spiritualizing and individualistic construals of the Christian faith present in popular forms of evangelicalism, each author emphasizes that salvation is a social reality, materially-embodied in the life of the church. Theologians can ill afford to ignore the concrete form that the church's life has taken over the course of its earthly pilgrimage. The embodied life of the church across time must be carefully attended to because it is the field in which God's promise to his people has played out in the form of the Spirit's faithful presence to the church in the midst of the church's faithfulness *and* unfaithfulness. This investment in providing a theological reading of history, along with the concomitant interest in visible unity, is perhaps more prevalent in the two works emerging from Wycliffe, however Franklin's commitment to understanding the church as a traditioned-community suggests potential openness to moving in this direction.

Recovering a theological understanding of the church as the field of the Spirit's activity in space and time could very well serve as a healing balm for evangelical pastors and church leaders who have been crushed under the weight of constantly having to make the church up from scratch, as a result of their immersion in the untheological, pragmatic assumptions which often dominate evangelical sub-culture.[17] Recognizing that the church is a gift to be received sets pastors and

15 Canadian-based interlocutors include: Jeremy Bergen, Joseph Mangina, James Reimer (Siegrist), Gregory Baum, Margaret O'Gara, Ephraim Radner (Pedlar); Stanley Grenz, J.I. Packer, Clark Pinnock, Steve Studebaker, Jens Zimmerman (Franklin).

16 See, for example, Philip J. Lee, *Against the Protestant Gnostics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Harold Bloom, *The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); David S. Yeago, "Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology: Reflections on the Costs of a Construal," *Pro Ecclesia* 2.1 (1993): 37–49.

17 For a couple of insightful works that take on some of these assumptions from different angles, see Andrew Root, *Faith Formation in a Secular Age: Responding to the Church's Obsession with Youthfulness* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), and Philip D. Kenneson and James L. Street, *Selling Out the Church: The Dangers of Church Marketing* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997; reprint, Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2003).

congregational leaders free for genuine ministry as they are liberated from the impossible task of re-creating the church *de novo* in response to ever-changing consumer tastes and preferences. A theologically discerning reception of the tradition also serves as a form of inoculation against the cultural captivity which so often seems to manifest itself in terms of conceiving the church in purely functionalist terms. When evangelicalism loses its connection to the Great Tradition, which is always mediated by a particular socio-historical tradition, some ideology inevitably rushes in to fill the void. In this regard, it could perhaps be argued that while "evangelical" makes for an indispensable adjective, "Evangelical" is a potentially disastrous stand-alone noun.

Interestingly, the shared evangelical concern to recover a truly theological account of the church as the loci of God's saving activity in Christ through the Spirit leads each of the authors to press for the recovery of a sacramental understanding of baptism and Eucharist. This is on most obvious display in Siegrist's work, as indicated by the book's title that points to the centrality of his concern to recover a sacramental understanding of baptism as a "participating witness." However, Franklin and Pedlar also advance similar interests through introducing the term "sacramental ordinances" and making recourse to the Wesleyan terminology of "means of grace," respectively. For all three, the sacraments cannot be understood in isolation, but rather must be situated within the larger sacramentality of the church, which is the result of the church's participation in the life of the triune God. The language of participation also points to a shared interest in recovering a non-competitive account of divine and human agency. Affirming the church as a genuinely theological reality in no way diminishes human freedom or responsibility for each of the authors. Rather, God's gracious initiative in drawing women and men through the Spirit into conformity with the Son can be understood as the basis and goal of human freedom.

The church is, for all three authors, in a very real sense intrinsic to the Gospel. The church's mission flows from its identity. For the sake of that mission, each theologian is uniquely interested in the continuing reformation of the church, but that reformation is ultimately inseparable from the recovery of the church's true catholicity. Perhaps then there is an emerging consensus in alignment with the evangelical theologian Donald Bloesch's assertion that "a true Evangelicalism is at one with a true Catholicism."[18] The recent publication of "A Reforming Catholic Confession" by an ecumenical collection of Protestant theologians—many of them evangelical—to mark the five hundredth anniversary of Luther's posting of the ninety-five theses suggests that Bloesch's conviction is becoming increasingly

18 Donald G. Bloesch, *Essential of Evangelical Theology*, vol. 1, *God, Authority, & Salvation* (Peabody, MA: Prince, 1998), 12.

shared.[19] Reflecting a similar spirit, Ephraim Radner has intriguingly suggested that we may be witnessing the rise of "naked Christianity," as Christians across historic confessional divides come to recognize the significance of their common baptism into Christ in the face of the increasingly powerful constellation of cultural forces hostile to the faith.[20] Such "mere Protestantism" or "naked Christianity" must not be confused with the empty evangelicalism criticized earlier.[21] Rather, it points to the only true and enduring catholicity, identifiable through the recognition that the source, ground, and goal of the church's life is found in the triune God of the gospel alone. To the extent that these three works contribute to this "evangelical" end, may they receive a broad and deep reception.

19 "A Reforming Catholic Confession," A Reforming Catholic Confession, accessed February 23, 2018, https://reformingcatholicconfession.com/.

20 Ephraim Radner, "The Naked Christian: Baptism and the Broken Body of Christ," *Pro Ecclesia* 26.1 (2017): 25–42.

21 The authors of "A Reforming Catholic Confession" describe themselves as "mere Protestants." One of the co-chairs of the drafting committee, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, makes an impassioned plea for the recovery of a "mere Protestantism" in his book, *Biblical Authority after Babel: Retrieving the* Solas *in the Spirit of Mere Protestant Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2016).

The Church as Necessary and Necessarily Derivative: The Gospel and Evangelical Ecclesiology[1]

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Abstract

In recent years the increase among evangelicals who are interested in ecclesiology is noteworthy. Despite this increase in scholarly activity and interest, there is still a lot of confusion around the diversity of options. Is there such a thing as an "evangelical ecclesiology?" Adding to this confusion is the growing realization that younger evangelicals are leaving evangelical churches at an increased rate. This article aims to explore the theological roots of the evangelical exodus of the younger generation in two disparate directions. While some evangelicals have joined the "SBNR" cohort of North Americans, others are seeking higher ground in the Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox Church. Examining the 19th century thinkers of Charles Hodge and John Williamson Nevin, this article will show the inherent ecclesiological diversity that is coming to full bloom in the 21st century. Using Ephesians 1 as a starting place, this exploration will provide a rationale for the exodus of younger evangelicals, while also arguing that the singularity of an evangelical ecclesiology is a chimera. Finally, it will close with a preliminary proposal for an evangelical ecclesiology that attempts to hold the best of these two ecclesiological proposals in tension, affirming the church as both *necessary* and *necessarily derivative.*

God put this power to work in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above

1 This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the interdisciplinary theology conference, "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, held at Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017.

> *every name that is named, not only in this age but also in the age to come. And he has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.* —Ephesians 1:20–23

Young evangelicals are leaving their churches.[2] Gone are the days when evangelical Christians could scoff at the drastic decline in membership of their mainline brothers and sisters and not-so-humbly reference their growing number among the various flavours of evangelicalism. Why this evangelical growth trajectory has stalled or declined, however, is not so clear. Among other sources for the stagnation are two evident ones: first, there has been a marked increase of young evangelicals who have left the institutional church altogether and now identify as Spiritual But Not Religious (SBNR);[3] second, and to a lesser extent numerically, there has been an uptick in evangelicals that have found ecclesial homes in Rome, Constantinople, and Canterbury.[4] If we were to lay these two options out simply, we might identify those who "love Jesus" but find no rationale, value, or salvific compulsion to "go to church" and, on the other end of the spectrum, those who find the ecclesial thinness of the evangelical world unable to correspond adequately to the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church in the Nicene Creed. According to the former, to make a claim that the church is *necessary* is dangerously close to *Churchianity* and, for the latter, to make a claim that the

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2 Barna Group, "The State of the Church 2016," *Barna Group*, September 15, 2016, https://www.barna.com/research/state-church-2016/. Barna's emphasis on the exodus of the millennial generation is noteworthy, if not surprising. See also the most recent Pew Research Center data at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/06/more-americans-now-say-theyre-spiritual-but-not-religious/; and, further, the recent results of the Public Religion Research Institute, where the decline in "white evangelicals" is particularly noteworthy: https://www.prri.org/research/american-religious-landscape-christian-religiously-unaffiliated/.

3 Whether or not there is overlap between the SBNR and the so-called "nones" is debatable. At the very least the ambiguity highlights the complete lack of institutional (ecclesial and otherwise) attachment. For the recent uptick in those millennials who identify with the "nones," see James Emery White, *The Rise of the Nones: Understanding and Reaching the Religiously Unaffiliated* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014); Ed Stetzer, "The Rise of the Evangelical 'Nones,'" *CNN*, June 12, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/12/living/stetzer-christian-nones/index.html. See also the most recent Pew Research Center data on the rapid rise of the SBNR subset http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/06/more-americans-now-say-theyre-spiritual-but-not-religious/

4 This is not to say that Roman Catholics, Orthodox, and Anglican Christians cannot or should not also identify as "evangelicals." Nevertheless, the point being made is the ecclesial identity among these evangelical emigrants—often self-referentially called "post-evangelicals"—is that something is either amiss or lacking (or both!) in their former churchly residence. For the book that some have suggested started this trend away from evangelicalism and toward "higher" options, see Thomas Howard, *Evangelical Is Not Enough: Worship of God in Liturgy and Sacrament* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1984). For more recent offerings, see Christian Smith, *How to Go from Being a Good Evangelical to a Committed Catholic in Ninety-Five Difficult Steps* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011); Douglas M. Beaumont, *Evangelical Exodus: Evangelical Seminarians and Their Paths to Rome* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2016). Cf. Mark Galli, *Beyond Smells And Bells* (Brewster, MA: Paraclete, 2008).

church is *derivative* of some more basic gospel is to miss the logic of the gospel itself.[5]

What if, however, the logic of the evangelical faith was intended to hold these two extremes in tension rather than falling too one side or the other? What if we could affirm the necessity of the church within the logic of the gospel, while also maintaining its necessarily derivative character at the same time? And why are these the seemingly default options within the evangelical world anyway? In order to examine these questions, we will narrow our focus by beginning with one New Testament text and two distinct ways in which evangelicals have interpreted this text ecclesiologically. The portion of Scripture to be our launching pad is taken from Paul's prayer at the beginning of his epistle to the Ephesian church. Specifically, 1:23: "And he has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all." In what follows, I will use the work of two eminent 19th century evangelical theologians as prototypical thinkers of the two interpretations of the church outlined above: Charles Hodge and John Williamson Nevin.

Hodge and Nevin were not only contemporaries but had a lifelong correspondence over various theological issues, the most well-known is their debate over the Lord's Supper, a debate that flows from their more basic ecclesiological differences.[6] Our historical distance from these theologians offers us better perspective on their proposals and their enduring legacies show that they have staying power in the realm of evangelicalism. In short, I propose that Hodge and Nevin are representative thinkers not simply for 19th century evangelicals, but that the divergence in their ecclesiology, as demonstrated in their explication of Eph 1:20–23, sheds light on the current exodus from evangelicalism by the SBNR and those on the road to Rome, Constantinople, and Canterbury.

My intention in this article is not to denigrate either group of evangelicals who have left. In fact, I believe they have, in many ways, followed the logic of their own sub-tradition of evangelicalism to its proper *telos*. Yet, my conclusion will offer a scripturally and theologically coherent alternative that attempts to uphold the best of these two theological alternatives in tension while avoiding their extremes.

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5 The portmanteau *Churchianity* will be explained further below, but is relatively self-explanatory in its proposal that the Church is prioritized over (and perhaps against) the centrality of Christ in the gospel.

6 The core of the dispute is found in the following: John Williamson Nevin, *The Mystical Presence: A Vindication of the Reformed or Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1846); Charles Hodge, "Review: The Mystical Presence. A Vindication of the Reformed or Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. By the Rev. John W. Nevin," *Princeton Review* 20.2 (1848): 227–78; reprinted in *The Book Reviews of Charles Hodge* (Logos Bible Software, 2014). For a recent republication with helpful commentary, see John Williamson Nevin and Charles Hodge, *Coena Mystica: Debating Reformed Eucharistic Theology*, ed. Linden J DeBie, vol. 2, Mercersburg Theology Study Series (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013).

Charles Hodge and Ephesians 1

Much has been made of the usage of Rom 5 in Hodge's covenantal theology as undergirding his entire soteriological schema.[7] Even when Hodge was unpacking Ephesians it is clear that the twofold headship of Adam and Christ in Rom 5 is lurking in the background. This idea of the representational headship of Christ for the elect who have been justified was of primary importance to his theological framework. Yet, as one explores Hodge's writings, it becomes increasingly clear that while Christ's headship dominated his soteriological understanding it was only given lip-service within his ecclesiology.[8] For Hodge, there was a real difference, if not utter distinction, between soteriology and ecclesiology.

The first and perhaps most telling way this divorce between soteriology and ecclesiology was evinced is in how Hodge concluded his interpretation of Eph 1:22–23. In a surprising move—though perhaps heavily influenced by Calvin's interpretation—Hodge understands the *plērōma* (πλήρωμα) in v. 23 in an active sense, as the Church *filling* Christ.[9] That is, he read "the fullness of him who fills all in all" as the Church being the fullness of Christ.[10] Still, he is careful to avoid Calvin's slippery language of Christ being, in some measure, *imperfect* until he is completed with the joining of his body. And here is where Hodge begins to explicate this Scripture in a rather unique manner by reading the Spirit into the passage. He writes, "It is the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, that constitutes the church his body. And, therefore, those only in whom the Spirit dwells are constituent members of the true church."[11] In other words, the Church, as the body of Christ, is able to *fill* Christ because it is, in reality, the Spirit that makes-up the body itself. There is a clear pneumatological shift that occurs in Hodge's exposition of the text

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7 For Hodge's expositional work on Romans, see: Charles Hodge, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1882). See also David H. Kelsey, "Charles Hodge as Interpreter of Scripture," in *Charles Hodge Revisited: A Critical Appraisal of His Life and Work*, ed. John W Stewart and James H Moorhead (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).

8 Holifield, in a comparison of Hodge and Nevin's ecclesiology, lends support to this point: "Nevin and Hodge were not divided over mere questions of polity and organization; their conflict was deeper. . . . Whereas Nevin's ecclesiology was based on his Christology, Hodge's doctrine of the Church rested on soteriology." E. Brooks Holifield, "Mercersburg, Princeton, and the South: The Sacramental Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Presbyterian History* 54.2 (1976): 249.

9 John Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians*, trans. William Pringle (Grand Rapids: CCEL), 177. Calvin comments on v. 23: "This is the highest honor of the Church, that, until He is united to us, the Son of God reckons himself in some measure imperfect. What consolation is it for us to learn, that, not until we are along with him, does he possess all his parts, or wish to be regarded as complete!"

10 This is not out of ignorance of the options either. Hodge lays out the two most prominent options of interpretation, notes that there is contestation among the scholars as to the preference, even admits that both could be Scripturally coherent, and then chooses the active sense because he believes it fits better with the "New Testament usage of the word πλήρωμα" (89).

11 Charles Hodge, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1856), 87.

that cannot easily be supported by its Christological focus. The pneumatological shift in emphasis was not simply a move beyond or away from the Christological explanation, but it also brought into relief the anthropocentrism of Hodge's ecclesial vision.

Let us unpack this further. Hodge's interpretation of this passage in Ephesians accomplished two things within his theological project. First, it protected the asymmetry and irreversibility within the Christ–Church relationship. The Church in no way completed Christ when it *filled* him with the Spirit; rather, Christ existed as a figurehead but remained materially separate from the Church. Building again from Rom 5, this reading was consistent with Hodge's soteriological vision of the federal relationship between Christ and the ones saved in forensic or judicial terms, as sinners declared to be righteous, but not sharing in an imparted righteousness.[12] Second, Hodge's ecclesiology emphasized the spiritual nature of the Church as the body enlivened (or constituted) by the Spirit of Christ, despite the head being materially detached. In this way, Hodge avoided both the need to articulate how the *humanity* of the incarnate Christ "fills" the Body which is His Church or how the *humanity* of the Church's members *filled* Christ as the head.[13]

The risk for Hodge in this biblical exegesis was that he ended up advocating for a theological dualism where the Church appeared to manifest itself as something like a decapitated ghost: a body enlivened by the Spirit with a Head that is all but severed from its host (despite the Spirit's *filling*).[14] This risk appeared to be a conscious and worthwhile one for Hodge, who was more concerned about the theological consequences of what his interpretation avoided: a substantial or material exchange of divinity and humanity between Christ and his Body, which potentially travelled in both directions. His primary concern was to avoid any theological configuration in which the Church was made to be "filling" Christ beyond a purely pneumatological exchange, for this would imply that without the Church, Christ was somehow lacking or deficient.

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12 Aubert's study of Hodge and Gerhart is very helpful in disentangling the finer points of this distinction between the two soteriological schemas: Annette G. Aubert, *The German Roots of Nineteenth-Century American Theology*, 2013.

13 This is, in many ways, what was at the root of the debate between Hodge and Nevin surrounding the Lord's Supper. For more recent secondary treatments of the debate, see Linden J. DeBie and W. Bradford Littlejohn, "Reformed Eucharistic Theology and the Case for Real Presence," Theology Today 71.4 (2015); Adam S. Borneman, *Church, Sacrament, and American Democracy,* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011); Arie J. Griffioen, "Nevin on the Lord's Supper," in *Reformed Confessionalism in Nineteenth-Century America: Essays on the Thought of John Williamson Nevin,* ed. Sam Hamstra and Arie J. Griffioen (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow; American Theological Library Association, 1995).

14 Deifell puts it this way, "It seems however that for Hodge the Church is the Body of the Spirit *attached* to its Head": J. J. Deifell, "The Ecclesiology of Charles Hodge" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Edinburgh, 1968), 392.

Hodge's Spiritual Body

One of Hodge's favourite axioms, used often as a quick riposte to his "ritualist" detractors, was a reworking of an Irenaeus quote from *Against Heresies*.[15] While Irenaeus wrote, "*Ubi enim Ecclesia, ibi et Spiritus Dei; ubi Spiritus Dei, illic Ecclesia et omnis gratia: Spiritus autem veritas*" (III.24.1), Hodge chose to restate only the middle affirmation, "*Ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi ecclesia*," claiming that it was the banner of the early evangelical fathers which "now waves over all evangelical Christendom."[16] Hodge's selective repurposing of Irenaeus was deliberate. While the Bishop of Lyon was joining the Spirit and the Church together in a reciprocal relationship so that they could not be pulled asunder by false teachers, Hodge utilized the Holy Spirit as the material condition of the Church: *if* Spirit *then* Church (Spirit → Church). The implication was that the logic could not be reversed in Hodge's construction as it was in Irenaeus.[17] After all, claimed Hodge, "the Spirit makes the Church, as the soul makes the man" and "where the soul is, there the body is." However, if there was a body without a soul it would be "a lifeless corpse . . . a dead man."[18]

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15 Hodge's catchy description of such "ritualists" was: "Popes and Prelatists, Patriarchs and Priests." Charles Hodge, "Presbyterianism (1860)," in *The Church and Its Polity*, ed. William Durant and Archibald Alexander Hodge (London; New York: T. Nelson, 1879), 120.

16 Hodge, "Presbyterianism (1860)," 120; Hodge, "Theories of the Church (1846)," in Durant and Hodge, eds., *Church and Its Polity*, 52. For "*Ubi Spiritus Sanctus ibi* Ecclesia" see Hodge, "Principles of Church Union (1865)," in Durant and Hodge, eds., *Church and Its Polity*, 97. In his May 30, 1979 General Audience address, Pope John Paul II translated the Irenaeus quote in full: "Where the Church is, there is also the Spirit of God; and where the spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace: the Spirit is truth." See https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_19790530.html (accessed May 16, 2016).

It is no surprise that Hodge makes no mention of another patristic formulation by Ignatius in chapter 8 of his Ignatius, "Epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans": ωσπερ οπου αν η Χριστος Ιησους, εκει η καθολικη εκκλησια. It is noteworthy that in a recent book promoting an evangelical ecclesiology, the quote is Latinized and the καθολικη is omitted, despite it being the earliest known usage: *Ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia*; see Miroslav Volf, *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 136. It is surprising that like Hodge, as far as I can find, Nevin makes no use of the Ignatian christological formulation either. The surrounding references to the presence of an επισκοπου (bishop) may be the reason he avoided the reference. Nevin does reference the letter, but only chapter 7, not chapter 8; cf. Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 131.

17 The logic of this material condition is premised on the assumption by Hodge that the opposite construction (Church → Spirit) refers to the visible Church. Hodge would, hypothetically at least, be comfortable with the formulation "True Church → Spirit", if the "True Church" was explicitly equated with the invisible (Spiritual) Church, thus creating a tautology. Another consequence of Hodge employing this dictum has to do with him answering a *what* question with a *where* answer. We know what the Church is by identifying where the Church is (the Church *is where* the Spirit indwells believers). This brings to the fore the issue of whether questions of ecclesial nature are largely subterfuges for the more fundamental act of pointing to *who* or *where* the Church is. This question of *where* or *who* will be delayed until the next section, but it must be noted here that it seems to lurk in the background of every discussion of *what* the Church is.

18 Hodge, "Presbyterianism (1860)," 120. Hodge's clearest summary statement comes a page later: "[Where] it was stated that the indwelling of the Spirit constitutes the Church, so that where the Spirit is, there the Church is" (121).

It must be noted how influential the pneumatological priority of the Church was for Hodge on the democratization and individualization of the Church.[19] The Church was not a Spirit-filled structure, but a collection of Spirit-filled individuals. As he concludes in his reflections on Eph 1 in his commentary, "The Spirit does not dwell in church officers… but in true believers, who therefore constitute that church which is the body of Christ."[20] Hodge was proud to stand with Tertullian, pronouncing, "*Ubi tres sunt, etiamsi laici, ibi ecclesia est*."[21] All that the true Church required was "sincere believers" who had a "similar spiritual union with Christ," a collection of individuals—even as few as three—with "the same Spirit dwelling in each."[22] The Spirit worked internally, invisibly, individually, and immediately in Hodge's theology, creating a pneumatological foundation for the Church that prioritized the individual and found no value in the Church structures *per se*. The Spirit "organized, animated and controlled" the Church.[23]

"Churchianity" vs. Christianity

For Hodge there was a necessary divide between the Church and salvation. The Church was simply the collective result from the individual paths of salvation which was the heart of the Christian faith.[24] The image of salvation might be represented by an electric fan, with Christ being the motor that turns the blades, the Spirit being the wind that is generated, and each individual person being a streamer tied onto the cage of the fan, which is the Church. The believer is moved by the Spirit through the benefits of Christ, the "source of its life," but is tied individually

19 It is not surprising that Hatch has only one reference to Hodge in his seminal work; see Nathan O. Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). On the surface Hodge seemed to dismiss so much of what Hatch focuses on: revivalism, new religious movements, and even full gender and racial egalitarianism. Furthermore, Hatch was right to brand him as one calling the Church back to "doctrinal rigor and confessional roots" (196). However, this was only one aspect of Hodge's ecclesiology (admittedly a vital one). What Hatch missed, or at least what goes unmentioned in his book, is the role Hodge's specific doctrinal understanding of the Church played in legitimating a democratization among staider, orderly mainline evangelicals within existing traditional denominational frameworks. Hodge and company at Princeton may not have been as radical as the New Haven New Schoolers, but they worked much more subversively, and arguably more effectively, at undermining the traditional theology of the Presbyterian structure while maintaining the outward order.

20 Hodge, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, 87–88.

21 "Where there are three, even if they are [only] faithful laypeople, there the church is": Hodge, *The Church and Its Polity*. The quote is likely reworked from the original: *Sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici* (Where there are three, there is the Church, notwithstanding they be laypersons): Tertullian, "On Exhortation to Chastity," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. S. Thelwall, vol. 4 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature, 1885), Ch. 7.3.

22 Deifell, "The Ecclesiology of Charles Hodge," 53.

23 Hodge, "Presbyterianism (1860)," 119.

24 See Kelsey, "Charles Hodge as Interpreter of Scripture," 244; Evans, *Imputation and Impartation*, 201; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 42ff.

to the cage of the fan, the frame or body of Christ.[25] No streamer is directly tied to the motor of the fan, but experiences union through the breeze that is generated by that motor—the streamers happen to move in the same direction through the working of the Spirit.

"The essential bond of union between the saints, that which gives rise to their communion, and makes them the Church or body of Christ," claimed Hodge, is not that they are "in Christ" *corporately*, but that "the indwelling of the Holy Ghost" in each of the saints individually affords them a *common* bond under which to gather together as the Church.[26] The Church is a *common* society, not a *corporate* reality.[27] Hodge's various references to the Church as a "band of witnesses,"[28] a "*coetus sanctorum*,"[29] and a "*coetus cultorum Dei*"[30] captures that distinction well by grounding itself in the federal theological imagery of a covenant between members.[31] Making the Church an ingredient in the theology of salvation was "Churchianity,"[32] according to Hodge, while in Christianity, "The individual believer gets his life by immediate union with Christ, and not through the Church."[33] His constant worry was that the Church would be made "so prominent that Christ and the truth [were] eclipsed."[34]

There was an irony in this theological concern, however. Though Hodge fretted over the eclipse of "Christ and the truth" by Churchianity, he claimed this was happening through an enlarged rather than diminished construal of Christ within the *ordo salutis*. More specifically, an ecclesiological predicament like Churchianity was only conceivable in a soteriological system that was predicated on the continuation of the incarnation—the extension of the theanthropic person of

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25 Hodge, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, 87.

26 Deifell noted that Hodge preferred the word *common* rather than *corporate* with reference to the Church because it denoted that the benefits of Christ were "experienced similarly by each and all the saints," while not connoting that the benefits somehow belonged to the communion itself. Deifell, "The Ecclesiology of Charles Hodge," 50 n. 2.

27 Here the term "corporate" is intended to connote the coordination and integration of a unified body, as in the Latin *corpus*. It is not, conversely, used in its legal definition as "of or shared by all the members of a group," which is much closer to "common."

28 Hodge, "Presbyterianism (1860)," 120.

29 Hodge, "Idea of the Church (1853)," in *The Church and Its Polity*, 18, 22; Hodge, "Visibility of the Church (1853)," in *The Church and Its Polity*, 55; Hodge, "The Church of England and Presbyterian Orders (1854)," in *The Church and Its Polity*, 137.

30 Hodge, "Church Officers (1846)," in *The Church and Its Polity*, 245.

31 Later in his career, Hodge takes up the catchy title of "band of brethren" for a short form of the Church. See for instance Hodge, "The Unity of the Church Based on Personal Union with Christ," in *History, Essays, Orations, and Other Documents of the Sixth General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance Held in New York, October 2-12, 1873*, by Philip Schaff and Samuel Irenus Prime (Ann Arbor, MI: Making of America, 2000), 142.

32 This is a term he borrows from Dr. [Samuel] Parr, who used it against the "ritualist" school of the Tractarians; see Hodge, "Theories of the Church (1846)," 48. A correlate theological term would be "intrincisist ecclesiology."

33 Hodge, "History of the Apostolic Church," 49.

34 Hodge, *The Church and Its Polity*, 48.

Christ—in and through the visible, historical church.[35] Hodge was concerned, and here is the irony, that Christ would be obscured by a Church that was an extended embodiment of Christ himself.

Nevin accused Hodge's Christ of being "a Nestorian Christ; in whose constitution, the new creation becomes at best, after the similitude of Peter's vision, a great sheet-like vessel, knit at the four corners, and let down to the earth, only to be received up again soon after into heaven."[36] This is what Nevin began calling an "avatar" Christ, claiming it was being proclaimed by many evangelical theologians.[37] Hodge's thin Christology, according to Nevin, resulted in a view of humanity as a "vast sand heap" (a pile of individual grains of sand), where the Church is constituted by a "fiat" of the Holy Spirit. This divine decree introduced a new creation into the world that lacked communality, belonging only "in an immediate and exclusive way, to each single believer for himself."[38]

Hodge was not, however, without ammunition in his counter-attacks on Nevin and the so-called ritualists. He perceptibly saw the direction that Churchianity could lead. Ultimately, for Hodge, if the Church's "supernatural power" is gained by virtue of being a "continuation of the incarnation," then it imbues the officers, sacraments, and structures with an "objective efficiency," something his pneumatological conception of the Church deemed untenable.[39] His response was to look to the cross first, as the source of the benefits of Christ gained by the individual saint. The theological logic comes full circle to Rom 5:

> For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more surely, having been reconciled, will we be saved by his life. But more than that, we even boast in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation. (vv. 10–11)[40]

Those reconciled were also those in whom the Spirit dwelt, and when they gathered together as the Scriptures claimed the Lord had implored them to do, therein lay the Church, argued Hodge. Evident within this construal is not only the individualization of this pneumatological Church, but perhaps even more fundamentally,

35 Hodge, "History of the Apostolic Church." This will be explored much more in depth with Nevin below.

36 Nevin and Hodge, *Coena Mystica*, 2:173. Throughout their back-and-forth, Nevin and Hodge regularly accuse each other of Christological heresy. Nevin's most common accusations against Hodge are Nestorianism and Sabellianism, while Hodge branded Nevin a Eutychian.

37 Nevin, "The New Creation," *The Mercersburg Review* 2 (1850): 7, 11.

38 Ibid., 2, 7.

39 Hodge, "History of the Apostolic Church."

40 It is not surprising that in his "Commentary" on v. 11, Hodge makes the direct connection to Eph 1:22 and the headship of Christ. See Hodge, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 218.

the anthropocentricism of the Church. The Church was for Hodge the mere collection of spirit-filled members.

John Williamson Nevin and Ephesians 1

The ecclesiologically rich passage of Eph 1 was also central to Nevin's theology, though in a very different way than that of Hodge. After leaving Princeton, the Mercersburg theologian had progressively shed some of the educational particularity acquired under Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller, and Charles Hodge.[41] Of primary importance to this theological change in direction was the rejection of what he viewed as an untenable dualism imposed upon the gospel.[42] One way this dualism was manifest was in a sharp material–spiritual divide that was evident in Hodge's pneumatological ecclesiology outlined above. While Hodge fretted over keeping the humanity of Christ separate from the Spirit-constituted Church, careful not to blur or conflate the two natures of Christ, Nevin, by the mid-1840s, increasingly emphasized the unity of the two natures in one person.[43]

Thus, Nevin preferred to talk about the *life* of Christ being bestowed onto the Church rather than the "Spirit of Christ" as Hodge had. Adopting the language of Eph 1, Nevin wrote, *"Christ's life rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; thus constituting the CHURCH, which is his body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all."*[44] While he was quick to dismiss any "pantheistic dissipation" of Christ's divinity into the "general consciousness of the intelligent universe," he maintained:

> Just as little does it imply any like dissipation of Christ's personality into the general consciousness of the Church, when we affirm that it forms the ground, out of which and in the power of which only, the whole life of the Church continually subsists. In this view

41 Late in life Nevin reflects on this theological shift, noting that it began particularly with his move to Western Theological Seminary in Alleghany during the 1830s, but that it was accelerated by F.A. Rauch and eventually Philip Schaff at Mercersburg in the 40s; see J. W. Nevin, "My Own Life: Between Princeton and Pittsburgh (V)," *Reformed Church Messenger (1867-1874)* 36.13 (1870): 1; J. W. Nevin, "My Own Life: Retrospective Self-Criticism (VI)," *Reformed Church Messenger (1867-1874)* 36.14 (1870): 1; J. W. Nevin, "My Own Life: Self-Criticism Continued (VII)," *Reformed Church Messenger (1867-1874)* 36.15 (1870): 1; J. W. Nevin, "My Own Life: Ten Years' Work in the West (X)," *Reformed Church Messenger (1867-1874)* 36.18 (1870): 1; J. W. Nevin, "My Own Life: My Call to Mercersburg. Narrative by the Rev. S. R. Fisher, D.D (XVII)," *Reformed Church Messenger (1867-1874)* 36.25 (1870): 1. The trio of Alexander, Miller, and Hodge are usually regarded as the formative theological influences on the so-called Old Princeton School.

42 See David Wayne Layman, "Revelation in the Praxis of the Liturgical Community: A Jewish-Christian Dialogue, with Special Reference to the Work of John Williamson Nevin and Franz Rosenzweig" (Ph.D. Diss., Temple University, 1994), 86ff.

43 This, of course, is what left him open to the charge of Eutychianism made by Hodge at various times through the 1840s and 50s.

44 Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 167; emphasis original.

> Christ is personally present always in the Church. This of course, in the power of his divine nature. But his divine nature is at the same time *human*, in the fullest sense; and wherever his presence is revealed in the Church in a real way, it includes his person necessarily under the one aspect as well as under the other."[45]

Hodge's accusation that Nevin's theology implied that Christ's humanity (alone!) constitutes the Church was understandable considering the Princetonian's theological apprehensions. Nevertheless, the indictment was clearly only a half-truth when Nevin's words are considered.[46]

New Creation and the Church

The key image used by Nevin in describing the connection between Christ and the Church was that the Church was an "extension" of the "new creation."[47] This new creation was wrought not only with the coming of the Holy Spirit or even with the death and resurrection of the Christ, but with the very incarnation itself: "The mystery of the incarnation involves in itself potentially a new order of existence for the world."[48] With the *Logos ensarkos* a new creation entered the earthly realm that did not pass away with the ascension of Christ but was extended temporally through the continuation of His body, the Church.[49] "As such a *fact*," Nevin contended,

45 Ibid., 173–74.

46 Charles Hodge, "Review of Christian Life and Doctrine by W. Cunningham" (1860), in *The Book Reviews of Charles Hodge*.

47 Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 222.

48 John Williamson Nevin, "Catholicism," *The Mercersburg Review* 3 (1851): 19.

49 Here it is interesting to note that Hodge and Nevin never formally, as far as this author knows, engaged in a debate over the *extra calvinisticum*. With all the Christological heresy-hunting on both sides, and all the Eucharistic debating, there was not a Christological exchange over whether the finite humanity of Christ was capable of "receiving or grasping infinite attributes." It is surprising simply because it seems to be at the root of much of their Christological differences, yet it goes unidentified. For a general description of the doctrine of the *extra calvinisticum*, see Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 111. Although it is true, as McGinnis notes, that the "nineteenth century saw an extensive realization and solidification" of the 18th century movement away from "traditional Christologies" in service of downplaying difference for "church unity" (best exemplified in the Prussian union of churches [1817]), Hodge and Nevin were notable exceptions (135). McGinnis assigns Hodge to his "counterfources" movement as a Reformed thinker who staunchly maintained his anti-Lutheran Christological bias or, to put it positively, his affirmation of the *extra calvinisticum* (141–43). Nevin, not explicitly mentioned by McGinnis, was more influenced by the continental discussions (and attempts at Protestant rapprochement) than Hodge and clearly was sympathetic to a more Lutheran-leaning emphasis on the *communicatio idiomatum*, where the attributes of both the divine and human natures of Christ were shared fully. It is likely that Nevin followed Isaak Dorner, whom he references often and speaks highly of, in trying to find a "dialectical affirmation" that satisfied both Reformed and Lutheran theologians (138–39). See Andrew M. McGinnis, *The Son of God Beyond the Flesh: A Historical and Theological Study of the Extra Calvinisticum* (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).

Aubert notes that Emanuel Vogel Gerhart, a former student of Nevin who is known for "systematizing Mercersburg theology," never dismissed the *extra calvinisticum* in favour of a more

again drawn back to the Eph 1 passage, the incarnation "includes life-powers which were not in the world before, but cannot be sundered from its history since. These life-powers belong to its very constitution, and as such are lodged in the Church, which is the 'body of Christ, the fullness of him that filleth all in all."[50]

While Hodge qualified his covenantal imagery by ensuring that the "natural" relationship between Adam-and-his-progeny and Christ-and-his-Church was downplayed in favour of their "moral" connection, Nevin made the natural connection even more substantial by borrowing what he called a "beautiful image" from Richard Hooker of the Church as Eve, formed from the very side of Christ:

Lutheran stress on the *communicatio idiomatum*, despite following much more closely Nevin's theology than Hodge's; see Aubert, *The German Roots of Nineteenth-Century American Theology*, 145–46. One reason this is so surprising is the tension both outside and inside the German Reformed Church, felt by Nevin and Schaff because of their liberal use of German Lutheran sources. This has also spilled over into the contemporary historiography of the scholars in debating how Reformed they truly were (Nevin particularly), as many of their theological sources were Lutherans. The debate does give insight into Hodge's anxiety toward Nevin's talk of the *humanity* of Christ being joined with the *divinity* of Christ in a continuation of the incarnation through the Church. For instance, Nevin's reprinting of Heinrich Schmid's "The Person of Christ" in the very first issue of the *MR* was strong evidence of sympathy, if not support, for a robust doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum.* Not to mention that the Lutheran translator, Krauth, like the Anglican Muhlenberg, was strongly influenced by Nevin in leading his church in an "evangelical catholic" direction that became known as Neo-Lutheranism; see Heinrich Schmid, "The Person of Christ," trans. Charles Porterfield Krauth, *The Mercersburg Review* 1 (1849): 272–306. For an even more direct example in the same volume, see Nevin, "The Lutheran Confession," *The Mercersburg Review* 1.1 (1849): 468–77. This article is an introduction for *The Evangelical Review*, which was a new Lutheran Quarterly that aligned closely with the Mercersburg School. Nevin's own take on his Lutheranism, at least at the end of the 1840s, is as follows: "We believe, indeed, that Lutheranism and Reform, the two great phases of the Protestant faith, may be so brought together with mutual inward modification, that neither shall necessarily exclude the other, that each rather shall serve to make the other more perfect and complete; and we earnestly long for this union; but so long as the antithesis, which, in itself, thus far, has been real and not imaginary only, is not advanced to this inward solution and reconciliation, we are in principle Reformed, and not Lutheran" (470). For Nevin's evolving relationship with Lutherans through his lifetime, see Russ Patrick Reeves, "Countering Revivalism and Revitalizing Protestantism: High Church, Confessional, and Romantic Critiques of Second Great Awakening Revivalism, 1835 to 1852" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Iowa, 2005), 196–213.

Nevin does speak of the *communicatio idiomatum* twice in direct reference to its place in the Heidelberg Catechism, but he does not offer extended commentary. Nor does he tip his hand to his own thinking beyond affirming that he felt it was equally a Reformed doctrine and a Lutheran one; see Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 85; Nevin, *History and Genius of the Heidelberg Catechism* (Chambersburg, PA: Publication Office of the German Reformed Church, 1847), 42. Holifield also provides an excellent window into the debate. However, within his narrative, Hodge and Nevin are supporting cast to the real main characters, Dabney and Adger, who play relatively the same theological roles in the South at the same time. See Holifield, *The Gentlemen Theologians: American Theology in Southern Culture 1795–1860* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 175ff.

50 John Williamson Nevin, "The Church," in *The Mercersburg Theology*, ed. James Hastings Nichols (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 71. For one of the most explicit connections Nevin makes between the incarnation and the constitution of the Church, see John Williamson Nevin, "Letter to Dr. Henry Harbaugh," in *Catholic and Reformed: Selected Theological Writings of John Williamson Nevin*, ed. Charles Yrigoyen and George H Bricker (Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1978). Not surprisingly, Nevin's final line of the letter is "the fulness of him that filleth all in all."

"a true native extract out of Christ's body."[51] Using the Gospel of John, and the letters of Paul especially, Nevin could simply not hold to the strict formality of the representational relationship of the covenantal heads of Adam and Christ that Hodge espoused. In an article where he argued for real union with Christ over and against only the image of Christ being impressed upon believers, Nevin wrote at great length of what it meant biblically to be "in Christ." His conclusion was that it would be foreign to speak of the "patriots of the American Revolution, as being *in George Washington*," just as it was unfitting to use "in Christ" when only an immaterial, moral representational role was reserved for Adam and Christ.[52] According to Nevin, for the Church to be "in Christ" meant that Christ was the "foundation of the Church; it [started] in his person," and its historical unfolding was the revelation of the "full force of the mystery" of the incarnation.[53] It is not merely the benefits wrought by Christ but Christ's very own person that is essential to the constitution of the church. In an accusation that could well have been directed toward Hodge, Nevin maintained that it was only "sectarian, schismatic Christianity" that tended to "make Christ's actual person of small account, as compared with his doctrine and work."[54]

The advent of the incarnation introduced a new creation, a new reality into the cosmos, a revelation of "the grace and truth which came by him in the beginning."[55] Yet nothing was lost to humanity when Christ ascended in the flesh. Christ was the "alpha and omega," the head of the Church; but in a very real sense, Christ was not made whole until He was given a body which is the "fullness of him that filleth all in all."[56] And so "Christ himself [was] made perfect in the Church" to such a degree that Nevin was comfortable claiming, "There can be no church without Christ, but we may reverse the proposition also and say, no Church, no Christ."[57] Quite simply, Nevin appeared unconcerned with maintaining the

51 Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 232. Nevin does not cite Hooker but seems to have taken the quotation from the Fifth Book: *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 56.7. See also John Williamson Nevin, *The Anxious Bench* (Chambersburg, PA: Publication Office of the German Reformed Church, 1844), 129–30.

52 Nevin, "The New Creation," 4.

53 Nevin, "The New Creation," 10. In *The Mystical Presence*, Nevin bolsters this Pauline understanding of being "in Christ" using his preferred gospel, John, and the image of the vine and branches in chapter 15. See Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, 229.

54 Nevin, *Antichrist*, 49.

55 Nevin, "The Church," 59.

56 Nevin, "The Church," 59.

57 Nevin, "The Church," 66. To my knowledge, Deifell is the only secondary source to deal in passing (though he does not explicitly site it) with this ecclesiological idea of Nevin's. It is either theologically unorthodox or confusing in its explication (or both); neither option invites engagement from most scholars interested in re-sourcing Nevin. First, it seems to be an intractable outcome of his understanding of the development of history. Though there is no indication that Nevin would have considered Christ "imperfect" prior to the constitution of the Church, there is a distinct idea of the *perfecting* nature of the development through time. This idea of history as a *perfecting* development underscores Nevin's understanding of providence as the growing and progressing way

sharp asymmetry between Christ and the Church that Hodge so anxiously fretted about.[58] In reality, he exchanged Hodge's equation (Christ > Church) for his own (Christ = Church), writing, straightforwardly, "The Church is the historical continuation of the life of Jesus Christ in the world."[59] It was this "new order of existence which was introduced into the world by his incarnation" that remained the Church's "perennial undying root."[60]

Ephesians 1 and The Church

Let us briefly summarize Hodge's and Nevin's interpretations of Eph 1 and how those explications translate to their markedly different ways of understanding the role of the Church in the economy of salvation. First, they agree on the Scriptural emphasis of Christ as the "Head" of the Church. However, by using his particular covenantal framework of Rom 5, Hodge unpacks the "headship" of Christ in moral, spiritual, and purely representational terms, whereas Nevin leans on the organic connection with body and finds a far more participatory interaction.[61] From these diverging premises, Hodge transposes the text from a primarily ecclesial key to a soteriological key and inserts the Holy Spirit into the final verse as the one who Christ sends as the "fulness of him who fills all in all." Nevin, on the other hand, sees the Church herself as the body that is the "fulness of [Christ], who fills all in all." In the end, it leads to an anthropocentrized Church for Hodge—a collection of spirit-filled individuals—that may well be helpful as a school of discipleship but could hardly be described as essential to the economy of salvation. Nevin, trending

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that God is redeeming the world. Yet, despite the argument that this idea was integral to Nevin's understanding of historical development, the actual argument itself is abstracted from history and made on logical grounds. That is, Christ and the Church are not two separate entities, but two ways of speaking about one thing.

58 He never directly used Augustine's understanding of the *totus Christus* but there are obvious echoes of it in Nevin's work. For a helpful introduction to Augustine's ecclesiological usage of *totus Christus*, see Kimberly Baker, "Augustine's Doctrine of the Totus Christus: Reflecting on the Church as Sacrament of Unity," *Horizons* 37.1 (2010): 7–24. It is worthwhile to note that while Augustine formulated his understanding of the whole Christ through the Pauline imagery of the "Body of Christ," like Nevin, it was actually Augustine's reflection on the "speaker" of the Psalms that pushed him to a more radical direction (11–12). This is certainly not to claim that Augustine's understanding of the *totus Christus* was explicated in the same manner as Nevin's extension of Christ in the Church. In fact, amid proposing his understanding of the *totus Christus*, Augustine takes great pains to avoid the kind of statement that Nevin makes about Christ "being made perfect in the Church." Augustine writes, "For indeed head and body form one Christ [*totus Christus*]. Not that he isn't complete without the body, but that he was prepared to be complete and entire together with us too, though even without us he is always complete and entire, not only insofar as his is the Word, the only-begotten Son equal to the Father." Augustine, *Sermons (341–400) on Various Subjects*, trans. Edmund Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 1996), 26 (341.11).

59 Nevin, "The Church," 65. See also Hodge, "Review: The Mystical Presence," 217–18; DiPuccio, *The Interior Sense of Scripture*, 53.

60 John Williamson Nevin, "Hodge on Ephesians: Second Article," *The Mercersburg Review* 9 (1857): 211.

61 See Evans, *Imputation and Impartation*.

in the exact opposite direction, finds an organic connection between Christ and His body, with a kind of ecclesial *communicatio idiomatum* as the extension of the incarnation. Thus, for Nevin, because of this divine ontology, there is an understanding of the Church that presents a certain triumphalism: the impeccability of the Church as salvation in social, historical, and objective form.

This divergence between Hodge and Nevin is seemingly very similar to the respective sensibilities underlying the divergent directions taken among many young evangelicals. For SBNR folk, with the social pressures of denominational affiliation all-but-erased in 21st century North America, the logic of Hodge's interpretation taken to its extreme conclusion is apparent: Weigh the individual benefits of belonging to a Church, if it is not "helpful" to my own spiritual journey of salvation, then it can be sloughed off because of its nonessential nature. The Spirit (or spirituality) of God living within me is the primary point of importance within the gospel. For those in search of "higher" ecclesial options, Nevin's understanding of Paul in Ephesians gives credence to their own trajectory: The Church as a prior and essential divine entity takes priority over any sort of "personal faith" and is nothing short of necessary in the economy of salvation. Having an organic and objective connection to the Church through history becomes vital, quite literally, for the gospel.

These two interpretations of the role of the Church are obviously and intentionally stark. Yet, it is clear they both continue to exist in very similar forms within the contemporary evangelical world.[62] There are, of course, many evangelical theologians who have attempted to avoid these extremes and have done so in differing ways.[63] This paper's primary intent is to offer an ecclesiological rationale for why there seems to be an exodus of younger evangelicals in two very distinct directions and does not intend to definitively resolve the interpretation of Eph 1:20–23, over which John R. W. Stott notes "gallons of printer ink have been spilled."[64] Nevertheless, there seem to be a two separate moves that Hodge and Nevin make in interpreting the passage that consequentially lead in two disparate ecclesiological directions, which need not be the case.

First, Hodge's insertion of the Spirit into the Eph 1:22–23 that inevitably leads

62 One thinks of groups like The Gospel Coalition as a Hodge-like ecclesiological example and the Reformed group loosely referred to as the Federal Vision theologians as a Nevin-like example.

63 Theologians like Ephraim Radner and the late John Webster have each tried to navigate these extremes in different ways. For Webster, it is resolved best with a pneumatological ecclesiology that begins in similar places to Hodges, but does not result in the same conclusions. For Radner, he begins with a much more thoroughly Christological ecclesiology as with Nevin, but reads this Scriptural image of the body of Christ figurally which leaves Nevin's conclusions untenable. See:

64 John R. W. Stott, *The Message of Ephesians: God's New Society* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1979), 61. Commentating on Eph 1:23 specifically, Stephen Fowl even goes so far as to say there is "fruitful ambiguity in the verse." Stephen E. Fowl, *Ephesians: A Commentary* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2012), 65. For an overview of the disputes around 1:23, see Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (Waco, TX: Word, 1990), 72–78.

him to *hyperspiritualism*, as Nevin calls it, is not a tenable reading of the passage.[65] Not only is the Spirit not mentioned here, but the dramatic image used by the apostle is an explicitly material one, the *body* of Christ. By ruling out this sort of spiritualizing of the passage, the Church cannot be understood as a merely optional "spiritual aid" for Spirit-endowed individuals who choose to associate together, as Hodge supposes on the logic of his interpretation. Contra Hodge, the Church, according to Eph 1, is unavoidably a *necessary* part of being "in Christ."

On the other hand, Nevin's leveraging of *plērōma*, interpreted in the active sense as the Church completing, perfecting, or filling Christ, although certainly a possible grammatical construction, is less compelling when considered with the overall weight of the Scriptural witness (save Col 1:24).[66] And so, though the Church *as the body of Christ* is an inescapable reality for those who are *in Christ*, the derivative character of the Church is maintained by the *primacy of the gift-giving God in Christ who fills the Church*. Gone is the scent of ecclesial triumphalism or the need to differentiate the sinless nature of the Church "as such" from her sinful members. The Church is conceived and sustained not as the life of Christ but by the superabundant self-giving of God, who raises the *body of Christ* up to its necessary place in the economy of salvation. The Church is necessarily derivative because it can only give what it receives, namely, the fullness of God through Christ's self-emptying. This also happens to be what it means to be *evangelicals*: people of the good news who are formed by God in order to give over what we have received through incorporation into the one body of Christ.

65 Nevin also calls this same move rationalism. Nevin, *Antichrist*, 59. It may seem odd to use *hyperspiritualism* (italics in the original) and "rationalism" synonymously for the 21st-century reader. However, Nevin uses both to explain the aversion among evangelicals toward the material world in general: "For Rationalism . . . has two sides, two opposite poles of unbelief, that are forever playing into each other with wonderful readiness and ease; an abstract naturalism on the one hand, that owns no reality higher than the present world; and then an abstract spiritualism on the other hand, by which the sense of the supernatural is not allowed to come to any real union with the sense of the natural in the way of faith, but is made to float over it fantastically in the way of mere Gnostic imagination." Nevin, "Natural and Supernatural," *The Mercersburg Review* 11 (1859): 204.

66 See especially Lincoln, *Ephesians*.

Cherishing the Trees, as Christ is Lord Over All and the Center of All Things: Martin Luther's Tacit Eco-theological Ethic[1]

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Abstract

Evangelical Christians and conservative Protestants are often thought to be less supportive of ecological concerns and the sustainable use of the earth's natural resources. As a result, their actions and inactions toward the environment are interpreted and understood to have contributed to its degradation. This indifference towards God's earthly creation and its present and future condition may stem from the evangelical emphasis on soteriological and eschatological concerns, at the expense of extant earthbound concerns. This paper contends that an apathetic attitude regarding the environment does not reflect the thinking of Martin Luther, the progenitor of the Protestant Reformation and founder of classic evangelicalism. Despite growing up in Germany's most industrialized region, an area that reflected the environmental consequences of copper and silver mining, Luther revelled in God's creation. His writings reflect a *tacit eco-theologic ethic*. Luther admired nature's beauty and intricacy but was profoundly aware of and observed people's ignorance of and indifference toward it, in their greedy consumption of creation's resources. Luther contends that with the fall into sin, humanity had "curved in on itself," distorting its obedience of the command of Genesis 1:28—such that humanity retains dominion as a *bare title.* Understanding that it is Christ who has and exercises true dominion over creation, Luther cherished the natural world all the more. Coupled with Christ's dominion and transcendent lordship, Luther proclaimed divine immanence in his Eucharistic theology, establishing Christ's ubiquitous

1 This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the interdisciplinary theology conference, "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, held at Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017.

presence within all of creation. Luther's thinking and his affirmation of the intrinsic goodness of the created world, can therefore provide an impetus for Christians, who have been called to collaborate with the Creator, to participate with Christ in the care of creation.

Evangelicals and the Environment

This year marks the major anniversary of several publications that have in some way shaped modern thought. Along with the quincentenary of the promulgation of Martin Luther's *Ninety-Five Theses* that set in motion the Protestant Reformation, 2017 also marks the notable anniversary of another seminal document. It was 50 years ago that the historian Lynn White famously argued that the earth's environmental crisis stemmed in part from the attitudes and actions of Christians. In an essay published in 1967 in the journal *Science*, White articulates that Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion because Christians held that the sole purpose of creation was to serve humanity.[2] The anthropocentricity of a Christian understanding of creation coupled with humanity's distortion of the divine injunction in the book of Genesis to have dominion over the earth has contributed to the exploitation and impairment of the natural environment. And while Christianity was but one of the contributing factors in White's argument, it was the one that garnered the greatest attention and has since been repeatedly cited by environmentalists.[3] In the past 50 years, since White's publication, have the actions—and inactions—of Christians continued to validate his charge?

Popular sentiment and scholarly papers alike contend that Christians, particularly evangelicals and conservative Protestants,[4] are less inclined to support causes that safeguard the environment and the planet's future.[5] It is interpreted

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2 Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science* 155.3767 (1967): 1203–1207.

3 Bron Taylor, Gretel Van Wieren, and Bernard Daley Zaleha, "Lynn White Jr. and the Greening-of-Religion Hypothesis," *Conservation Biology* 30.5 (2016): 1000–1009. Taylor et al. reveal that White's article had 924 citations in the Web of Science's core collection and 4,600 citations in Google Scholar's collection.

4 The terms evangelical and conservative are not necessarily synonymous when describing communities within the Christian faith. In addition, there is not a strict definition for either term that is supported by general consensus. There is ambiguity associated with both terms and diversity within their communities. Nevertheless, I am employing the popular understanding of evangelicals which I consider to be theologically and socially conservative Protestants.

5 Taylor et al., "Lynn White Jr. and the Greening-of-Religion Hypothesis," reference numerous studies that conclude evangelical Christians remain less supportive of environmental issues. Many of these studies are also identified in Paul A. Dube and Patrick K. Hunt, "Beyond the Lynn White Thesis: Congregational Effects on Environmental Concern," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48.4 (2009): 670–86, and Darren E. Sherkat and Christopher G. Ellison, in "Structuring the Religion-Environment Connection: Identifying Religious Influences on Environmental Concern and Activism," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 46.1 (2007): 71–85. However, these works also cite reports that indicate the relationship between religion and environmental

that evangelical Protestants focus on soteriological and eschatological concerns, while disregarding ecological ones, such that they fixate on "heavenly" matters while forsaking earthly ones.[6] And yet, as one scholar observes, a "focus on the afterlife . . . when taken by itself . . . denigrates the creation left behind."[7]

This discussion contends that Martin Luther, the seminal figure of the Protestant tradition and classic evangelicalism, did not share such an indifference towards the earth; he certainly was no enemy of the environment. As suggested from numerous others reading Luther, this essay maintains that the reformer's theology contains a *tacit eco-theological ethic*.

Luther's teaching on creation is implicit within his writings, interwoven and scattered throughout his sermons, catechisms, and biblical commentaries. These works reflect Luther's appreciation for the natural world and reflect his understanding of Christ's dominion over and ubiquitous presence throughout it. Luther viewed the material world as a divine blessing. He did not uphold Platonic philosophy which esteemed the spiritual while denigrating the physical, a philosophy that greatly influenced medieval Christian theology. The reformer rejected Gnostic dualism, and its assessment of the inherent evil and inferiority of this temporal domain.[8] Rather, Luther reveled in God's creation and proclaimed the intrinsic

stewardship is more ambiguous or reports which reflect Christianity exhibiting a concern toward the environment. Although organizations, such as the Evangelical Environmental Network, the Evangelical Climate Initiative, and countless church-based grass-roots initiatives, might suggest that Lynn White's indictment is weakening, there remains among some evangelicals hostility towards the environmental movement. For an articulation of this notion in the popular press see John Collins Rudolph, "An Evangelical Backlash Against Environmentalism," *The New York Times,* December 30, 2010 and Molly Redden, "Whatever Happened to the Evangelical-Environmental Alliance?," *The New Republic,* November 3, 2011.

6 It is contended that the evangelical's expectation of the great tribulation to come, Christ's imminent return, and God's promised future restoration of all things has contributed to a disregard or at least an indifference towards the earth's current environmental condition. In *For the Beauty of the Earth: A Christian Vision of Creation Care* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), Steven Bouma-Prediger considers some evangelical theological interpretations and how Christianity contributed to the ecologic crisis. A discussion on the possible root of conservative Christianity's failure to promote and preserve the environment is also presented by Michael S. Northcott in "BP, the Blowout and the Bible Belt: Why Conservative Christianity Does Not Conserve Creation," *The Expository Times* 122.3 (2010): 117–26. In addition, Calvin B. Dewitt has outlined a number of stumbling-blocks that he contends many evangelicals have created for themselves that inhibit embracing a reverent attitude, and engaging in responsible action, towards the environment. See Dewitt's "Creation's Environmental Challenge to Evangelical Christianity" in *The Care of Creation*, ed. R.J. Berry (Leicester, England: IVP, 2000), 60–73.

7 David Rhoads, "Reflections on a Lutheran Theology of Creation: Foundations for a New Reformation," *Seminary Ridge Review* 15.1 (2012): 7.

8 Luther's rejection of Platonic idealism is seen foremost in his clash with those who denied the salvific efficacy of Christ's physical body and instead confined it to His spirit. God's incarnation was fundamental to Luther's theology. As such, he countered the teaching of his opponents with "I do not know any God except Him who was made flesh. Nor do I want any other. And there is no other God who could save us besides the God incarnate. Therefore, we shall not suffer His humanity to be underestimated or neglected." Luther's retort is from the Marburg Colloquy of 1529 as quoted in Hermann Sasse, *This is My Body: Luther's Contention for the Real Presence in the Sacrament of the Altar* (Adelaide: Lutheran Publishing, 1977), 203.

goodness of the sensible world and divine immanence with it. If rightly understood, Luther's theology can contribute to a contemporary dialogue on ecological concerns and perhaps affect evangelicals—for that matter, all Christians—to respond favorably to the environmental movement and celebrate the gift of creation through the sustainable use of its resources.

Luther's World: Mansfeld, Mining, and the Environment

However, before considering Luther's appreciation of nature and his implicit eco-theologic ethic, reflection upon humanity's exploitation and despoiling of the natural environment in Luther's world is necessary. The landscape of 16th century Germany was not pristine. Luther's homeland reflected the effects of many years of mining. And Luther would have observed the destructive consequences from the consumption of natural resources. Indeed, his father, Hans Luther, was a miner and smelting master, operating numerous copper mines and ore smelters around Mansfeld, in the Harz region of Germany.[9]

Luther's writings make scant mention of his early years, but there is no indication that his childhood in the Harz hills was an unhappy one. Still when the time came, young Martin showed no interest of following in his father's footsteps, admitting years later of his rather limited knowledge of mining.[10] Perhaps too, the elder Luther envisioned a future for his son far from the dampness of the mines and the smoke from the smelters. Instead, Martin took up academic studies, and left Mansfeld at age fourteen. Nonetheless, he retained a fondness and concern for the region and its people his entire life.[11] Luther's lifelong loyalty to Mansfeld is manifest in his advocacy for the area's miners and smelters in their dispute with the Mansfeld nobility, whom wished to nationalize the mining industry. Although

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9 Hans' surname was actually Luder. Martin had adopted the Humanist-tradition of using the Hellenized form of his family name, Eleutherios, which he later shortened to Luther.

10 Martin Luther, *D.Martin Luthers Werke.* Kritische Gesamtausgabe. *Tischreden*. 2. Band. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1913), 556, as noted in Martin Brecht, *Martin Luther, Volume 1: His Road to Reformation, 1483–1521,* trans. James L. Schaaf (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 6. As a result of Luther's ignorance of mining he did not incorporate the subject into his sermons as did his friend, and one of the transcribers of his *Tischreden*, Johann Mathesius. See Warren Dym, "Mineral Fumes and Mining Spirits: Popular Beliefs in the Sarepta of Johann Mathesius (1504–1565)," *Renaissance and Reformation Review* 8.2 (2006): 161–285. Following the time he spent at Luther's table, Mathesius became a pastor in Joachimsthal a significant silver mining region in the Ore Mountains of Bohemia. There Mathesius became friends with George Agricola the town physician who was also the author of the pioneering treatise on mining and metallurgy *De re metallica*. Agricola stimulated Mathesius' studies in mining, so much so that Mathesius the mineralogist (rather than the pastor) was recently honored by the scientific community with having a newly discovered mineral named after him. See Jakub Plášil, František Veselovský, Jan Hloušek, Radek Škoda, Milan Novák, Jiří Sejkora, Jiří Čejka, Pavel Škácha, and Anatoly V. Kasatkint, "Mathesiusite, $K_5(UO_2)4(SO_4)4(VO_5)(H_2O)_4$, A New Uranyl Vanadate-Sulfate from Jáchymov, Czech Republic," *American Mineralogist* 99.4 (2014): 625–32.

11 Lyndal Roper, *Martin Luther: Prophet and Renegade* (London: Bodley Head, 2016), 17 and Brecht, *Martin Luther,* 9.

the reformer may have acknowledged his ignorance regarding the exploration for minerals and the excavation of mines, he was familiar enough with the economics of the industry to understand and believe that nationalization threatened the livelihood of the locals. As one of Europe's leading thinkers, even late in his life, Luther remained cognizant of his mining roots and all the time exhibited an affection for Mansfeld, asserted that he was "ein Manfeldisch Kind."[12]

The roots of mining ran deep in Mansfeld. By the time Hans Luther plied his trade in the Harz Mountains, for hundreds of years the region had already been a major mining area and a significant source of silver, copper, and lead in Europe. But it was during the elder Luther's career that the area would undergo phenomenal growth, as it rode the mining boom sweeping the continent. The mid to late 15th century experienced an explosion in population across Europe, including Martin Luther's birth in 1483. And with that growth came economic expansion and increased manufacturing, trade, and resource development. The era saw the rise of the modern money-based economy and with it the demand for metals. Silver and copper coins were needed to fund commercial trade and everyday transactions—including the payment of papal indulgences. Copper metal was also needed for the printing press, launching the book publishing industry of the late 1400s. Metal movable type and engraved plates also turned out the certificates of papal indulgence, and consequently the tracts and treatises in response, that spread the Reformation's teachings.[13] This prodigious demand for metals was met with unprecedented production.[14] New technological developments helped deepen mines, extract more ore, and better refine copper and silver. Yet even with much improved technology, mining was still labor intensive. It is estimated that several thousand laborers worked the mines and stoked the smelters around Luther's hometown in those boom years.[15] During the Reformation, the Mansfeld copper

12 Martin Luther, "Nr. 4157, Luther an die Grafen Philipp and Johann Georg von Mansfeld, Mansfeld, 7. Oktober 1545" in *D. Martin Luthers Werke*. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. *Briefwechsel.* 11. Band (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1948), 189.

13 Andrew Pettigrew in *Brand Luther* (New York: Penguin, 2015) presents a detailed description and an informative look at Luther's relationship with the publishing trade and the early printing industry.

14 Almost cotemporaneous with Luther's lifetime (1483–1546), there was a four to five-fold increase in metal production across Central Europe between 1470 and 1540. John U. Nef, "Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilisation," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Volume II: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. eds. M.M. Postan and Edward Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 755. Roper notes that by the late 15th century Mansfeld was among the largest producers of silver in Europe and produced a quarter of its copper. Roper, *Martin Luther*, 17.

15 Nef, "Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilisation," 735. Fessner estimates that by 1525 the mining and smelting industry in Mansfeld employed well over 3,000 workers. See Michael Fessner, "Das Montanwesen in der Grafschaft Mansfeld vom ausgehenden 15. bis zur Zweiten Haelfte des 16. Jahrhunderts," in *Montanregion als Sozialregion*, ed. Angelika Westermann (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2012), 301; cited in Roper, *Martin Luther*, 436 n. 41. Roper remarks that around this time Hans Luther probably employed about 200 workers in his seven smelting operations (27 and 436).

mines, the Upper Harz and Rammelsberg silver workings, and the waterworks that powered them, made the Harz Mountains Germany's most industrialized region.[16]

And with industrial development came environmental impairment. Mining was energy and water intensive. Large waterwheels powered the machinery that sank the mines, drained the shafts and adits of flooding groundwater, and ventilated them of noxious fumes. This water power also lifted the ore to the surface, crushed the rock with heavy stamps, and washed it of impurities. As a consequence, muddied and sullied streams ran off the mountains. Water was then needed to power the bellows and fan the flames that roasted and smelted the ore in furnaces, which belched forth heavy metal laden smoke polluting the mountain air. Such demand for water saw a network of excavated trenches, rerouted streams, and manufactured ponds begin to spread across the Harz landscape in Luther's time. It was a landscape already littered with shallow pits and slag piles reflecting hundreds of years of mining and smelting in the region. But the most significant devastation to the environment was the harvesting of timber, necessary toproduce charcoal that fired the furnaces.[17] The smelters demanded much fuel, and the dense hardwood forests of the Harz provided a tremendous resource to be exploited, causing extensive deforestation.[18] Today the name Harz is a misnomer, for it had once referred to the thick stands of hardwoods. But beginning in the 1700s, after the harvesting of the oak and beech trees, the region was reforested with softwood spruce trees. The hardwoods were gone.[19]

This labor force is based on Westermann's estimate that each smelter likely involved 30 workers. See Ekkehard Westermann, "Der Wirtschaftliche Konzentration-prozess im Mansfelder Revier," in *Martin Luther und der Bergbau im Mansfelder Land: Aufsätze*, ed. Rosemarie Knape (Stiftung Luthergedenkstätten in Sachsen-Anhalt, 2000), 70. Roper also notes that during this period of peak production there were 194 mine shafts around Mansfeld and nearby Eisleben (26).

16 Harzwasserwerke. "UNESCO-Welterbe Oberharzer Wasserwirtschaft, Die Anlagen des Oberharzer Wasserregals" (Marz 2011). http://www.harzwasserwerke.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/files/pdf/Flyer/Flyer_UNESCO-Welterbe-Oberharzer-Wasserwirtschaft.pdf (accessed April 6, 2017).

17 An example of forest exploitation in another German mining district during the medieval and early modern era is provided in Johann Friedrich Tolksdorf, Rengert Elburg, Frank Schröder, Hannes Knapp, Christoph Herbig, Thorsten Westphal, Birgit Schneider, Alexander Fülling, Christiane Hemker, "Forest Exploitation for Charcoal Production and Timber Since the 12th Century in an Intact Medieval Mining Site in the Niederpöbel Valley (Erzgebirge, Eastern Germany)," *Journal of Archeological Science: Reports* 4 (2015): 487–500.

18 Charcoal was not only produced to fuel the furnaces but acted as a chemical agent during the ore smelting process to yield elemental copper. Roper notes that there were 40 smelting masters with operations around Mansfeld in 1508 (24). Like Hans Luther each master was probably overseeing more than one smelter. An information plaque at Luther's birth house in Eisleben indicates that circa 1500 there were 112 smelting furnaces around Mansfeld and that they used about 42,000 tonnes of charcoal annually. This amount of consumption would have required about half a million tonnes of timber. Additional quantities of timber were needed to construct the mines and the new mining towns that sprung up in the Harz region.

19 For a discussion on the removal of the hardwoods in the Harz and their replacement with coniferous trees see R. Schulz and M. Jansen, "Study Areas and Basic Data," 11–18; M. Jansen, W.

Martin Luther need not have ventured far to see the environmental consequences of medieval mining. Historian Lyndal Roper notes that from the Luther family house the environmental impact would have been visible, including the destruction of agricultural lands, and large pond outside the Mansfeld town walls contaminated with effluent from the smelters.[20] Consequently the town water was largely undrinkable. This is the world Luther grew up in, and yet *he loved it.*

Luther's Love for Creation and its Beauty

Luther had "a serious case of *biophilia*, a love of creaturely life, [as well as] *cosmophilia*, an utter awe in the presence of life, as described by Lutheran scholar Larry Rasmussen."[21] Luther proclaimed that while God richly provides and sustains humanity with all of the necessities of earthly living in the gift of creation, his extolling of creation is not limited to its practical benefits. Luther expounds upon the splendor of creation. While Luther would have witnessed humanity's destructive and exploitative impact upon the environment, his writings routinely reflect on the beauty and intricacies of the natural world.[22] Whether it is illustrations from the animal kingdom, forests and meadows, or mountains and streams, Luther describes creation as "the most beautiful book."[23] He insists that God has provided humanity "such an attractive dwelling place."[24] Naturally Luther can admire the divine handiwork in the beauty of a rose,[25]—but the reformer even esteemed rodents. He expresses an almost child-like glee when he describes mice as having "a very beautiful form—such pretty feet and such delicate hair . . . [and]

Schmidt, V. Stüber, H. Wachter, C. Naeder, M. Weckesser, and F.J. Knauft, "Modelling of Natural Woodland Communities in the Harz Mountains," in *Spatial Modelling in Forest Economy and Management: A Case Study*, ed. M. Jansen, M. Judas and J. Saborowski, (Berlin: Springer, 2002), 162–75.

20 Roper, *Martin Luther*, 20. Roper further indicates that the 16th century historian Cyriacus Spangenberg in his history of Mansfeld *Mansfeldische Chronica* provides "a detailed description of the environment, noting that many fields around Mansfeld had been destroyed by mining and . . . the vast quantities of wood and coal used in the mines." 431 n. 2. Spangenberg (1528–1604) was also a theologian and a pastor in Mansfeld and had been a student of Luther.

21 Larry Rasmussen, "Waiting for the Lutherans," *Currents in Theology and Mission* 37.2 (2010): 93. Bornkamm makes a similar observation and he notes that Luther took great pleasure in studying even the most insignificant created works and from which he revealed an astonishing observation for detail. Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther's World of Thought* trans. Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis: Concordia, 1958), 185.

22 Schwanke reminds us that Luther, as an Old Testament scholar, developed his doctrine of creation from his study of Genesis; a part of Scripture that the reformer had a particular fondness for, and in which he wrote and lectured extensively on. See Johannes Schwanke, "Luther on Creation," trans. John Betz *Lutheran Quarterly* 16 (2002): 1.

23 Luther as quoted in Bornkamm, *Luther's World of Thought*, 179.

24 Martin Luther, "Lectures on Genesis, Chapters 1–5," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 1, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1958) (hereafter LW 1), 39.

25 Martin Luther, "Table Talk," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 54, ed. and trans. Theodore G. Tappert, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967) (hereafter LW 54), 355.

therefore here, too we admire God's creation and workmanship."[26] The 16th century saw the beginnings of the scientific revolution, and the emerging discipline provided Luther an opportunity to more closely study the wondrous workings of God's gift of creation.[27] His writings reveal a particular interest in biology. Possessing the curiosity of a scientist, he observes that if one gazed intently on a kernel of grain "you would die of wonder."[28] Even so Luther must have had a particular affection for trees, despite his curiosity. Envisioning a new earth, and perhaps lamenting the loss of the forests on the Harz hills, Luther conjectures that the eschatologically restored creation will "be adorned with many trees."[29]

Luther's Environmental Assessment: Humanity's Ignorance, Indifference, and Greed

While Luther extolled nature's beauty and phenomena, he recognized that humanity's grasp of, and gratitude for, creation had been replaced with ignorance, indifference, and greed in the Fall. Luther contends that humanity's apathy towards the natural world was in part owing to its familiarity, suggesting that "we do not marvel at the wonderful light of the sun, because it is a daily phenomenon. We do not marvel at the countless other gifts of creation . . . it is a great miracle that a small seed is planted and that out of it grows a very tall oak. But because these are daily occurrences, they have become of little importance."[30] Employing a more visual invective, Luther likens human indifference and ingratitude to the earth's splendor to "cattle . . . trampling the most beautiful blossoms and lilies underfoot."[31]

Yet for Luther, the Fall did not merely result in ignorance or indifference toward creation; humanity's distorted state also produced a pronounced greed toward God's creational blessings. Regarding the beauty of a cherry tree and the thousands of cherries produced from one seed, he rather graphically preaches, "people do not see or heed [it] but pass it by and do [nothing] but gorge and swill

26 Luther, LW 1, 52.

27 For a discussion on Luther's view of the emerging sciences in relation to his theology see Duane H. Larson, "Martin Luther's Influence on the Rise of the Natural Sciences," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion*, published online November 2016. http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-306 (accessed April 6, 2017).

28 Martin Luther, "The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ – Against the Fanatics," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 36, ed. Frederick C. Ahrens, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1959), 344.

29 Luther, LW 54, 41.

30 Luther, LW 1, 126. Likewise, Luther observes people's indifference to a hen laying an egg and the birth of a baby chick because it is commonplace, but "if we had never seen such an egg and one were brought from Shangri-la, we'd all be startled and amazed." Luther, LW 54, 200. Churchill stresses Luther's laments regarding humanity's insensitivity towards natural phenomena and everyday events due to their ubiquity in Steven L. Churchill, "'This Lovely Music of Nature': Grounding an Ecological Ethic in Martin Luther's Creation Mysticism," *Currents in Theology and Mission* 26.3 (1999): 183–84.

31 Luther, LW 54, 327.

all that grows. They are like swine that run across a field or wallow in [the] garden and devour what they find."[32] He further observes that humans "stalk about proudly, act defiantly . . . abusing all the good things and gifts of God only for our own pride, avarice, lust, and luxury."[33]

For Luther, greed was the manifestation of the sin of idolatry.[34] Greed may express itself as the despoiling of creation and the exploitation of others, but at its core it is rebellion against the Creator. Thus, the reformer considered greed the most dangerous and corrupting force in Christendom.[35] Commenting on the avarice of rich men who plundered the land of tenant farmers in the book of Isaiah, Luther voiced that though the world may not rebuke such immoral acts, "God . . . does not want the poor to be thrown off their property, but that they be helped."[36]

During the Peasants War of 1525 Luther may have sided with the German nobility when the rebellious peasants resorted to violence, but he put the blame for the revolt squarely on the shoulders of the princes who had exploited the poor.[37] In a tract entitled *Trade and Usury* Luther had earlier expressed his disgust against the exploitative practices of the profit economy. In particular, he highlighted the financial houses and trading companies whose manipulative and fraudulent practices oppressed the common people and small businesses.[38] And yet, Luther understood such abuse was not confined to the nobility, monopolists, or merchant bankers. He recognized that the emerging market economy presented opportunities for the lower classes to also engage in corrupt and exploitative business practices. According to Luther, thievery in its many forms was "the most common craft and largest guild on earth."[39]

Observing humanity's insatiable hunger for all things and its disregard for the

32 Martin Luther, "Selected Pauline Epistles I," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 28, ed. Hilton C. Oswald, general ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1973) (hereafter LW 28), 179.

33 Martin Luther, "The Large Catechism," in *Concordia Triglotta: The Symbolic Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, German-Latin-English*, ed. and trans. F. Bente and W.H.T. Dau (St. Louis: Concordia, 1922), 193.

34 Ricardo Willy Reith, "Luther on Greed," in *Harvesting Martin Luther's Reflections on Theology, Ethics and the Church*, ed. Timothy J. Wengert (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 163.

35 Martin Luther, "The Sermon on the Mount and the Magnificat," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 21, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1956), 167.

36 Martin Luther, "Lectures on Isaiah, Chapters 1–39," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 16, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1969), 61. The comment refers to Isa 5:8: Woe to you who add house to house and join field to field till no space is left and you live alone in the land.

37 Martin Luther, "Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants of Swabia, 1525," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 46, ed. Helmut T. Lehman and Robert C. Schulz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), 17–43.

38 Martin Luther, "Trade and Usury," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 45, ed. Walther Brandt, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1962), 244–308. For a discussion on Luther's understanding of usury and the emerging market economy see Carter Lindberg, '"Christianization' and Luther on the Early Profit Economy" in *The Reformation as Christianization: Essays on Scott Hendrix's Christianization Thesis*, eds. Anna Marie Johnson and John A. Maxfield (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 49–78.

39 Luther's commentary on the Seventh Commandment in *The Large Catechism* in *The Book of*

well-being of others, Luther often used the phrase *incurvatus in se*, for humanity had curved in on itself and sought only self-gratification. With the Fall, greed and self-centredness had entered the human heart, distorting humanity's obedience to God's mandate in Genesis to subdue the earth and have dominion over it. Because of this distortion, for many today the word *dominion* in the Genesis context is pejorative. Luther felt the same way, acknowledging that "we retain the name and word 'dominion' as a bare title, but the substance itself has been almost entirely lost."[40] Prelapsarian dominion has given way to postlapsarian domination.

In the context of his sixteenth-century understanding, Luther advocated against the abuse of nature, whether it was greed-driven exploitation or malicious destruction. In his commentary on Genesis, Luther appreciates that God has provided humanity the riches of the earth to enjoy but concludes that we are to do so "in proportion to [our] need."[41] Along with encouraging modest consumption of nature's resources, Luther's writings also appear to promote nature's protection. For Luther, trees were not to be ravaged, but safeguarded. He likened the springtime blossoming of trees to our own glorious resurrection and the coming restoration of all things. Thus he contends that when "Christians look at [trees] they do not think of gormandizing like swine; no, in them they see the work prefigured which God will perform on us."[42] Even during warfare the earth was to be respected; Luther expected that invading armies not cut down the trees of their enemies, "not to devastate a land which has not sinned."[43] And if they do, Luther avowed that the sinless land does not suffer silently. He observes even an innocent tree "that is cut down does not tumble to the ground without a creaking noise."[44]

In many of his reflections regarding creation Luther invoked Christ—the sinless one who did suffer silently—and it is Him that we now consider.

Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. Eric Gritsch and Charles P. Arand, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 417.

40 Luther, LW 1, 67.

41 Luther, LW 1, 39. Churchill emphasizes Luther's limitation in Churchill, "This Lovely Music of Nature," 195.

42 Luther, LW 28, 180.

43 Martin Luther, "Lectures on Deuteronomy," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 9, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1960), 204.

44 Martin Luther, "Selected Psalms II," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 13, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1956), 107. This audible response to suffering is reminiscent of the groaning of creation in Romans 8. Walsh et al. present a thoughtful study on "hearing the voices of creation," particularly those of trees that suffer abuse. In proposing a reciprocal relationship between trees and humans they consider the responsive nature of trees, scientifically and scripturally. Brian J. Walsh, Marianne B. Karsh, and Nik Ansell, "Trees, Forestry, and the Responsiveness of Creation," *Cross Currents* 44.2 (1994): 149–62. Stewart presents an imaginative discussion on the ecological suffering of creation at the hands of humanity in Scripture as an approach to encouraging an emotion-based environmental ethic. Alexander Coe Stewart, "Heaven Has No Sorrow that Earth Cannot Feel: The Ethics of Empathy and Ecological Suffering in the Old Testament," *Canadian Theological Review* 4.2 (2015): 19–34.

Christ's Dominion, Immanence, and Ubiquity within Creation

While he contends that humanity has "dominion" in *bare title* only, Luther also proclaims who has and exercises *true* dominion. True dominion is only acquired through holiness, and thus it lies with Christ alone.[45] For Luther, "it is Christ the Lord, who was present at the time of creation of all things, not as a mere spectator, but as a coequal Creator and Worker, who still governs and preserves all and will continue to govern and preserve all, until the end of the world."[46] By asserting that it is Christ who has dominion over all, Luther reflects a new and deeper appreciation for creation. Thus, he declares, "Now if I believe in God's Son, and bear in mind that he became [hu]man, all creatures will appear a hundred times more beautiful to me than before. Then I will properly appreciate the sun, the moon, the stars, trees, apples, and pears, as I reflect that he [Christ] is Lord over all and the Center of all things."[47]

Yet while affirming Christ's transcendent lordship, Luther is also always aware of his immanent presence. Christ has dominion over creation, but he is also present throughout it. Thus the reformer was wont to say: Christ "is, with[in], and under" all things. Luther's awareness of divine immanence and Christ's ubiquitous presence within creation is forcefully expounded in his debate regarding Christ's real presence within the Eucharist, with fellow reformer Ulrich Zwingli. This is a crucial point in our discussion, one that is presented in the work of numerous Lutheran theologians, including Paul Santmire and Cynthia Moe-Lobeda. These scholars have observed in Luther's Eucharistic theology, and in his affirmation of the goodness of creation, a tacit eco-theologic ethic that invites amplification.

Zwingli had argued that because the ascended Christ is now at the right hand of the Father, he cannot be present locally in the creaturely elements of bread and the wine. However, Luther countered that Christ was truly present in the Eucharist; he expounded:

> that the right hand of God is not a specific place . . . such as . . . a golden throne, but [it] is the almighty power of God, which at one and the same time can be nowhere and everywhere . . . essentially present at all places, even in the tiniest leaf . . . [God] himself must be present in every single creature in its innermost and outermost

45 Martin Luther, "Lectures on the Psalms II," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 11, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1962), 393. Luther's contention is derived from his exposition of Ps 114:2.

46 Martin Luther, "Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, Chapters 1-4," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 22, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, trans. Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis: Concordia, 1976), (hereafter LW 22), 28.

47 Luther, LW 22, 496.

> being, on all sides, through and through, below and above, before and behind.[48]

In describing the divine presence within and throughout creation, Luther used a variety of prepositions, protecting the reformer against accusations of panentheism, Santmire contends.[49] God was not merely 'in' the creature, but also above it, below it, and within it. Nor was Luther a pantheist, having always maintained the Creator-creature distinction. God is not the creature, nor can God be contained within it.[50] For Luther, the Creator is always immediately present with creation, but He is also always separate from it and transcendent to it. As Santmire observes, for Luther, "our commonplace spatial categories simply do not apply to God."[51] The reformer recognized that divine transcendence and immanence is a mystery. While he acknowledged that these were "exceedingly incomprehensible matters," Luther believed they were attested in Scripture.[52] Citing Jer 23:23–24, Luther understood that God is both nearby and far off, that he fills heaven *and earth*.[53]

Christ's Eucharistic presence had given Luther the platform to proclaim divine immanence and ubiquity and in turn, has given contemporary theologians the occasion to observe in the reformer an eco-theologic ethic. Such an ethic can provide further motivation to respect and preserve the natural world, without idolatrizing it. As Moe-Lobeda offers, "if, as Luther asserts, God dwells not only in human creatures but also in all earth's bounty, then . . . God's presence there . . . obligate[s] us to live toward the healing and sustaining of creation."[54]

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48 Martin Luther, "That These Words of Christ, "This Is My body," etc., Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics, 1527," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 37, ed. Robert E. Fischer, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961), (hereafter LW 37), 57–58.

49 H. Paul Santmire, "Creation and Salvation according to Martin Luther: Creation as the Good and Integral Background," in *Creation and Salvation Volume 1: A Mosaic of Selected Classical Christian Theologies,* ed. Ernest M. Conradie (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 184.

50 H. Paul Santmire, *Before Nature: A Christian Spirituality* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 141. Similarly, Westhelle relates, that for Luther, "God is *in* creation without being creation." Vitor Westhelle, "The Weeping Mask: Ecological Crisis and the View of Nature," *Word and World – Theology for Christian Ministry,* 11.2 (1991): 145.

51 Santmire, *Before Nature*, 139.

52 Luther, LW 37, 59.

53 Martin Luther, "Confession Concerning Christ's Supper – From Part I (1528)," in *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, 2nd edition, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2005), 266.

54 Cynthia Moe-Lobeda, "Journey between Worlds: Economic Globalization and Luther's God Indwelling Creation," *Word and World* 21.4 (2001): 422. Bayer, as well, relates that because of our planet's "ecological crisis, it becomes increasingly necessary to speak theologically about the immanence of God in the world." Oswald Bayer, *Martin Luther's Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation,* trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 103. Similarly, Churchill highlights Luther's Eucharistic theology and divine immanence to promote an eco-theologic ethic. Churchill, "This Lovely Music of Nature," 187–88.

An Eco-theologic Ethic: Caring for Creation as Fellow Workers with Christ

Although Luther's theological teachings initiated reform of the ecclesiastical abuses perpetrated by the papacy 500 years ago, his teachings can also encourage reform of the ecological abuses committed by Christians today. Gazing upon the natural world with wonder, Luther mined Scripture to defend divine immanence within that natural world, and to proclaim Christ's dominion over it. These explicit pronouncements reflect a tacit eco-theologic ethic that can rouse Christians to engage environmental concerns. Yet, a further incentive remains; God desires that humanity participate with him in tending to creation.

There is an anecdote, perhaps apocryphal, that relates Luther's response to the question of what he would do if he knew the world would end tomorrow. He said, "I would still plant my apple tree."[55] In his essay on Luther's ethics, Gerhard Forde understands the story to imply that, when all is said and done and the Kingdom of God has come, Luther believed that God should find us doing what is intended of us—"taking care of creation."[56] For Luther, our calling and vocation from God, whether sacred or secular, great or small, goes hand-in-hand with ethics.[57] And we fulfill this, hand-in-hand with God in Christ. Luther reminds his readers of their role of collaborating with the Creator who "does not work in us without us, because it is for this he has created and preserved us, that he might work in us and we might cooperate with him."[58] Thus in the divine work of preserving and sustaining creation, God enlists and enables humanity to become fellow workers with Christ, as earthly agents of healing.[59]

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55 Luther's declaration may reflect in part his affection for trees, but, as Hendrix relates, the statement has not been found in any of the reformer's writings. Hendrix further indicates that scholars have attributed the anecdote to the German Confessing Church to inspire resistance against the Nazis during World War II. Scott H. Hendrix, *Martin Luther: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 90.

56 Gerhard O. Forde, "Luther's Ethics," in *A More Radical Gospel: Essays in Eschatology, Authority, Atonement, and Ecumenism*, ed. Mark C. Mattes and Steven D. Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 149.

57 Forde, "Luther's Ethics," 148.

58 Martin Luther, "The Bondage of the Will, 1520, Part V Rebuttal of Erasmus' Critique of the *Assertio*" in *Luther's Works*, vol. 33, ed. Philip S. Watson, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 243. While Schwanke notes Luther's frequent emphasis on the divine seeking human cooperation, Gregersen particularly references the quote cited above and applies this example of Luther's understanding of humanity's participation with God to the preservation of creation. See Schwanke, "Luther on Creation," 7; Niels Hendrik Gregersen, "Grace in History and Nature: Luther's Doctrine of Creation Revisited," *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 44.1 (2005): 24.

59 Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda also emphasize that Christ works with humanity in restoring creation based on Luther's statement that Christ "is present in the sacrament and in the hearts of believers not really because he wants to be worshipped there, but because he wants there to work with us and help us." See Larry Rasmussen and Cynthia Moe-Lobeda. "The Reform Dynamic: Addressing New Issues in Uncertain Times," in *The Promise of Lutheran Ethics,* ed. Karen L. Bloomquist and John R. Stumme (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 138. and Martin Luther, "The Adoration of

If Luther is correct, and God has given humanity the privilege of collaborating with Christ in his dominion, it should provide evangelicals the impetus to embrace and safeguard their earthly home. However, Luther would be the first to remind the Christian that the ethical act of stewarding creation—or any ethical act, for that matter—in no way justifies one before God. The reformer proclaimed that one's reconciliation with the Creator is solely based on Christ's salvific work and righteousness that God graciously bestows on people. This is the crux of the Reformation. Justification by faith in Christ's work frees the Christian from attempting to justify oneself by one's own work. Instead, now empowered by the Spirit, the Christian responds to God's grace by freely serving God's people along with *serving* the planet. As Lutheran theologians Kolb and Arand observe, "faith in the God who justifies is at the same time faith in the God who created the world [and] thus, faith embraces the world as God's good creation." [60] Evangelicals who rightly admire and assert Luther's teaching on justification ought to also endorse his ethic that upholds creation and denounces its abuse.

Concluding Remarks

Fifty years ago, Lynn White argued that Christian arrogance had led to an ecological crisis. For White, the root of the problem was a religious one, but he also believed—and probably much to the chagrin of non-Christian environmentalists—that the solution was religious. Thus, White encouraged Christians to consider Saint Francis of Assisi, who was a friend to all creatures, and whom White called "the greatest spiritual revolutionary since Christ."[61] In his assertion, White hoped to highlight both Francis' humble and reverent attitude toward creation, and his conviction of humanity's undomineering place within it. White concluded his essay by proposing Francis to be the "patron saint of ecologists."[62] May I conclude this essay by proposing that another revolutionary also share that honor.

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the Sacrament, 1523," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 36, ed. and trans. Abdel Ross Wentz, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), 294.

60 Robert Kolb and Charles P. Arand, *The Genius of Luther's Theology: A Wittenberg Way of Thinking for the Contemporary Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 106.

61 White, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," 1206.

62 White, "The Historical Roots," 1207.

Revisiting Perfection: A Constructive Approach to the Wesleyan Doctrine of Sanctification

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Abstract

For Wesleyan evangelicals seeking inspiration from their theological roots, entire sanctification presents a significant challenge. Christian perfection faces neglect in Wesleyan circles, and among the most pressing problems for Wesleyans is how believers know that they have achieved the state of perfection, since Wesley originally rooted the knowledge of one's entire sanctification in the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. Rather than dispensing with perfection, these challenges indicate the need for a constructive approach. The current study engages in this task using the theology of Karl Barth, arguing that a fresh articulation of the doctrine of Christian perfection, faithful to Wesley's intent, can be found in the christological doctrine of sanctification in the *Church Dogmatics*. Barth offers an alternative explanation of sanctification in *CD* IV that locates the believer's holiness concretely in the person and work of Jesus Christ, overturning the move to the subject and removing the problem of subjectivity in Wesley. Although Barth himself must be amended in the way he pictures the practical unfolding of the Christian life, Wesleyan theology in its traditional formulation possesses the necessary resources for overcoming these deficiencies and making beneficial use of Barth's dogmatic insights.

For Wesleyan-Methodist evangelicals seeking inspiration from their Wesleyan roots, the doctrine of Christian perfection presents a significant challenge. Perfection faces such neglect in Wesleyan circles that theologians such as William Abraham have pronounced Wesley's cardinal teaching on holiness as effectively dead.[1] The problems with Wesleyan holiness teachings, he claims, are many. Historically,

1 William J. Abraham, "The End of Wesleyan Theology," *WTS* 40 (2005): 17–18; William J. Abraham, "Christian Perfection," in *The Oxford Handbook of Methodist Studies*, ed. James E. Kirby and William J. Abraham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 587.

the loss of Christian perfection occurred after holiness groups began emphasizing the role of religious experience in attaining entire sanctification, leading to unhealthy extremes among revival movements in America. Mainstream Methodism responded by either abandoning the concept altogether or reinterpreting holiness under the influence of social gospel theology, giving it a much different focus than Wesley's original teachings.[2] What is more, debates within contemporary Wesleyan theology about how Christian perfection works, whether gradual or instantaneous, have added to the crisis.[3] If Wesleyans cannot agree on a basic interpretation of their own distinctive doctrine, then it appears to be of little use for their theological identity.

One of the most widely-accepted reasons for why perfection has been neglected in Wesleyan circles is a lack of adequate theological foundations. Christian perfection after Wesley needed to be integrated into robust theological reflection. Historically, however, Methodists largely failed to take up this task, and those who did engage in theological work made fatal mistakes that need to be addressed. Part of the problem, Abraham argues, was a radically anthropocentric turn in Wesleyan theology due to what he understands as a misconstruing of Wesley's focus on inner attitudes and heart motivations.[4] Abraham is correct in his diagnosis, but the problem was not simply with the theology of the later Methodists. Some of Wesley's original assertions contain problematic elements that plagued the tradition after him. His theology was in many ways captive to the modern turn to the subject, primarily through his doctrine of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. Few studies have pinpointed the problem of entire sanctification in Wesley's doctrine of assurance, but if believers' knowledge of their holiness is grounded in subjectivity through an inner witness of the Spirit, as Wesley himself argued, it is impossible to know with any certainty that a person has achieved perfection. This is the central problem of Wesleyan theology that drove the excesses of the Holiness Movement and the mainstream Methodist reactions against perfection.

But there is hope in the current situation. If the problem was a lack of

2 Abraham, "Christian Perfection," 592.

3 The works of Randy Maddox and Kenneth Collins capture both sides of this passionate debate. Whereas Maddox argues that entire sanctification is a gradual work of "responsible grace," involving the give and take of human relationship with the divine, Collins says that entire sanctification for Wesley was an instantaneous work of God's free grace, accomplished in an instant by the sole activity of God. Randy L. Maddox, *Responsible Grace: John Wesley's Practical Theology* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994); Kenneth J. Collins, *The Theology of John Wesley: Holy Love and the Shape of Grace* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2007). The contrast is whether Wesley held to a type of synergism in soteriology (Maddox), or whether his teachings on holiness reflect a monergistic perspective (Collins). Comments on this debate will be made from time to time in this study, but at the outset, we may say that both of these polarities are present in Wesley's teachings, and is a conflict that neither he nor Wesleyans after him resolved. Unravelling these questions is beyond the scope of this study, but by clearing away some of the other difficulties in Wesleyan theology of sanctification, it is possible that new avenues of inquiry may be unearthed.

4 Abraham, "Christian Perfection," 593–94, 598–99.

theological reflection on holiness, resources exist for Wesleyan theologians to reconstruct perfection today. Towards this end, the current study recommends the theology of Karl Barth as a potential resource for Wesleyan theologians. Barth's doctrine of sanctification and the Christian life in *CD* IV/2 and *CD* IV/4 fragments provide theological resources for a fresh articulation of entire sanctification, overcoming the problem of subjectivity using a christological interpretation of holiness. This new understanding of Christian perfection is faithful to Wesley's original intent and concerns, especially his desire for a practical holiness of heart and life, as demonstrated by Barth's vision of the Christian life in his reconciliation ethics. Such a recommendation of Barth for Wesleyans may strike some as odd, as Barth is often seen as neglecting human agency. Nevertheless, while Barth may be critiqued at certain points, this study maintains that Wesleyan theology contains the necessary safeguards for overcoming Barth's own deficiencies, making his contributions invaluable for Wesleyan theologians.

The Problem of Christian Perfection in Wesleyan Theology

The heart of Wesleyan theology exists in the two primary doctrines of Wesley's ministry: assurance and entire sanctification (Christian perfection). Wesley based the first doctrine, Christian assurance, on what he called the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, which he defined as that event occurring in the believer's heart when the witness of the Holy Spirit and the witness of the believer's own spirit coincide and testify together to an individual's salvation. Many scholars speak of the inner witness as it applies to the initial stages of the Christian life, but this inner witness of the Spirit occurred not only at justification and conversion according to Wesley, but also at the event of entire sanctification. Basing perfection in the inner witness meant that holiness could only be known through a modern turn to the subject, a theological decision that had detrimental consequences for the Christian experience of holiness.

The doctrine of the Spirit's witness was the result of Wesley's long quest for spiritual certainty. He struggled throughout his early life and career with doubts about his salvation, which led him to seek certainty through ascetic discipline and rigorous moral examination. Through the frustrations of his own efforts, Wesley concluded that assurance is not gained by one's moral strivings, but by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, declaring to the believer that he or she is saved. According to the doctrine of the inner witness, the believer could be assured of salvation through "an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly 'witnesses to my spirit that I am a child of God.'"[5] When the Holy Spirit's

5 John Wesley, Sermon 10, "The Witness of the Spirit, I," in *Sermons I, 1–33*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 1 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 274. Wesley is unclear on how important this inner witness is for the believer's own salvation. At times he appears

testimony coincides with the believer's own inner conviction, one may have absolute certainty of one's redeemed state.

The inner witness according to Wesley is the person's own "spiritual senses" that have been enlivened by the Spirit of God after the new birth, a theme that Wesley develops through his adaptation of Lockean epistemology.[6] When believers' intuitions concerning their spiritual state are correctly ordered by the Spirit, believers could have full certainty that they are saved, since God's own testimony would confirm the convictions of believers. Assurance through the inner witness was so important to Wesley's theology and ministry that he claimed it was the divinely-ordained mission of the Methodists to proclaim this hope to the church.

The Spirit's witness was a subjective reality for Wesley, occurring as it did within the believer's interiority. While evidence of salvation always involved the external fruits of the Spirit, love and good works, these works were only the "indirect" witness. Perhaps to avoid the tiring moralism he escaped from, Wesley made the inward impression of divine love upon the soul the primary witness of the Holy Spirit, and evidences external to the self only secondary.

Wesley correctly saw the need to avoid basing assurance in human moral efforts, but locating assurance in the subjectivity of the inner witness brought its own challenges. According to Thomas Oden, "the central problem is how one discerns the Spirit of God working within one's own spirit without denying either the finitude of one's own perception or the transcendence of God's own Spirit."[7] If the work of the Holy Spirit is a subjective impression upon the soul, it is difficult to determine how exactly the Spirit of God is working in the heart of the believer. The movements of the Spirit can very easily be mistaken for human psychological experiences, and telling the difference can be confusing. Locating the doctrine of assurance in the subjective inner witness of the Spirit therefore leaves Wesley open to the charge of psychologism—defining the Spirit's work by

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to say that the Spirit's testimony is necessary for salvation, and at other times that it is not necessary to always have the inward conviction of one's own salvation, though it is desirable. John Wesley, Sermon 8, "The First Fruits of the Spirit," in *Sermons I, 1–33*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 1 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 238; John Wesley, Sermon 11, "The Witness of the Spirit, II," in *Sermons I, 1–33*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 1 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 287.

6 Wesley, "The Witness of the Spirit, I," 282–83; John Wesley, "An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743)," in *The Appeals to Men of Reason and Religion*, ed. Gerald R. Cragg; vol. 11 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 56–57. For in-depth studies of Wesley's indebtedness to Locke and his unique adaptation of Lockean philosophy, see Kevin Twain Lowery, *Salvaging Wesley's Agenda: A New Paradigm for Wesleyan Virtue Ethics* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2008); Richard E. Brantley, *Locke, Wesley, and the Method of English Romanticism* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984).

7 Thomas C. Oden, *John Wesley's Scriptural Christianity: A Plain Exposition of His Teaching on Christian Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 230.

the psychological movements of the human mind, compromising the transcendence of the divine Spirit.[8]

The inner witness as normally described in accounts of Wesley's theology applies to the knowledge of one's justification. However, few treatments of the inner witness of the Spirit look closely at its application to entire sanctification. To follow through consistently on the Reformation theme of the *duplex gratia* (twofold grace), Wesley felt that justification and sanctification must function in similar ways: what applies to one must apply to the other.[9] Thus, when it comes to the inner witness, if the Holy Spirit gives testimony of salvation in its initial step, then the twofold grace dictates that the Spirit must also testify when the believer has been perfected in grace.

Wesley found problematic the Lutheran and Reformed claims that entire sanctification could not be attained in the present life and awaited the believer only after death.[10] He sought a different way of thinking of holiness that not only

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8 Whether or not Wesley's use of Locke for the purpose of spiritual assurance is a consistent outworking of Locke's thought could be debated. Greg Forster notes that Locke was suspicious of the "enthusiasts" who claimed direct divine inspiration apart from reason, as he felt that their claims to inspiration created division and a false, circular sense of certainty. To be sure, Locke did not think immediate inspiration was impossible. However, he imposed stringent conditions for any such claims, and even Wesley's use of external works as indirect, corroborating evidence did not meet Locke's standards of authenticating spiritual claims. And yet, Forster also argues that Locke's religious epistemology emphasizing personal communication with God opened the door to easier claims of direct inspiration. In this case, Wesley's application of Locke would not be too far afield. Greg Forster, *John Locke's Politics of Moral Consensus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–123, 126.

9 In this sense, this study agrees with Kenneth Collins' argument that entire sanctification is an attempt at a doctrine of "sanctification by faith alone." Collins, *The Theology of John Wesley*, 187–88. Forging similarities between these two aspects of soteriology was an insightful development in Wesley, but as the study of Barth will demonstrate, the inner witness of the Spirit applied to sanctification obscured the christological unity between justification and sanctification. But positively, Wesley recognized the need for a deeper connection between the initial stage of salvation and the sanctified end of the Christian life.

10 Wesley held to a gradual view of sanctification, as did Calvin, but Wesley sought to make room for the actual completion of this process within the believer's lifetime. Wesley held more against Luther regarding soteriology. Implicitly within his sermon on "Justification by Faith," he appears to deny the Lutheran *simul iustus et peccator* when he states that "Least of all does justification imply, that God is deceived in those whom he justifies; that he thinks them to be what, in fact, they are not; that he accounts them to be otherwise than they are." John Wesley, Sermon 5, "Justification by Faith," in *Sermons, 1–33*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 1 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 188. For Wesley, the Lutherans erred in thinking that a person could be simultaneously righteous and yet still a sinner; the two states are mutually exclusive. If one was justified and received initial sanctification (however imperfectly), then the person is no longer a sinner, but is in fact made actually righteous. Lutheranism, however, at least as Wesley understood it, taught that a person was declared righteous but remained a sinner for the rest of their earthly lives, never in themselves becoming righteous. Such a thought could only be antithetical to Wesley's insistence that the eschatological reality of full sanctification was available before death.

Insofar as Wesley was combatting antinomian tendencies within later Lutheranism, his objection against the *simul iustus et peccator* is correct. As an interpretation of Luther himself, however, Wesley's teaching is questionable. Finnish Luther interpretations have argued that Luther's doctrine of justification by faith involves drawing the believer into the life of God himself, functioning

admitted of some progress in the Christian life but gave the believer hope and certainty that this holiness could actually be achieved.[11] According to Wesley, sanctification begins in the believer's life at conversion and increases gradually as the believer cooperates with the grace of God.[12] However, he felt compelled by Scripture to say that there was a temporal moment in the believer's life when this purification was accomplished. After all, Jesus had commanded his followers to be "perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect," reflecting the Levitical command for holiness (Matt 5:48). For Wesley, Christ's command for believers to be perfect implied that perfection is achievable by believers in their lifetime. The NT letters from Paul, Peter, and John likewise state that those who are justified have ceased from sin and cannot continue any longer in sin, and Wesley found no other explanation for these texts than the simple reality that one can and should strive for perfection in the here and now.[13]

Christian perfection was a heavily qualified term for Wesley. At its core, perfection was another term for holiness and so did not eliminate the possibility of either falling from perfection or progressing in it.[14] Further, perfection has an external and internal component to it. On the one hand, believers become holy when they have ceased from all outward sin, meaning that they simply do not commit sinful actions. Here Wesley is not referring to a cessation of only willful or habitual sin, but a complete cessation from all outward forms of sin.[15] On the other hand, perfection also includes an internal component, which is the freedom

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as a type of *theosis* or deification. Thus, the imputation of righteousness does not rule out being made righteous in oneself; both realities accompany one another for Luther. Tuomo Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith: Luther's View of Justification*, ed. Kirsi Stjerna (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 16–19, 55–58. If there is any accuracy in this reading of Luther, then perhaps there are more similarities between Luther and Wesley than Wesley himself recognized. Even so, the question of when this full sanctification may be experienced remained a dividing factor between himself and the reformers.

11 Oden, *John Wesley's Scriptural Christianity*, 334.

12 Hence Maddox's insistence on "responsible grace." Maddox, *Responsible Grace*, 177–78. That there are synergistic elements in Wesley is undeniable. The debate between Maddox and Collins, however, is whether gradual sanctification naturally leads into the state of perfection, or if entire sanctification is a result of an instantaneous work of God's free grace. Again, without attempting to resolve the dilemma, the assumption of this paper is that the debate is not due to either side's negligence of the material, but an ambiguity within Wesley himself.

13 John Wesley, Sermon 40, "Christian Perfection," in *Sermons II, 34–70*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 2 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1985), 106.

14 John Wesley, "Christian Perfection," 104–105; Maddox, *Responsible Grace*, 187. Wesley attributes this to a shift from a Western view of perfection as static and unchanging to a more Eastern view of perfection as connoting progress after the experience of sanctification. Here is part of the great promise of Wesley's theology, as he tries to speak of perfection from a biblical perspective that shakes off Greek definitions of perfection, wrapped up as they are in the notions of timelessness. The result is that perfection is not a Stoic distancing of oneself from the world, somehow rising above the cares of earthly life, but a holiness that engages the creaturely and bodily nature of believers.

15 Wesley, "Christian Perfection," 107.

from all evil thoughts or tempers.[16] Christians may still suffer from lack of knowledge, error, and physical or mental infirmities, and are susceptible to temptations of varying degrees, but in a perfected state they are completely released of all sin, both in their minds and in their actions.[17]

Wesley's concepts of the inner witness and entire sanctification cannot be considered as separate, unrelated ideas; they possess a fundamental continuity with one another. Since the goal of Wesley's theology was to give people certainty that progress towards holiness was occurring in their lives, he made the inner witness part of the experience of entire sanctification, just as he did with justification. In "Thoughts on Christian Perfection," Wesley makes this connection clear:

> When, after having been fully convicted of inbred sin, by a far deeper and clearer conviction than that he experienced before justification, and after having experienced a gradual mortification of it, he experiences a total death to sin, and an entire renewal in the love and image of God, so as to rejoice evermore, to pray without ceasing, and in everything to give thanks. Not that the feeling *all love* and *no sin* is a sufficient proof. Several have experienced this for a considerable time, and yet were afterwards convinced that their souls were not entirely renewed. None therefore ought to believe that the work is done till there is added the testimony of the Spirit, witnessing his entire sanctification as clearly as his justification.[18]

To be sure, the inner witness of the Spirit to the first act is a separate witness from the second, and the two witnesses are distinguished by the fact that entire sanctification requires visible works as the lead-up to this second work of grace. But the two testimonies function in similar ways. Although works are necessary leading up to perfection, these works are only an indirect witness to one's entire sanctification. Someone could exhibit perfect love and cease from sin and still be deceived, but if to the mortification of sin be added "a clear, direct witness of the

16 Wesley, "Christian Perfection," 118.

17 Wesley, "Christian Perfection," 100–104.

18 John Wesley, "Thoughts On Christian Perfection," in *Doctrinal and Controversial Treatises II*, ed. Paul Wesley Chilcote and Kenneth J. Collins; vol. 13 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 2013), 73; emphasis original. Wesley reaffirms this in his major treatise on the same subject. John Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," in *Doctrinal and Controversial Treatises II*, ed. Paul Wesley Chilcote and Kenneth J. Collins; vol. 13 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 2013), 174. As with the witness to justification, Wesley is unclear if the believer must experience the inner witness to lay claim to entire sanctification. Nevertheless, it was one of the central ways of knowing one's entire sanctification, and Wesley taught that it could be expected. John Wesley, "Farther Thoughts upon Christian Perfection," in *Doctrinal and Controversial Treatises II*, ed. Paul Wesley Chilcote and Kenneth J. Collins; vol. 13 of *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 2013), 102.

renewal," Wesley says, "I judge it as impossible this man should be deceived therein as that God should lie."[19] Entire sanctification, at least in its epistemological foundation, is based on the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit.

Applying the inner witness of the Holy Spirit to entire sanctification, however, also brings with it the same problem of subjectivity. Wesley wanted to make Christian perfection a work of the sovereign grace of God, but grounding it in an inner testimony of the Spirit makes it dependent upon the interiority of the believer and subject to the psychological movements of the soul. This foundation makes Christian perfection hard to pinpoint. If the works of love and cessation from sin, even without an inner conviction of one's own holiness, are not sure indicators that God's sanctifying work has taken place, it is impossible to know for certain if one has achieved perfection or not. It is even more difficult to see if, as Wesley said, the believer grows in grace even after this event takes place. How a person tells the difference between the witness of the Holy Spirit and the believer's own psychological state is not altogether clear, and therefore, the inner witness fails as an epistemological ground for entire sanctification.

Wesley's concern, however, was twofold: to accurately give voice to the perfective aspect of sanctification as described in the Scriptures, and to be consistent in applying the Reformation concept of the twofold grace by making justification and sanctification parallel acts of God. The main problem with Wesley's understanding of perfection, however, is that it required him to posit a subjective inner witness to sanctification. Knowledge of sanctification requires a stronger basis outside of the believer's own self and consciousness for it to function in the way Wesley desired. Creatively weaving together an understanding of divine initiative in sanctification can help Wesleyans to build more theological foundations into the doctrine of Christian perfection, guarding it against tendencies towards psychologism. Twentieth-century developments provide new ways of reconstructing some of Wesley's concerns in this fashion, and for these new theological foundations, we turn to examine Karl Barth.

Reconstructing Christian Perfection

Barth dealt thoroughly with the topic of the Holy Spirit and sanctification in a 1938 lecture on *The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life*, where he addresses the relation between finite human experiences and the transcendence of God's Spirit. Already in these early lectures, Barth began with the foundational insight that the Christian life must begin with the divine act. The Spirit's divinity requires a complete distinction between the Holy Spirit and our spirit, meaning that "none of the external or internal 'urges' of our existence, as creatures that we know of, can be taken

19 Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," 175.

by us in themselves and as they are already as the Creator's word."[20] While Barth never directly references Wesley, here he reiterates what I have claimed is the real problem behind Wesley's theology: there is no way of telling what is simply an "internal urge of our existence" and what is the event of the Word's sanctifying power. The result is that the human aspect of the Christian life obscures the divine action. A stronger sense of God's work in sanctification is needed for believers to know with certainty that they are sanctified entirely.[21]

Barth's formal doctrine of sanctification in *CD* IV/2 provides the emphasis on God's work by centering the believer's holiness upon the salvific work of Jesus Christ. The covenant of grace secures the believer's sanctification through the exaltation of humanity in the Son of Man. Locating sanctification in the covenant of grace means that it is not we ourselves, but Jesus Christ, who is the sanctified human being—entirely sanctified and perfected as the exalted one:

> The sanctification of man which has taken place in this One is their sanctification. But originally and properly it is the sanctification of Him and not of them. Their sanctification is originally and properly His and not theirs. For it was in the existence of this One, in Jesus Christ, that it really came about, and is and will be, that God Himself became man, that the Son of God became also the Son of Man, in order to accomplish in His own person the conversion of man to Himself.[22]

In this way, the purification of the sinner is made certain in the person and work of Jesus Christ, in his act of atonement and his resurrection from the dead, and it is by participation in the holy humanity of Jesus Christ that the believer comes to partake in Christ's holiness. To assert a more objective sense of sanctification, it is important to emphasize that holiness is proper first and foremost to the triune God, and secondarily and derivatively to his people. Knowledge of our entire sanctification is not found through analyzing the psychological movements of our souls, but by gazing upon the sanctified person of Jesus Christ, by whom we ourselves become holy through union with his body and participation in his righteousness.

Based on this christological restatement, the sanctification of humanity can even be spoken of as an "entire" sanctification or as "Christian perfection."[23]

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20 Karl Barth, *The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis of Ethics*, ed. Robin W. Lovin (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 9.

21 Barth, *The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life*, 7.

22 Karl Barth, "The Doctrine of Reconciliation," in *Church Dogmatics* IV/2, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1958), §66.2, 514.

23 Bruce McCormack makes a similar amendment to Wesley's theology. He argues that Barth and Wesley both attempt to articulate the temporal realization of sanctification's eschatological reality, but that Barth's method is decidedly more christocentric. For McCormack, the problem is that Wesley operates with an "essentialist" ontology, whereas Barth's ontology is "actualistic" and

Wesley and Barth both creatively make room for the perfective aspect of holiness, an insight often obscured in other Protestant understandings of the Christian life. Yet, Wesley's overblown pneumatology prevented him from making the christological move of linking entire sanctification to the atonement.[24] Barth grants this perfective aspect a christological basis in the covenant of grace, which makes knowledge of sanctification more reliable than it is in Wesley's inner witness. Human beings become entirely sanctified by the Christ event, and they become holy in their lives and hearts through receiving Christ by faith and continued participation in his holiness. Believers can affirm that they are perfect as the heavenly Father is perfect—not subjectively in themselves, but by participation in the reality accomplished in Christ. Barth's theology focuses sanctification in the Christ event rather than a subjective inner witness, thereby providing a secure theological foundation for the Wesleyan idea of perfection. For this reason, he is a valuable resource for Wesleyan theologians.

Using Barth as a resource for Wesleyan theology might seem to be an awkward

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"nonmetaphysical." Bruce L. McCormack, "Sanctification After Metaphysics," in *Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice*, ed. Kelly M. Kapic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2014), 121–22. McCormack's assessment is important and insightful, but we have diverged from him at crucial points. While an essentialist versus an actualistic ontology is central for McCormack's evaluation, applying the essentialist category to Wesley misses the way that Wesley eschewed Greek understandings of perfection as a perfection of being. Although McCormack might be correct that the Eastern (that is, non-essentialist) elements of Wesley have been exaggerated, at the very least we can say that Wesley was sufficiently critical of a metaphysics of being when he taught a dynamic perfection; he is explicit in his divergence from Greek thought at this point. Thus, although McCormack and I have both used Barth's christocentric doctrine to modify Wesley, our understandings of the problem appear to be different, as it has been my main contention that the inner witness of the Holy Spirit in Wesley represents a modern turn to the subject that prevented him from making the christological move. As a man of his age, Wesley was still captive to the shortcomings of the Enlightenment, and Christian theology more broadly would have to wait another century after Wesley before this turn began to be seriously questioned from within.

24 Noted earlier was Wesley's attempt to define justification and sanctification as fundamentally similar acts. Here is another point where we may affirm Wesley in his basic insights, if not in his final articulation. His impulses were not wrong, and it was consistent with his Reformation heritage to emphasize their similarity, even in their perfective aspect. The problem, however, was twofold: first, Wesley introduced an unhealthy amount of introspection and subjectivity into these doctrines using his inner witness of the Holy Spirit as their unifying basis. Secondly, Wesley temporally separated these two events and attributed their likeness to a similarity of function. Instead of proceeding from a general likeness, however, Wesley should have unified the twofold grace in Christ's salvific work, as found in Barth's theology. Barth strengthens the connection to the atonement by making justification and sanctification two distinct but inseparable moments of the one divine act of reconciliation, centered in the history of Jesus Christ. George Hunsinger, "A Tale of Two Simultaneities: Justification and Sanctification in Calvin and Barth," *Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie* 18, no. 3 (2002): 317, 324. Barth, *CD* IV/2, §66.1, 505. Wesley would not have distinguished the grace of entire sanctification from the grace of God in the atonement. He would have claimed that the grace of God operative in the cross is the same as the grace that perfects the believer, but one of the weaknesses of his theology is that he offered little conceptual basis for this claim, failing as he did to root sanctification in the Christ event. Thus, we may affirm Wesley in the goal of making justification and sanctification parallel acts of God, but opt for the Barthian method of making this assertion on the grounds of the Son's reconciling work.

fit, especially since Barth has a reputation for emphasizing divine initiative in ways that at times can seem to obscure human agency. In his now classic book, *Character and the Christian Life*, Stanley Hauerwas articulates one of the central critiques of Barth's theological ethics, which is the problem of the seeming lack of visible ethics in the Christian life.[25] Particularly in the realm of Wesleyan theology, it is not difficult to see some Wesleyans asking, given Wesley's own concern for practical holiness, how Barth's ethical theory becomes manifest in the life of the Christian. Barth's reconciliation ethics in *CD* IV/4 and the lecture fragments, published in *The Christian Life*, display the strengths as well as the challenge of Barth for the task of constructive Wesleyan theology.

In his study of the final volume of the *Church Dogmatics*, John Webster observes that Barth's mature theology is through and through a work of moral theology, and therefore, ethics is never far throughout his dogmatics.[26] In the reconciliation ethics, Barth makes room for the visibility of theological ethics through the category of "invocation." Prayer is the central theme of Barth's account of the Christian life; it is, after all, a human action, but one that is by nature directed to the divine action and dialogically related to it. God is the decisive force of the Christian life, but rather than eliminating the possibility of human activity, God's action frees the human being to respond with gratitude and faithfulness.[27]

As Barth moves through the various petitions of the Lord's prayer, he mentions the divine action invoked as the basis of the Christian life, as well as the human response that participates in this divine act. Believers pray for the hallowing of God's name, but even as they pray they hallow the name of God by giving precedence to the Word of God in all areas of life, above all other gods, ideologies, and loyalties.[28] They pray, "Thy kingdom come," all the while seeking to conform their human righteousness and justice, however flawed they may be, to the righteousness of God.[29] Divine agency does not rule out human action in the Christian life but rather enables it to function freely.

Despite the attention that Barth gives to human action in *The Christian Life*, however, Barth's later theology tends to divide divine and human actions into separate events, undermining the participatory aspect of the Christian life so prominent in *CD* IV/2. The separation of Spirit baptism and water baptism in the baptism fragment as distinct divine and human actions reveals that human action

25 Stanley Hauerwas, *Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics* (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975), 169–71.
26 John Webster, *Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4.
27 Karl Barth, *The Christian Life:* Church Dogmatics IV, 4 *Lecture Fragments*, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), §76.3, 86–89.
28 Barth, *The Christian Life*, §77, 111–204.
29 Barth, *The Christian Life*, §78, 205–71.

and God's action can tend to be elided in Barth's reconciliation ethics. Each of their respective agencies is placed in different spheres, with no overlap. However, if Barth places sanctification in the divine category, he undermines human participation in Christ's holiness, since the human acts that correspond to Christ's work of sanctification must belong to an altogether different sphere. Sanctification may apply to Christ, but the way that it applies to believers becomes strained if the divine and human actions are pulled too far apart.

In part, this problem for Barth is related to his loss of sacramentality. John Yocum's in-depth study on ecclesial mediation argues that as he reached his mature theology, Barth slowly drained the church of its sacramental area as divine and human actions became viewed as mutually exclusive realms.[30] With the loss of a sacramental understanding of reality, it became harder for Barth to avoid overemphasizing God's action, since the human being was increasingly understood as being unable to mediate divine actions. In the context of our discussion, this tendency undermines the participatory nature of sanctification, since human actions become incapable of manifesting the holiness of God. Holiness applies to Jesus Christ, but it is difficult to establish a conceptual basis for holiness in believers without a robust sacramentality that allows the human to mediate divine actions.

The loss of agency given to the Holy Spirit and the human agent in sanctification, I would argue, is a side effect of Barth's dismissal of sacramental reality. Wesleyan theology, however, is not lacking in this area, at least in its classical articulation. Wesley retained a strong sacramentology from Anglicanism and continued to make it evident in his discussions of the means of grace. These means of grace are "outward signs, words, or actions, ordained of God, and appointed for this end—to be the *ordinary* channels whereby he might convey to men preventing, justifying, or sanctifying grace." These continued to serve as visible, instituted practices where God's work and human actions came together.[31] Here, human actions serve as channels of the divine action, and God conveys grace to the believer through these actions. The means of grace, in other words, are where sanctification is communicated from the divine to the human and becomes visible.

Through these sacramental actions, human beings receive God's grace and enact their discipleship in tangible means, both in works of piety (Scripture reading, prayer, fasting, meditation) and in acts of mercy (feeding for the poor, caring for the sick, hospitality). Such a concept makes the Christian life concrete by

30 John Yocum, *Ecclesial Mediation in Karl Barth* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), xi–xv.

31 John Wesley, Sermon 16, "Means of Grace," in *Sermons I, 1–33*, ed. Albert C. Outler; vol. 1 in *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 381.

retaining a sacramental view of reality that tends to be obscured in the later Barth, allowing for human manifestation of God's holiness.

Thus, if Barth's theology is to be of any use to Wesleyan theologians, they must repudiate the tendency to adopt the anemic sacramental views common in evangelicalism and return to the rich sacramentality that Wesley himself valued. Anglican sacramentalism was a crucial part of Wesley's vision for the Christian life, and no recovery or development of his insights on Christian perfection can occur if Wesleyans continue to neglect the importance of sacraments in their ecclesiological practice. A reconstructed doctrine of Christian perfection must not only draw on Barth's Christ-centered view of sanctification but must also reassert a sacramental understanding of the world and God's relationship to humanity. Doing so unlocks the potential of Wesley and Barth's theology for a fresh understanding of sanctification in contemporary Wesleyan theology.

A Revival in Wesleyan Sanctification

Perhaps it is as William Abraham has said: Christian perfection is dead, and Wesleyan theology with it. This study has been an exploration of whether we might resurrect Christian perfection. The answer I have given is a yes and a no. Christian perfection can live again—that is, there is worth in examining John Wesley's theology and engaging in the same questions that he asked. He offers plenty of valid insights on sanctification that not only are resonant with the church's tradition but also add significant depth to our understanding of the Christian life. However, Wesleyan evangelicals must not become adherents to a dead tradition. They must amend and develop Wesley's thought as part of a living tradition, most importantly by reversing the turn to the subject embodied in the inner witness and exploring different theological foundations for some of their most core convictions.

Doubtless, some Wesleyans will not be convinced by these proposals. Nevertheless, Barth challenges us to ask deep questions regarding the theological foundations of sanctification and the Christian life. His christological understanding of sanctification is a promising way of developing Christian perfection in such a way that reverses the subjective elements of the doctrine while also maintaining Wesley's core teaching that holiness is not hopelessly out of reach but is available for believers today, if they will only gaze upon their crucified and risen Lord and reach out to him in faith. Barth is not the savior of Wesleyan Christianity, and there are times when Barth's theology itself falls short. Where he is less helpful, Wesleyans can fall back on the riches of their own tradition and recover resources for the renewal of their theology.

Finally, these proposals offer a way of reinterpreting Wesleyan theology that bolsters the work of theological reflection within the tradition. One of William Abraham's keys for retrieving Christian perfection is serious endeavors of

systematic and historical theology that not only focus on post-Wesley Methodist dogmatics but also attempt to heal the tradition of its anthropocentric turn through immersion into the great themes of the Christian faith.[32] This study is an effort to engage in this ongoing task. Regardless, whether Barth answers all of our questions and concerns or not, he asks the question all Wesleyans must answer: whether there is not a more rigorous critique that is first needed before Wesleyans can reclaim Christian perfection.

32 Abraham, "Christian Perfection," 598–99.

An Evangelical Scientist Rescues Methodological Naturalism[1]

Anjeanette Roberts
Reasons to Believe

Abstract

Among many evangelicals, methodological naturalism (MdN) is maligned as an undue commitment to naturalism and a tack taken only to exclude intelligent design or creation arguments from scientific discourse. Many antagonists of MdN argue that strict MdN as the only valid methodology for conducting research should be abandoned. As an evangelical Christian and a research scientist in molecular and cellular biology, I will argue that this criticism is misguided and counterproductive to science and to the science-faith discourse. I believe the harsh position against MdN results from a series of misunderstandings: (1) misunderstanding the difference between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, (2) misunderstanding the proper demarcation of science and scientific pursuits, (3) equivocating science with human reasoning and human rationality, and (4) neglecting a robust Christian theology that entails methodological naturalism as the proper methodology for scientific research and demarcation of scientific pursuits. These misunderstandings lead some Christians to make an unnecessary call to redefine science and contribute to an anemic view of Christian theology. I will argue that properly understanding and demarcating science within its sphere sovereignty and its constraints of methodological naturalism is the appropriate way to access God's revelation in creation and ground a Christian apologetic for research scientists.

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1 This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the interdisciplinary theology conference, "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, held at Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017.

The Challenge

Is it inconsistent for someone who follows Jesus and believes in miracles like his resurrection and who is engaged in scientific research to embrace methodological naturalism (MdN) in the pursuit of their work? Many Christian scholars contend it is. Yet, many professionals engaged in scientific research insist that MdN is the *only* appropriate methodology for conducting their research.

I will make my case as an evangelical Christian who believes in strict MdN for conducting scientific research (both in design and implementation of experiments) by arguing that others reach this tension over MdN—from both sides—*by conflating critical concepts*. I will identify these concepts, distinguish critical differences, and argue for MdN on the basis of those definitions and distinctions and by offering a coherent Christian theological basis for doing so.

Defining Methodological Naturalism

In 1982, Paul de Vries coined the term "methodological naturalism" when he was faculty and founder of the Center for Applied Christian Ethics at Wheaton College. De Vries, currently president of the New York Divinity School, described MdN saying, "The natural sciences are limited by method to naturalistic foci. By method they must seek answers to their questions within nature, within the non-personal and contingent created order, and not anywhere else. Thus, the natural sciences are limited by what I call *methodological naturalism*" (emphasis mine).[2]

Many argue for strict MdN in order to rule out alternative definitions of science that open the doors of science to such things as the Intelligent Design (ID) movement or religious creation claims. Yet, in accordance with de Vries definition, I, as others have done, will argue for strict MdN due to the nature and limitations, or proper demarcation, of science itself.

Distinction of a Methodology from a Philosophical Commitment

First, one should make clear that methodological naturalism is not the same as *metaphysical* (or philosophical) *naturalism* (PhN). Part of the problem that leads many to reject the claims of MdN as the appropriate means for science is that they do not make this distinction. *The distinction between the two is critical.* New Testament scholar Michael Licona, donning a professional historian's hat, offers a helpful and brief distinction between the two:

Metaphysical naturalism is sometimes confused with methodological naturalism. The latter is the process by which a scientist or historian looks for a natural cause of an event. Although she does not rule out the possibility of a supernatural

2 Quoted by Keith B. Miller, "The Misguided Attack on Methodological Naturalism," in *For the Rock Record: Geologists on Intelligent Design*, ed. Jill S. Schneiderman and Warren D. Allmon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 123.

cause, she limits herself only to consideration of the natural. Metaphysical naturalism goes further, claiming that everything has a natural cause. Supernatural causes are *a priori* ruled out as possibilities. Although little difference exists in practice between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, the latter is guided more by the metaphysics of the practitioner.[3]

The language Licona employs and his concluding statement in particular are telling. In describing MdN he says, "She limits herself only to the *consideration* of the natural" (emphasis mine). And in comparing methodological and metaphysical naturalism he says, "*little difference exists in practice between [the two]*" (emphasis mine).

Although Licona lumps the scientist and historian together, in regard to science (although not history), it would be beneficial to tweak Licona's definition to, "She limits herself only to the *examination* of the natural." This is an important distinction because it allows a clearer differentiation between one's methodological and metaphysical commitments as one looks for a natural cause of an event.[4] If one insists on using "consideration" instead of "examination," then one begins to conflate the two. (This conflation is due to another confusion I will address a bit later in my argument.) One could also avoid conflating a methodological approach with a philosophical commitment to naturalism by adding the qualifying phrase, "in her experimentation." Importantly, either of these suggested changes affirms an inherent demarcation of the nature of science itself. Much of the tension over MdN, unfortunately, persists because of a failure to faithfully understand the demarcation of science.

The Demarcation and Nature of Science

This brings us to my second point, understanding the demarcation and nature of science. Science is a set of processes or assays employed for examining natural phenomena—those involving matter, energy, space, and time. Thus, science has limits. Some current limits are dynamic and will be pushed further and further out into currently unknown areas as technology and instrumentation become more sophisticated. For this reason, we may never be able to pinpoint some boundaries of science's limits. But this fact does not negate the reality that science has limits, some of which are definite and innate to science itself. For example, scientific

3 Michael R. Licona, *The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), 142 n. 28.

4 Another possible solution is to abandon the terminology of *naturalism* in one's methodology altogether, e.g. substituting *methodological subsidiarity* as suggested by Graham Cole in his address to the 2018 Dabar Conference. Borrowing concepts from Michael Polanyi, *The Study of Man* (Mansfield Center, CT: Martino, 1959), 30–31, Cole suggests the work of research science occurs in one's focal awareness, describing natural phenomena, while one's philosophical commitments are entailed in one's subsidiary awareness.

methodologies cannot ultimately differentiate philosophical claims regarding the nature of reality. Science will never be able to differentiate between a philosophical commitment that states, "All that exists is matter and energy," and one that claims, "There are things that exist that transcend matter and energy and physical laws and entities." Science cannot differentiate between these two because scientific experimentation and inquiry are constrained to examine only natural phenomena that occur within the material realm of reality. *We have to be faithful to understand and employ science for what it is.*

Experimental science or the natural sciences are performed through direct observations and measurements with or without specialized instrumentation. Physical phenomena are observed, data captured, variables regulated, and data re-collected. Doing science entails physical measurements of physical phenomena. It is essential to the scientific process that the investigator control variables to sequester and identify causal relationships. We scrutinize the physical regularities of nature, its cause-and-effect relationships, identify laws that account for properties and activities of various natural phenomena and build models (real or conceptual) about how nature works through scientific processes. Science is a systematic activity for identifying physical properties and mechanisms that underlie links of natural cause-and-effect relationships. The rigors of our scientific investigation of nature have led to great success and gains in reliable knowledge of how things work.

Advantage—Natural Science

The natural sciences fare better in respect to gaining systematic knowledge in their spheres of inquiry in comparison to the humanities or social sciences in that the objects of inquiry in the hard sciences lend themselves to a more precise study of such properties and mechanisms. As my philosophy colleague puts it, "Science is the best way to know things that science is suited to study." Or sometimes, "Obtaining knowledge about the nature of reality is easier in the natural sciences than in the humanities and social sciences." This is true because science is well suited to study natural phenomena and has had great success in prediction and application. This success has led to a *preeminence* of science in the pursuit of knowledge, but all the more reason to be careful to realize that science has limits—both definite and innate as well as indefinite and dynamic. If we fail to recognize this, we may extrapolate science beyond its limits or conflate it with something else.

So, to my second point, it really is a misunderstanding or misappropriation of science and its methodologies that suggests Christians should not employ methodological naturalism in all scientific design and experimentation. But it is also a grave misunderstanding or blind spot to think that because science cannot address

a particular phenomenon, it is *unreasonable* or *irrational* to consider the phenomenon as data in evaluating competing theories.

Conflating Science and Knowledge

Here lies another critical distinction. Science is not, despite its etymological root, equivalent to knowledge. Scientific inferences and human reasoning are not synonymous; yet they too are frequently conflated. Statements or arguments contextualizing something as scientific are often made due to a preeminence of science and scientific theories in contemporary societies. If something is scientific we are likely to give it more credence. Additionally, people often erroneously label claims or conclusions as "scientific" while failing to recognize philosophical naturalism at work. Philosophical naturalism masquerades as scientific reasoning by distorting or extrapolating science beyond its limits, stating that that which is being determined scientifically is all that there is in reality. This is a philosophical conjecture, not a scientific conclusion or statement.

The conflation of science and knowledge and more often of scientific reasoning and human reasoning is pervasive. The definition of science debated between ID advocates and opponents regarding the 2007 Kansas Science Standards exemplifies this: "Science is a human activity of systematically seeking natural explanations for what we observe in the world around us."[5] ID advocates, seeking inclusion of intelligent design theories in science education, tried to change the language by replacing "natural" with "logical" rendering, "Science is a human activity of systematically seeking logical explanations for what we observe in the world around us." This is an unfortunately poor definition of science, and the proposed fix by ID advocates is no better.

Rendering the definition of science as the "explanation for what we observe," like Licona's use of "consideration," employs language that could represent stepping outside normative empirical science into interpretations driven by philosophical biases. As Alvin Plantinga puts it, "Explanation is a slippery notion and a complex phenomenon."[6] Although science involves explanations and model building, we must recognize that in the process of abductively reasoning to best explanations, philosophical views are imported into the process.

Scientific inferences are a subset of human reasoning and can be used in support of naturalistic *or* theistic narratives. Furthermore, scientific reasoning is not a restriction to be put on all human reasoning. In other words, our reasoning to best *explanations* is not limited to *consider* only scientifically derived inferences.

Let's consider an example.

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5 Miller, "Misguided Attack" in *For the Rock Record*, 118, see also p. 137 n. 1.
6 Alvin Plantinga, "Methodological Naturalism?," *Origins and Design* 18.1 (1997).

Human Reasoning and a Proper Demarcation of Science

If I put you in the hypothetical situation: that of an observer who knows only this, a full-grown, living box turtle is balanced and stuck on the top of a fence post of a barbed wire fence. You will almost certainly rule out various explanations as to how the turtle got there. It did not climb the fence post. It did not climb the barbed wire. It was not left there by a predator. It did not fall from any cliff or rock. It was not launched there by a well-timed and perfectly positioned earthquake or meteorite strike. In fact, based on strong inferences of past experience, your most reasonable explanation is that some prankster picked up the turtle and placed it atop the post. This is not a scientific explanation, but it is a rational one. Even though you may approach the likelihood of possible explanations through experimental design and implementation, scientific testing will get you only so far. Collect turtles, attempt to have them climb the post or wire. Observe only failed outcomes. Create earthquake (EQ)-like conditions in a scenario where a fence post and turtle are exposed to such conditions. Increase intensity and vary durations of EQ conditions to see if you can ever launch the turtle to the position atop the fence post without disrupting it from that position once attained. Run the experiment 50 times, 500 times. Observe only failed outcomes.

At some point, human reasoning will intervene and suggest that your scientific inquiries might be futile. Although you have not yet falsified the theory that a non-human explanation is possible, human reasoning will lead one to a confident (but not necessarily certain) conclusion that the turtle was placed there by a person. Your confidence in your explanation is very high even in the absence of direct evidence that any such prankster exists or has been seen in the area. Scientific observations contributed to your conclusion, but they were not the sum of the data considered in abductively reasoning to the best conclusion or theory as to how the turtle arrived atop the fence post.

The lack of absolute certainty in your conclusion creates a problem but also opportunities. The problem is that one may never exhaust one's commitment to find a naturalistic explanation for a phenomenon. One may find practical reasons for abandoning further investigation, but often the strong intuition of some researchers leads them to persist and succeed where others may have long ago abandoned experimentation. Ultimately the individual in the research community is the only one that can determine when enough is seemingly enough. The opportunities invite us to maintain intellectual humility in all pursuits of truth about reality—about what we do and don't, can and can't know, and to recognize and articulate that science is not equivalent to rationality or human reason. Science is conducted by rational minds, and experimental findings contribute to human reasoning and determinations about the nature of reality. But science provides only

one set of tools for examining human nature, human experience, and the nature of reality.

Human rationality and reason are not constrained to consider, imagine, or intuit only those things that can be scientifically confirmed or described. In other words, human reasoning is not synonymous with scientific determinations. Employing scientific methodologies, we generate data for consideration, but fitting that data to a model necessitates reasoning within an underlying worldview. Human reasoning is employed in scientific experimentation and determinations, but human reasoning is not limited to consider only the scientifically verifiable. Interpretation and model development require more than the scientific data alone.

As Gerald Rau puts it, "Interpreting data requires logical inferences to: pass judgment, offer explanations, build models, and submit conclusions. Empirical evidence cannot stand alone in the process of science nor in any endeavor to understand the world in which we live."[7] In other words, science does not explain anything; *scientists* explain things. And scientists employ experimental findings, human reasoning, *and* philosophical commitments to make explanations.

Another way to consider the distinction between scientific determinations and philosophical commitments is to understand that all scientific explanations are naturalistic, but not all naturalistic *explanations* are necessarily scientific. Naturalistic explanations that describe specific mechanisms, regularities, and relationships of cause and effect in the natural world are scientific, but many more may be just naturalistic storytelling employing non-descriptive naturalistic place holders (e.g., "punctuated equilibrium" or "emergent property") to link data and render a naturalistic inference or best explanation. Recognizing this is extraordinarily important, especially if the true nature of reality includes an immaterial or supra-natural realm.

One other problem in separating a methodological from a metaphysical position in rendering explanations is that if one adopts the position of philosophical naturalism, one is left with little but methodological naturalism for making sense of reality. For this reason, many Christians and non-Christians mistakenly think that MdN favors philosophical naturalism, but that's not true.[8] Methodological naturalism is neutral. It flows and follows from a proper understanding of science from within a Christian theology as well as (or better than) from a philosophical commitment to naturalism.

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7 Gerald Rau, *Mapping the Origins Debate: Six Models for the Origin of Everything* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), 25.

8 Paul Draper, "God, Science, and Naturalism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Religion*, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford University Press, 2005), 299–300.

Christian Theology Provides Robust Grounding for Methodological Naturalism in Science

Christian theology supports methodological naturalism within the sphere of scientific studies of nature. It is the Creator and creation story of the Abrahamic faiths that accounts for the uniformity, regularity, and intelligibility of the universe. A rational creator accounts for the rationality of nature. Nature is not self-explanatory; nature itself needs an explanation. Its origins must be eternally existent or began to exist through the mediation of some being or force that transcends nature. The laws of physics and mathematics reliably concord with our comprehension of the universe and this need not be. As Einstein once said, "The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible."[9] Furthermore, the regularity of nature provides for all scientific inquiry; without it science as a discipline would fail. The rationality of the natural order concords far better with creation by a rational entity than with creation by unguided forces.

As evangelicals, we believe that the heart of the gospel message is that the Creator God desires restored relationship with all people made in his image. Because reconciliation is desired, God has made abundant revelation. Our Creator God has self-disclosed truth through revelation in nature, and in Scripture, and ultimately in the God-man, Jesus Christ. It is our shared endeavor as evangelical scholars, across our various disciplines, to unpack God's revelation in all of creation for all of humanity. As Abraham Kuyper puts it, "No one brain, one genius, one talent is given the ability to understand the fullness of *the Word* in creation, but all people together have the task of making this comprehension possible" (emphasis original).[10]

It is therefore impeccably reasonable to think that God delights in our scientific discoveries, in our growing understanding and acknowledgement of his glory in the elegant and intricate creation. As Proverbs 25:2 states, "It is the glory of God to conceal things, but the glory of kings [and scientists] is to search things out" (RSV).

This verse makes it clear that God did not create just for creation's sake. He created for the glory of the revelation of his majesty and greatness. Truly, nature is richly endowed for our good and ongoing discovery. The regularities and reliability of physical and chemical laws allow for our continued exploration of the extravagance and glory of creation. It is our Creator who has endowed creation in such a way as to not only reveal himself to us but to supply us with a means to flourish and care for creation better. It is the apologetic of the evangelical

9 Albert Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions: Based on "Mein Weltbild*," trans. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Bonanza, 1954), 292.

10 Abraham Kuyper, "Common Grace in Science," *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader*, ed. James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 445.

Christian scientist to highlight evidences of the extravagant and loving God of the Christian gospel in each new discovery. Indeed, there is no field of study, no academic discipline, no aspect in all of creation that does not fall under the sovereignty of God. As evangelical scholars, it is our joy to discover the truth of the gospel through various methodologies in various fields of study, including the natural sciences.

Conclusion

In still another unnecessary area of tension between Christians and scientists, I offer a way forward that benefits both groups. By de-conflating methodological and philosophical naturalism and recognizing the limitations and proper demarcation of science, researchers are free to pursue knowledge of underlying cause-and-effect mechanisms and relationships through scientific experimentation constrained by methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is the proper approach in design and experimentation where the integrity of research science may be pursued within its sphere sovereignty according to its limitations.

Embracing scientific discoveries as one source of data for consideration, we clear the ground for human reasoning where philosophical commitments and statements may be rightly identified and owned by their respective holders. As we foster dialogue, we should cease striving to make all human reasoning fall under the constraints of scientific reasoning, which may lead to an empiricist and positivist position that perhaps few of us might wish to defend or espouse.

When we wisely and humbly acknowledge the limitations of scientific inquiry and pursuits, it is reasonable and rational—within a worldview not constrained by philosophical naturalism—to conclude that the mind, if not also the hand, of one who transcends and orders nature has been at work. A robust Christian theology calls the scientist and all scholars to develop rigorous apologetics as we study and uncover the complexities and fullness of God's revelation. It is not inconsistent for a Christian to pursue science according to strict methodological naturalism. On the contrary, it is a good and beautiful place to stand and live in the humble pursuit of truth in science and in faithful theology.

Eve Christology: Embodiment, Gender, and Salvation[1]

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Abstract

Scholarly interaction with the position of Eve in relation to Christology has tended towards relegating her to an absent, subordinate, or implicit position, from the standpoint of the typological significance of Adam. The result is the assumption of an exclusively male representation of salvation, which inadvertently leads to questioning the particularity of the female body in relation to salvation. Does the Adam-Christ paradigm entail the inability for a male Christ to save women, since humanity in all its diversity is not represented in Christ? Does the idea that a woman is merely a deformed man who must "become male" to enter into salvation best capture the figures of Adam and Christ presented by the Pauline writings? In order to counteract these ideas, this essay will explore how Eve figures in Christological significance. The essay argues that Eve in the Pauline writings is a type of Christ, whose existence may serve to undermine the prevailing notion of male domination in the representation of embodied humanity.

Scholarly discussions of Pauline Christology have tended to relegate Eve to an absent, subordinate, or implicit position in contrast to the typological significance of Adam.[2] Indeed, the standard view of Paul's typology tethers together two men, Adam to Christ.[3] The result is the assumption of the presence of *only* a particularly

1 This essay won the Jack and Phyllis Middleton Memorial Award for Excellence in Bible and Theology, awarded to the best paper by a graduate student or non-tenured professor given at the conference on "Evangelical Theology—New Challenges, New Opportunities," co-sponsored by the Canadian-American Theological Association and Northeastern Seminary, held at Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, on October 21, 2017.

2 See the discussion in Benjamin H. Dunning, *Specters of Paul: Sexual Difference in Early Christian Thought* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Dunning, *Christ Without Adam: Subjectivity and Sexual Difference in the Philosopher's Paul* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

3 See Dunning's summary in "Christ Without Adam: Subjectivity and Sexual Difference in the Philosopher's Paul," Harvard Divinity School video lecture, October 16, 2014 (https://hds.harvard.edu/news/2014/10/16/video-christ-without-adam); around the ten-minute mark.

male representation of salvation, with an inadvertent question mark when it comes to where a female body might fit into this scheme.[4] That is, the discussion is typically approached from the standpoint of the assumed presence of Adam and the "problem" of Eve's placement as a representation of humanity (both male and female).[5] It is my contention that the difficulty of whether a male Christ can represent humanity is an artificial one, conceived with a lens that from the start erases "Eve" (that is, women), and then either mourns or celebrates her absence.[6]

It is time to begin approaching Christology and gender from a fresh perspective, without ignoring the historical exclusion of women on the basis of biblical, primarily Pauline, texts.[7] For this reason, I will launch the beginning of a discussion of how Eve figures Christologically, with the hope that there may be a transfiguration of our notions of the embodiment of salvation. My aim is that we will be able to see faith and calling in multifaceted, inclusive ways and be emboldened to seek out the representation and leadership of women. The question of where "Eve" figures in the theological world not only affects the inner world of faith and worship but has the power to transform how one relates to the outer world of social relations.[8]

This essay will argue that far from being absent—or merely present as an absence—Eve is a type of Christ whose existence serves to undermine the prevailing notion of male domination in the Christological representation of embodied humanity.

I will begin by offering a change in lenses from an emphasis on both historical reconstruction and patriarchy as the frame for understanding Eve's place in salvation, to the utilization of varied gendered language in the Pauline text to exemplify

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4 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Cross Roads, 1983).

5 According to Mary Daly: "Exclusively masculine symbolism for God, for the notion of divine 'incarnation' in human nature, and for the human relationship to God reinforce sexual hierarchy." Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 4.

6 From henceforth I will be using Eve as shorthand for women in general in the spirit of her typological significance. Gradually, I will expand this type to encompass humanity in general.

7 Although biblical scholars often distinguish between undisputed and disputed Pauline letters (with the Pastoral epistles in the latter category), this is not relevant to my analysis in this essay. While I tend to think that Pauline authorship is plausible for 1 Timothy, this is not required for my thesis, since there is a significant degree of continuity throughout the "Pauline" corpus on the status and role of women. So the reader may take my use of "Paul" and "Pauline" in what follows as they will.

8 To the extent which women are barred from representation, leadership and agency; there often follows a stunting of a community or society. The participation of both men and women is necessary for mutual human thriving." Gender inequality hurts economic growth," and as a result, education, micro financing, easing repression, and enabling access to jobs are some of the strategies employed to develop formal economies. Should theology be an exception when most of humanity is deeply religious? Perhaps "The double X solution" or "the girl effect" is the missing component across the board. See Nicholas D. Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn, *Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into Opportunity for Women Worldwide*, (New York: Knopf, 2009), xiv–xx.

embodied faith, while exploring how this undermines various perceived gender hierarchies. I will also be considering how early Christian writers used gender language to describe the struggle of faith, embodied existence, and future hope. The point here is to provide a plausibility lens from which to be able to conceive of an Eve Christology, thus opening the doors to re-imagine the place of Eve in our theological world, while remaining rooted in Scripture and tradition.

Following this change of lenses, I will attempt to launch a uniquely Eve Christology. Far from being absent or implicit, I will argue that 1 Tim 2:13–3:1a (along with 2 Cor 11:3) offers Eve as a type to Christ and representation of humanity.[9] Not only will I explore *how* the text understands Eve and Christ as representatives of humanity, but I will begin to wrestle with whether Christ as male reinforces gendered power structures or serves to diffuse them. This latter concern is what incentivized me to write this essay in the first place. I had initially become convinced of my position from my exegetical studies, following the internal logical of 1 Timothy; but I noticed that many positions, some overtly feminist, assumed a thoroughly sexist portrayal of Paul and would then read this portrayal back into various passages.

But does the idea that a woman is merely a deformed man, who must become male to enter into salvation, best capture the existence of the figures of Adam and Christ presented by these Pauline writings? What happens to this paradigm if it is forced to confront the "other" present in the same Scripture?

Finally, why take a multifaceted theological approach rather than merely an exegetical one that focuses on textual details in 1 Tim 2:15–3:1a? The answer is that this is the beginning of a much larger project and functions to launch a larger discussion. I do not wish to pretend that I have single-handedly resolved all exegetical or theological contentions, but perhaps my reflections here can move the discussion slightly or encourage further dialogue. Also, a multidisciplinary approach can contribute in ways that a narrow focus cannot, and visa versa. Theology need not be opposed to exegesis as though one dilutes or replaces the other. Rather, the Bible itself is already theological and we as human beings interpret our world and the text theologically; therefore, why not bring our theology intentionally to the text? By the same token, we must allow our theological notions to be challenged exegetically—indeed, by the text's own internal logic—since this will help guide and shape our conclusions and constructions.

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9 Although the final section of this essay will focus on 1 Tim 2:13–3:1a, I will also touch on Paul's reference to Eve in 2 Cor 11:3. The perceptive reader will note that I have included 1 Tim 3:1a ("It is a trustworthy statement") as the end of the unit beginning with 2:13, although it is typically taken with what follows. The reason for seeing 3:1a as referring to what came before will be addressed at the appropriate time.

Switching Lenses

How one approaches and/or experiences the larger question of gender in the Christian world will shape what is noticed or goes unnoticed in the Pauline corpus. It is not my desire to contend there is never the assumption of male priority in the background of the Pauline texts or to argue that everything fits neatly or perfectly into a modern feminist scheme. However, I would like to offer the following interpretive possibility: There exists a unity-in-diversity in Christ that relativizes power structures, which results in men, in a metaphorical sense, being allowed to become women in the context of these structures and in women becoming men, also metaphorically, in relation to gendered power structures.

This lens, which will be used as a starting point for approaching the position of Eve in relation to Christ, is rooted in two main considerations. The first is a sampling of Paul's use of feminine and masculine language in regard to himself and the spiritual growth of believers toward their *telos* in Christ. The second is how some early Christians used gendered language to describe themselves in relation to Christ.

Paul: Power, Embodiment, and Destiny

Paul readily applies feminine imagery to himself and to male believers, as well as masculine imagery to all believers, including women, in order to encourage an overall transformation in how they live out Christ in the world. In a world where, as Cynthia Westfall puts it, "virtue was manly, and males were stringently cautioned against displaying any kind of effeminate behavior, dress, role-playing or emotion,"[10] Paul captures the imagination in such a way as to take something societally devalued and threatening to masculinity, and gives it a pride of place in Christ.

This use of metaphor is not merely decorative, but profoundly formative. The power of a metaphor is in its ability to subvert our sensibilities by conveying something unexpected or unknown. The way Paul applies feminine imagery to himself and to men is subversive. By inviting listeners to accept feminine imagery for Paul himself, the door is open for this imagery to be applied to male readers of Paul, that they might understand what he is conveying.[11]

Paul uses three mother metaphors to describe himself and his role as an apostle who gives birth and nurses children. I will focus on two of these, which are found in 1 Cor 3:1–2 (similarly 1 Thess 2:7) and Gal 4:19.[12] The first mother metaphor

10 Cynthia Long Westfall, *Paul and Gender: Reclaiming the Apostle's Vision for Men and Women in Christ* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 51.

11 See Wayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation," in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 6, 63.

12 These mother metaphors are discussed in detail by Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007).

is set in the context of infighting for superiority of place and boasting in connection to various religious leaders, whether Apollos, Paul, or Cephas. Paul accomplishes what Beverly Roberts Gaventa identifies as "a metaphor squared," involving a double switch in order to counter the effort in the Corinthian congregation to gain the highest place over others.[13] He states: "Brothers, I could not talk to you as spiritual people, but as fleshly people, as infants in Christ. *I fed you milk*, not solid food, because you were unable to take it. Indeed, you are still not able, even now, for you are still of the flesh" (1 Cor 3:1–3a; NAB).[14]

Key to this scenario is not only the identification of the Corinthians as infants "in Christ" who need milk, rather than as adults, but also Paul's self-identification with a mother role, feeding them this milk. As Gaventa puts it: "First he metaphorizes (with apologies for the barbarism) the gospel as milk, then he 'squares' that image by metaphorizing himself as the mother whose body supplies the milk."[15] Initially, it is tempting to take the milk metaphor as merely a critique of the Corinthians, a sign of their immaturity. But in light of all is said to belong to the Corinthians in terms of their status in Christ, Paul is urging them to regard themselves as positively in need of the life-sustaining milk of the gospel.

The society of Paul's day generally held mothers to be of lesser status than fathers and viewed childhood as a precursor to adulthood, in which one moves away from the mother. In contrast, Paul has simultaneously lowered both himself and the Corinthians and, by the same token, elevated motherhood into apostleship, seeing it as corresponding to a deeper (or higher) reality in Christ. "When Paul presents himself as a mother," explains Gaventa, "he voluntarily hands over the authority of a patriarch in favor of a role that will bring him shame, the shame of a female-identified male." Yet, the imagery is effective because it "plays on hierarchical expectations: Paul presents himself as the authority who does not conform to standard norms of authority."[16] Paul has transfigured himself, allowing the "foolishness of the cross" from chapter 1 to permeate his being.

In Gal 4:19 Paul portrays himself as a woman in labor who remains so until Christ is birthed in the Galatian churches. This labor is a metaphor for Paul's apostolic anguish due to the Galatian tendency to return to slavery at the prompting of the missionaries Paul opposes. "My children, for whom I am again in labor until Christ be formed in you! I would like to be with you now and to change my tone, for I am perplexed because of you." (Gal 4:19–20) Here Paul freely feminizes himself in an effort to plead for the Galatian addressees to embrace the

13 Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul*, 83.

14 Emphasis added. Translations from the Bible in this essay will be from the New American Standard Bible (NASB), unless otherwise indicated. Note that this translation should be distinguished from the New American Bible (NAB), which will sometimes be used.

15 Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul*, 83.

16 Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul*, 219.

fullness of his gospel of freedom. In order to accept Paul's message about himself, they must see him as a sort of mother in anguish, but nonetheless the one bringing them the message of freedom and sonship because of the Son.

Paul, the metaphorical mother, has already declared in Gal 3:26–29 that through faith all are *sons* (υἱοὶ) and *heirs* of God in Christ. This serves as the basis for another flip in expectations on several counts, including gender, since the first-born son represents, inherits, and leads his family. Gal 3:26–29 comes in the context of Paul's controversy with Peter, who had refused to eat with the gentiles in the presence of the Jesus-following Jews sent from Jerusalem. Paul deems this hypocritical with respect to the "truth of the gospel" (Gal 2:13–14) and thus worthy of opposing him "to his face" (2:11). The well-known affirmation of Gal 3:28 ("there is no male and female"; author's translation) is situated within this larger context; this expresses Paul's understanding of the direct bearing that the reality of Christ has on how those who are "in Christ' ought to see themselves and others.

"There is no male and female" is a slight departure from how the other categories (Jew/Greek, slave/free) in Gal 3:28 are configured. Where the other pairs are contrasted with οὐδὲ, male and female are joined by καὶ. The basic meaning appears to be the same, except that the construction for male and female alludes to Gen 1:27 ("male and female he created them"). Paul is linking, and contrasting, the new creation theme of Galatians with the original creation of male and female in Genesis.

As with the other pairs in the context of the controversy with Peter, Paul is not denying that any differences exist, or trying to erase differences entirely (he still identifies as a Jew, for instance). What he is consistently countering is the *status* divisions that those in the church are retaining on the basis of these distinctions, so that a gentile is not fully and functionally an heir in Christ because he or she does not observe certain Jewish practices; in the case of men, this would include the former identity marker of circumcision. In Paul's view, women in this world of Christ have the *status* of first-born sons, something not merely to be realized in the future; rather, this should change the very fabric of the household economy of Christ in the church.

The context of this passage in Galatians is thus highly practical, dealing with the level of participation of gentiles in the life of the church, rooted firmly in the gospel message. In order to avoid hypocrisy, one's salvific inheritance must be recognized by a fundamental change in praxis. Gender difference in this context has no bearing on one's status and participation level in the life of the church. In Christ, represented through the world of metaphor, Paul can be a mother and women can be first-born sons. The result is not an erasure of difference, but an embracing of difference with a functional abolition of the status difference

accompanying it. "Sonship" is no longer gender or hierarchally based but shared in relation to Christ.

Gendered Metaphor Used by Early Christians

Of interest to this discussion are instances where masculine imagery is ascribed to early Christian women, who have "put on" Christ. At other times their female bodies are identified with the body of Christ, who is worshiped. What I hope to show in the examples below is how adopting masculine imagery functions to metaphorically switch the dynamics of power for women whose bodies were exploited and destroyed in ways intended to highlight their gender.[17] That is, they can be female, yet embody the character and status thought to be only reserved for men; they are thus able to represent both men and women in faith.

Strikingly, these accounts do not attempt to actually remake these women into men, as though they had to put off the feminine to make way for the masculine Christ. Rather, in metaphorical space women as women were able to take on attributes that were thought to be available only to men, such as bravery and steadfastness.[18] Thus, while remaining women, they defied gendered expectations in Christ.

The first example comes from Perpetua, a twenty-year-old breast-feeding woman who found herself threatened with death for her faith. The narrator of her story opens with an appeal to a "single manifestation of the one Holy Spirit," who gives gifts to all people as sons and daughters. Brothers are told to associate themselves with the martyrs, in this instance with Perpetua.[19] Perpetua herself describes her fear for her child's life since she is unable to nurse him, along with her father's rejection of her as his daughter. However, she believes "power comes not from ourselves but from God."[20] Before she dies she dreams of her impending martyrdom: "I was stripped of my clothing, and suddenly I was a man. My assistants began to rub me with oil as was the custom before a contest."[21]

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17 This exploitation and destruction included being set on poles naked, to be ripped apart by beasts, or put naked in nets to be gored by a mad cow (to match their gender). Curiously, those watching Perpetua and her companion be killed were horrified not by women being put naked in nets to be killed, but by their appearance: one is a young girl and the other's breasts are still dripping with milk. The "solution" was to cover their bodies.

18 This change should not be too surprising since gender was closely associated with status or poss ition. In both Paul and in ancient thinking one does not usually get a discussion of gender per se, but more concretely of wives, virgins, or other categories. In other words, one is dealing with where one is situated in an economy, whether societal or in a household; by contrast, in more recent times it has been easier to separate gender from positions closely tied to it. See Tommy Givens, "The Politics of Marriage in the Household Code: 1 Timothy 2:8–15 in Context" (unpublished essay).

19 Amy Oden, ed., *In Her Words: Women's Writings in the History of Christian Thought* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 27.

20 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 29.

21 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 31.

Her fight is thought not be against the beasts or opponents, but, cosmically, she battles the devil. In this context she is described as retaining her modesty, while immodesty is forced upon her in the process of her destruction. In the final scene, Perpetua guides the gladiator's trembling hand to her throat, interpreted by the narrator in this way: "so great a woman . . . could not have been slain had she not herself willed it." We get the strong sense that the power of God in the Spirit transfigures earthly power dynamics so that where one may see a young woman and mother, embedded within her is *also* powerful agency—an athlete and warrior. Positionally, she is "a man" who controls her destiny and battles evil because she is the "true spouse of Christ."[22]

Similarly, a martyr named Blandina is called "a noble athlete," who has "renewed strength with her confession of faith."[23] She was hung on a post "in the form of a cross" waiting for wild beasts to rip her apart. But she became a source of hope, strength, and courage for others who saw "in the person of their sister [in her female body] him who was crucified for them."[24] Although her body is described as tiny and weak, she is seen as an "inspiration to her brothers, for she had put on Christ, that mighty and invincible athlete" who had overcome the adversary and won the crown of immortality.[25] Accompanying these masculine metaphors are powerful feminine ones as well. She is a "noble mother encouraging her children . . . duplicating in her own body all her children's sufferings," transcending outward expectations of her gender to onlookers.[26]

At the very least, these narratives reveal that early Christians thought a woman could represent them and could embody Christ. There does not appear to be anxiety in these accounts of mixing male and female metaphors nor reservations about a female body hung on a pole representing the male Jesus hanging on a cross on behalf of humanity.

The early church was also not dissuaded from freely mixing graphic gender metaphors for God; hence God the Father can be called Mother and Jesus can have breasts and give birth, as seen in the following quotations from Clement of Alexandria and Synesius of Cyrene. According to Clement: "By his loving the Father became of woman's nature, a great proof of which is he whom he begat from himself; and the fruit that is born of love is love." Clement also affirms: "O Christ Jesus, / heavenly milk of the sweet breasts / of the graces of the Bride / pressed out of your wisdom." Synesius of Cyrene can say of the Holy Spirit: "She is mother / she is sister / she is daughter / who has delivered / the secret root." Synesius again: "You are Father, you are Mother, / you are male, you are female,

22 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 34.
23 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 39.
24 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 40.
25 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 40.
26 Oden, ed., *In Her Words*, 41.

/ you are voice, you are silence, / nature giving birth to nature, / you are master, age of the ages."[27]

There is more than enough space within Christ and the church for the persons of the Trinity to be conceived in feminine metaphors and for males and females to represent one another—and notably Christ.

Eve as a Type of Christ, with Christological Implications

Now that space has been created for a shared understanding of the possibility of a female representation of Christ, it is time to build a case that Eve is a type of Christ, who serves as a representative of humanity, generally, and of the church, specifically, in 1 Tim 2–3:1a. I will try and show that, like Adam, she serves as a negative representation of humanity, yet with a hopeful twist; and I will identify some relevant, unique Christological features in our passage.

The Christological Context of 1 Timothy 2:13–15

The Christological concern of 1 Timothy can be summarized as follows: The salvation and hope of all people (even false teachers) depends on Jesus Christ, characterized as the "Human One" who saves everyone.[28] In contrast, false teaching undermines the τέλος of Paul's instruction, which is "love from a pure heart and a good conscience and a sincere faith" (1:5) and stands in opposition to the "household of God, which is by faith" (1:4).[29] Earlier we noticed, in other limited considerations of Paul, that household language accompanies Paul's rhetoric and at times serves to reorient the reader's perspective away from normal household expectations and roles. Hence, Paul as an apostle can be a mother, and women (as well as men) have the household status of first-born sons.[30]

The Christological themes and even the wording of 1 Timothy bear uncanny resemblance to the themes and wording of Romans 5 regarding Adam and Christ. Some noteworthy themes include access and hope in Christ (Rom 5:1–2, 4); the love of Christ in the heart (Rom 5:5); and the ungodly (false teachers in 1 Timothy) having the hope of salvation in Jesus Christ (Rom 5:6–11, 14–21). The similar wording used to describe the Adam-Christ typological connection in Rom 5 and 1 Tim 2 has to do with the use of ἀνθρώπος, an inclusive term for "humanity" to describe Christ, rather than a gendered term to denote his maleness (Rom

27 Quotations taken from Martien Parmentier, "Greek Patristic Foundations for a Theological Anthropology of Women in their Distinctiveness as Human Beings," *Anglican Theological Review* 84.3 (2002): 555–83, here 581–83.

28 For references to false teaching, see 1 Tim 1:18–20; and 4:1–8; although not exactly false teaching, various ways in which people can go off track are addressed in 5:11–15; and 6:9–10.

29 This is my translation. Typically translated as the "administration of God," the Greek is οἰκονομίαν θεοῦ.

30 Men in God's household can be expected to do cleaning and washing, if they model their actions on that of Christ (Eph 5:25–28).

5:12–19). Adam (at times used to convey humanity, without masculinity specifically in mind) is similarly described as ἀνθρώπος. Just as all humanity dies in Adam, all humanity lives in Christ. Similarly, in 1 Tim 2 we are told that God desires for all people [ἀνθρώπους] to be saved and come to the knowledge of truth (2:4) because there is "one mediator between God and humanity [ἀνθρώπων], the Human One [ἀνθρώπος], Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (1 Tim 2:5–6a; author's translation). For this reason, Paul was appointed a teacher and apostle.

More fundamental than the explicit appeal to an example from Gen 2–3, the universal applicability of Paul's message has been based in the universal scope of God's salvific work in Christ, the representative of all humans. However, what follows in 1 Timothy are the well known behavioral corrections that mention men and women specifically—though women perhaps more infamously.

What grammatically links the gender-specific sections in 1 Tim 2:11–3:1a to the previous universal Christological discussion? The link is Paul's "Therefore" (οὖν) in 2:8. Paul desires men (ἄνδρας) to lift their hands without wrath and "likewise" (ὡσαύτως) the women (γυναῖκας) to be characterized by modesty, self-control, and good works (1 Tim 2:9–10). Gender-specific claims such as these are not to be confused with gender-exclusive ones, as though women were free to raise their hands with wrath or men were free to act brazenly in the Christian community. Rather, a life of quietness and tranquility is tied to Paul's τέλος because it is empowered by God the Savior and Christ Jesus the mediator of humanity; this is the reason that Paul is an apostle (who tells the truth; 2:7) and it is on this basis that he gives commands to both men and women. Modesty, self-control, and good works without wrath or dissension all characterize the gospel, as opposed to the false teachers who did not live a quiet life in "all godliness and dignity" (2:2).

Without getting too sidetracked in the gender debate over women's leadership in the church, it is important to note that quietly receiving instruction with all submissiveness is the essence of what Paul wants of *both* men and women, rather than bragging about what they do not know (two men are even mentioned by name as negative examples in 1 Tim 1:20). The word ἡσυχίᾳ used twice in 2:11–12 to characterize the "quietness" of the women is the same word used for the demeanor of the whole church in 2:2. Submissiveness is in line with the entire spirit of the letter.

Additionally, Paul's statement in 2:12, "I am not permitting [present active indicative] a woman to teach nor usurp authority over a man, but to remain quiet" (author's translation), is perfectly in line with the prevalence of false teaching accompanying ignorant and domineering behavior over content that is not truly understood. The present active indicative naturally points to the behavior Paul is presently banning. The imperative "woman, learn" (author's translation) perhaps

signals the urgency of what he has wanted all along, namely that those who are entrenched in false teaching (or who are teaching what they do not understand) need instead to be emboldened to first learn and follow the gospel of Christ.

One would think that with the strong ties to living peaceful and quiet lives for the church, to God desiring all human beings to be saved, and to Christ being the Human One who is the mediator for humanity by offering himself as a ransom for all, interpreters would understand the gender-specific passages in light of the dominant Christology of 1 Timothy. Instead, more attention has been paid to 2:11–12 in isolation, generating an almost infinite number of interpretations—and these verses are "hailed as the very 'guide for understanding the role of women.'"[31]

Eve as a Type of Christ

In what follows I will more closely make my case for Eve as a type (or antitype) that prefigures Christ in 1 Tim 2:13–3:1a.[32] Eve may be identified as a type of Christ on the basis of three interlocking themes. First, she is a type of Christ because of her resemblance as a representative, and even by way of contrast. Second, she is a type of Christ because of her linkage to Christ on a thematic and textual level. And third, she is a type of Christ because she looks ahead toward the work of Christ, who is the hope of humanity in the entire epistle. Each individual line of evidence should be taken together as a complex whole and not isolated as if it were the entirety of my case.

I would also note that my case for Eve being identified as a type intersects with some of the discussion concerning what is known as a messianic interpretation of 1 Tim 2:15. It would, however, go beyond the purpose of this article to focus entirely on making an exegetical case for a messianic reading.[33]

In Rom 5 both Adam and Christ serve contrasting representative functions, whereby Adam leads to sin and death but Christ leads to grace and life. Similarly, in 1 Timothy, Eve typologically represents deception and transgression, while Christ represents the content of true instruction and the grace of salvation. Christ and Eve are not mentioned as separate and unrelated figures but are inextricably linked. Christ has already been established as the mediator of humanity in terms of salvation. Eve is used to represent not only the deceived women mentioned in the epistle, but, by implication, all who are deceived.

This universal figuration of Eve is explicit in 2 Cor 11:3: "But I am afraid that,

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31 Quoted by Jamin Hübner, "Revisiting the Clarity of Scripture in 1 Timothy 2:12," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 59.1 (2016): 99–117, here 111.

32 I will use the terminology of Eve as a "type" of Christ, although technically she is an "antitype" in the sense of a prototype, a type in advance, of which the "type" is a fulfillment.

33 Much of my understanding is in line with select points that Stanley Porter makes in "What Does it Mean to be 'Saved by Childbirth' (1 Timothy 2.15)?" *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 49 (1993): 87–102, but with some notable departures, which I will touch on.

as the serpent deceived Eve by his craftiness, your minds will be led astray from the simplicity and purity *of devotion* to Christ."[34] Note that no special representative function of Eve for *only* women is spelled out either here or in 1 Timothy. Although it is grammatically possible to link Eve to the women in 1 Timothy, she may be more convincingly linked also to men, in keeping with the "likewise" (1 Tim 2:9). Thematically what is repeated to a specific gender—women—is contextually a gender-inclusive concern.

This is not to deny that women are being singled out in 1 Tim 2, but a gender-specific reference does not amount to a gender-exclusive one. Such an exegetical move is often taken in regard to women, but not men. However, just as church members (both male and female) were at risk of accepting a different Jesus than was preached in 2 Corinthians and were thus compared to Eve, in 1 Timothy we also have the similar theme of truth versus lies, as well as issues with trying to give oneself pride of place versus humility. Canonically, then, we can take Eve as representative of those of both genders who have fallen into deception; and in 1 Tim 2, this is the likely best exegetical option. Perhaps both men and women may represent each other, and particular missteps should not invite ontological assumptions that are absent from the text.

Eve's representative function is evident in some additional ways in 1 Tim 2. The first is the introduction of her narrative with an explanatory γὰρ (2:13), intended to give the basis for the commands in 2:11–12.[35] This basis takes the form of a narrative summarized in 2:13–14, which highlights the deception and resulting transgressions that have been dominant among humanity, while 2:15 points to the future hope that will bolster Paul's desire for changed behavior.

Further, within 1 Tim 2:15 there is the switch from the singular ("she will be saved") to the plural ("if they continue"), which links Eve, the nearest singular feminine referent, to the referent of the plural. Although translators often try to smooth this out for grammatical consistency, it risks muting some of the author's intended connections between 2:15 and what came before.[36]

The plural subject in the verb μείνωσιν has several grammatical options, discussed by Stanley Porter. I agree with him that it is best to take it as representative of the women in 1 Tim 2, since Eve is the nearest single reference and the women are the nearest plural. However, we must also account for the epistle's universal focus, its address specifically to men and then women linked with "likewise," and the fact that the entire epistle attempts to bolster Paul's case for good behavior.

34 The NASB here uses italics to designate words that are implied, but not actually present.

35 The explanatory γὰρ is far from rare; it is well documented by Philip B. Payne, *Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Exploration of Paul's Letters* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 399–402.

36 NASB, NIV, NLT, CEV are among the translations that render the singular as plural ("women"), so the numbers match.

The epistle even singles out two men in 1:20 as examples of those who were deceived (as Eve was), not to mention Paul himself before he was in Christ.

Eve is also linked to Christ thematically through the echo of Mark 10 in connection to Christ's role as the mediator of humanity. Jesus is the one who "gave himself as a ransom for all, the testimony at the proper time" (1 Tim 2:6;). With the term "ransom" we are swept back into the narrative context of Mark 10:45, where James and John request positions of power alongside Jesus, whose destiny is to be killed before resurrection. They are reminded, "You know that those who are recognized as rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them; and their great men exercise authority over them" (Mark 10:42;). Their request was counter to Jesus's chosen life as a slave and what he desired for those who embraced the truth of his message. "For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many" (Mark 10:45;).

This servant model of Christ is one of the key concerns of 1 Timothy. In contrast to the false teachers who sought to elevate themselves above others, Paul wants his readers to offer themselves to others in prayer and service; they are not to assume authority or pride of place, but rather to follow the example of Christ. The issue of pride of place may also be the sentiment behind the narrative summary in 1 Tim 2:13, which mentions Adam being formed first, then Eve, which is followed by the reminder of Eve's deception, and implicitly that of the readers too (male and female).[37]

The last linkage of Eve with Christ can be found in what is arguably a packed Christological passage, which will be important to translate as literally as possible: "But she will be saved (*σωθήσεται)* by the Childbirth *(*τῆς τεκνογονίαςτῆς), if they continue in faith and love and holiness, with self-control. The saying is trustworthy." (1 Tim 2:15–3a; author's translation).[38] Our passage retains the singular, which points back to Eve, combined with a future "she will be saved" (divine passive?), which points ahead from Eve towards salvation. Σωτηρία is most often used to refer to the salvation that comes from Jesus Christ for sinners; but 1 Timothy is clear that one is not saved in a way that is detached from how one lives their life. To have the salvation that is from God in Christ is to live a holy life

37 In case there is a temptation to interpret this ontologically as women being more susceptible to deception as women, one should consider that even though it is mentioned here that Adam was not deceived, Paul has no issue regarding himself in Romans 7 as subject to deception, using the same term: "For sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, deceived me and through it put me to death" (7:11). This is another indicator that even when Paul is being gender-specific he is not being gender-exclusive when it comes to those represented in these types; and he is not gender-exclusive when it comes to which figure (Adam or Eve) led to the death that requires life in Christ and an antidote.

38 I leave it to the reader to decide if the reading of this passage is too "obscure" (as Donald Guthrie puts it) within its Christological context. Donald Guthrie, *The Pastoral Epistles*, Tyndale New Testament Commentary 14 (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 78.

that is not characterized by the bad behaviors of the deceived false teachers, including their arrogance and the extensive vice lists at the beginning of the epistle (1:4a, 6–7, 9a–10, 13a). Given the standard Pauline usage of Σωτηρία and its immediate Christological context, Eve's "salvation" should be interpreted in this light, without positing or importing some other meaning.

What many may find unpalatable is the reference to "the Childbirth," which they then take to refer to the actual childbearing process of women generally. Besides reconstructions of Paul's possible interactions with the Artemis cult, it is this reading of childbirth as an ongoing process that encourages the translation of *σωθήσεται* as "preserved," rather than "saved." Along with the awkward grammatical construction, since "*the* Childbirth" is deictic, pointing to something specific, one is also left with what appears to be an absurd, perhaps offensive, statement.

To say one can have salvation by having children certainly goes against everything Paul ever said concerning salvation being by grace through faith in Christ Jesus. Additionally, it goes beyond the wording and expressed theology of our passage to interpret this to mean that women should pray to God instead of Artemis to help them through childbirth (even if this may be true, this is not what the text is intending).

Although many are tempted to go with a translational option that is smoother (and seemingly more orthodox), fighting this urge forces one into the broader context. The Christological context of 1 Timothy tells us that one is saved by God in Christ, through his laying down of his life on our behalf. This framework directly challenges the quest for authority and pride of place among Jesus's disciples and among those receiving Paul's epistle.

One might responsibly ask in this context: Was or is there a childbirth or childbearing that saves? The obvious answer is the birth of Christ.

Stanley Porter concedes that Eve could be the subject of the deception in 1 Tim 2:14 paired with the singular "And she will be saved" of 2:15; but he is not quite convinced because: "The attitudinal force of the future form of the verb in v.15 is one of expectation, that is, it . . . conveys not a temporal conception (past, present or future) but a marked and emphatic expectation toward a course of events."[39] In other words, Eve's deed was done, over with, hence beyond future expectation.

But was there no looking ahead towards a future salvation within the context of a current fallen state in the Genesis narrative? Contrary to his conclusion, Porter's explanation actually makes a good case for seeing Eve in view here.

The article τῆς ("the") preceding "Childbirth" indicates that a particular childbirth is in view. This is not only thematically in line with the Christology

39 Porter, "What Does it Mean to be 'Saved by Childbirth'," 92.

articulated in 1 Timothy, but also consistent with the hope of Adam and Eve presented in Gen 3:15 with its reference to the (singular) seed of the woman.[40] It is uncontroversial that Gen 3:15 is taken by the church to be the promise of the future eschatological hope of Christ. However, that the childbirth in 1 Tim 2 refers to this promise does not have as much consensus. Yet, "the Childbirth" does not appear to be representing an ongoing present activity.

Additionally, this particular childbirth has the possibility to save those who have fallen into transgression, namely, Eve and those deceived like her; and so the definite article is best not taken as merely generic or collective of childbirth in general. Christ is the hope of 1 Timothy for false teachers and likely the hope referred to here. Porter gets this right: "Final salvation is united with past events."[41] Paul is encouraging believers to look into their past with new eyes, enabling them to see a future hope even in the original sin or deception, leading to hope for themselves and for those deceived around them.

If the Christ child is the one referred to in 1 Tim 2:15, why is Mary absent from the text, since she quite literally bore the Christ? First, typology is not categorically "literal"; Adam is not literally Christ. More interpretive possibilities are open through allegory and metaphor than are possible from wooden one-to-one correspondences. In this case, it seems more than plausible that the childbirth of Christ has been conflated into Eve to further highlight the contrast between her and Christ, but with a twist.

Contained *within* Eve, who led to the transgression and resulting death, is also the future hope for salvation. The author closely associates Christ with Eve by placing him metaphorically in her womb. This is an intimate connection that goes beyond the closeness of the tight parallel structure linking Adam and Christ. It is another detail forcing us to look ahead from the fall of Eve, and also from the women and false teachers that Paul mentions, to the salvation in Christ Jesus. First Tim 2:15 is thus a passage pregnant with hope. Indeed, we saw earlier that Paul metaphorically looked on himself, though male, as one who would *deliver* the gospel, when he spoke of his anguish waiting for Christ to be born in the Galatians. The gospel of Christ is something that is thought of as born in a believer, which will lead to a transfiguration of the believer's status so that those fallen into deception have the future possibility of salvation (and a change of status) already contained within them.

To cap off the case for the close connection between Eve and Christ, we come to the "trustworthy statement," which is separated from our text by the designation "chapter 3" and typically linked with what follows by translators and

40 "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and hers; he will strike at your head, while you strike at his heel."

41 Porter, "What Does it Mean to be 'Saved by Childbirth'," 94.

interpreters. And yet it might just as well be linked with the preceding verse (2:15). This would be a further signal that 1 Tim 2:15 is directly connected to everything that has been said already concerning Christ, since the almost liturgical formulation of "It is a trustworthy statement," both in this epistle and in other Pauline material, accompanies Christological affirmations and promises of salvation.[42] Consider just two examples, both from 1 Timothy:

> It is a trustworthy statement, deserving full acceptance (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος καὶ πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος), that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, among whom I am foremost *of all*.
>
> (1 Tim 1:15; italics original)
>
> It is a trustworthy statement deserving full acceptance (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος καὶ πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος). For to this end we toil and strive, because we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe.
>
> (1 Tim 4:9–10; RSV)

Similarly, 1 Tim 2:15 in its connection to 3:1a constitutes a Christological affirmation connected to the τέλος of Paul's instruction, which is based on the gospel of Christ Jesus. That is, "she will be saved by the Childbirth [of Christ], if they continue in faith and love and holiness, with self-control," a call universal in scope.

Based on the evidence provided, it makes sense to acknowledge Eve as a type of Christ in her representing our deception and transgression. However, unlike the metaphorical use of Adam with Christ, we discover in 1 Timothy that contained within those who are enmeshed in transgression and deception there is also the hope of Christ for salvation. The power of God is such that even in our evil and fallenness there is the possibility of future redemption. The martyrs understood this, readily seeing their persecution transfigured into glory in light of their baptism and connection to Christ. A woman's body brutalized and exploited was transfigured into Christ who was their life. In Eve's deception we are reminded of our own shortcomings, as we vie for a more powerful position at Jesus's right hand. But we also see the hope of humanity in Christ Jesus, open to transforming all of us, both in our status and in our interactions.

Finally, why consider a uniquely Eve Christology? The short answer is: due to

42 1 Tim 1:15; 4:9; 2 Tim 2:11; Titus 1:9; 3:8. Also consider Titus, which like 1 Tim 3, also addresses who can be an overseer in a gender-inclusive way with "anyone" (τις), the need to teach sound doctrine accompanied by good works in connection with renouncing ungodly behavior in light of the hope in God our savior Jesus Christ (Titus 2:1–15), and the entire church being reminded to be submissive towards those in authority (Titus 3:1–2; 1 Tim 2:1–2, 11) and all tied toward remembering (as Paul did of himself in 1 Timothy) that "we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various passions and pleasures, passing our days in malice and envy, hated by others and hating one another" (Titus 3:3) followed by the work of Christ. In Titus, the trustworthy sayings accompany behaviors tied to living out the gospel.

our own shortcomings and inability to imagine Christ apart from "Adam." Historically, we have not only tended towards omitting female representation, but have resisted it. Metaphor can help undermine this resistance. In metaphorical space, James Cone's Jesus can in a real sense be black, Paul can be a mother, and Bladina can be a type of Christ hanging from the cross. The crucified savior challenges the status quo by diffusing and reconceptualizing power. If a society fully embraces that women have the same status, privileges, value, and opportunities that first-born sons have, then eventually the gender-exclusive status slant we glean from the term "Son" will fade away. In the end, the questions of whether women may be saved by the crucified Christ and whether they may represent him on earth should be answered with a resounding *yes*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Evolution and the Fall. Edited by William Cavanaugh and James K. A. Smith. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. ISBN: 9780802873798. Pp. xxix + 231. $26.00 (USD).

The fallout from Darwinism continues to keep theologians scrambling. Amid a flurry of fresh literature on this topic,[1] *Evolution and the Fall* comes to readers as a collection of thoughtful essays specifically dealing with the Western theological understanding of the fall and its status with relation to the evolutionary consensus regarding human origins. Contributions come from the editors as well as from Celia Deane-Drummond, Joel Green, Richard Middleton, Aaron Riches, Brent Waters, Norman Wirzba, and Peter Harrison—all Christian thinkers from various disciplines.

After a preliminary chapter outlining relevant issues, biology professor (and former BioLogos President) Darrel Falk lays out the current scene regarding anthropological origins and history. This topic is, of course, the cause for the entire debate and so naturally comes first, so to speak. The scoop is this: the *location* of ancient human fossil remains (i.e., not centralized in the ancient Near East), when combined with their associated cultural/technological *features* (e.g., emergence of language, tools, etc.) and the *dating* of those fossils in association with their expected evolutionary features (e.g., before some species and after others; older samples are less "advanced" physiologically), strongly points to a gradual and evolutionary history of human beings. This also appears to be confirmed by genetic evidence—which converges to support physiological changes in a

1 See, for example, J. B. Stump, ed., *Four Views of Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan 2017); Scot McKnight and Dennis Venema, *Adam and the Genome: Reading Scripture after Genetic Science* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2017); Kenneth Keathley, J. B. Stump, and Joe Aguirre, eds., *Old Earth or Evolutionary Creation?: Discussing Origins with Reasons to Believe and BioLogos* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2017); Denis Lamoureux, *Evolution: Scripture and Nature Say Yes!* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016); Kathryn Applegate and J. B. Stump, eds., *How I Changed My Mind About Evolution: Evangelicals Reflect on Faith and Science* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016); Stanley Rosenberg, et. al., *Finding Ourselves after Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of Evil* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018); Kyle Greenwood, ed., *Since the Beginning: Interpreting Genesis 1 and 2 through the Ages* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018); Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall, eds., *Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science*, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018). Cf. James K. A. Smith and Michael Gulker, eds., *All Things Hold Together in Christ: A Conversation on Faith, Science, and Virtue* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018).

number of ways. While not air-tight, this modern scientific consensus remains compelling.

Although the idea of human evolution is over a century old, it's important to note that this contemporary evidentiary platform is extremely recent:

> [U]ntil just the last few decades, detailed knowledge of our history—how we came to be who we are—only stretched back several thousand years. Suddenly though, as a result of this knowledge-explosion, we can go back millions. We have the bones—the skeletal remains of our ancestors. We can see when and how their anatomy changed, becoming more and more like our own. And we can see that finally about 200,000 years ago, their skeletal features became indistinguishable from ours. (6–7)

Many or perhaps even most Christians have therefore "moved on" to discuss what implications this might have, instead of erecting a new set of barricades surrounding the disintegration of traditional Western thought.

In the next chapter, Deane-Drummond explores Catholic theological boundaries regarding the concept of the fall, arguing for a more communitarian sense, "a strong sense of the moral collective that is common in smaller hunter-gatherer societies" (43). Her own view is "that original sin can be reinterpreted to mean that a person is born in each generation into an imperfect community of others, including other creaturely kinds" (45). Like most authors in the book, she notes that specific views on "original sin" are not "required or necessary for Christian faith" (45). The upshot about redemption, then, is that "sin takes place in a tragic context and the unity hoped for is an eschatological expectation of the end, rather than a return to a paradisiacal state" (46). For readers steeped in creation-fall-redemption narratives, this drumbeat of "the idyllic-prefall-past-is-more-of-a-theological-construct-than-a-biblical-necessity" comes through strongly in the book.

Smith's "What Stands on the Fall?" offers his own two cents on how the traditional Western conception might be reformulated. He summarizes his model in one page (bridging 61–62), asserting God's covenantal election of individuals from an early population of hominids (to be "image-bearers") and hence—given their new, advanced moral and physical capacities—a new responsibility over creation, such that if they fail, "creation falls" with them. In his own reflections of this view, (1) the fall is "still historical, temporal, and even 'evental,' though it is something like an episode-in-process" (65); (2) this model neither ontologizes the fall (i.e., altering nature itself) nor "naturalizes" it (as if it is inherent to creation). Thus, one must be careful neither to reject nor to overstate the apostle Paul's "cosmic" picture of sin's intrusion (e.g., Col 1–2).

Middleton, an Old Testament scholar, then discusses a variety of issues,

including the relationship between domains of knowledge (leaning on Brown's *The Seven Pillars of Creation*) and specific theological import with regard to an evolutionary anthropology. Having studied the Genesis text in detail for well over a decade, Middleton's analysis of Gen 1–3 is saturated with significant exegetical insights—all of which involve considerable "unlearning" for a Christian audience. For example, "humanity as God's image refers primarily to the human *calling* or *vocation* to represent God in the world; we might even call this a *missional* interpretation" (76; italics original), not simply clinging to an understanding of humanity as a static set of physical or intellectual features. Furthermore, "mortality [is] an ordinary and even intrinsic component of the world God made," though "this does not mean that we should exclude immortality as the ultimate result of eating from the tree of life" (80). As alluded to above, "the text does not actually envision a paradisiacal period" (84). Labor pains didn't originate with the fall, either, he points out, but it led to an *increase* in such pains (92). Sin is also not binary, but *grows with time* (96; cf. James 1:15). In short, a fair reading of the text—and not one that is hopelessly anachronistic, superficial, or forced—provides plenty of room for a much-needed revision to the doctrine of "the fall."

Joel Green then examines the concept of the fall in the first-century period. He examines *The Life of Adam and Eve* (or *The Apocalypse of Moses*), *4 Ezra*, *2 Baruch,* and *Biblical Antiquities*. Then, he looks at the New Testament (mainly James and Paul). His findings?

> First, neither Genesis 3 nor scripture as a whole develops much the specific interests that would later coalesce into the traditional doctrine of original sin; that is, scripture does not refer to the Fall, traditionally understood, and nowhere speaks of Adam's sin as a physical inheritance. Second, Jewish literature in the Second Temple period does raise the question of sin's origins, but does not identify sin as an inherent human condition. This literature generally speaks of obedience to God's instruction as the antidote to sin. Third, Paul's more radical view of sin leads him to speak of human servitude to Sin, understood as a power at work in the world, in the fact of which humans stand in need of liberation. Simply put, humans need more than God's instructions; they need God's saving intervention in Jesus Christ. . . . Fourth, . . . James urges that humans need the good news, God's own word, planted deeply inside them. Fifth, . . . Paul and James thus emphasize sin's corporate dimension and assume sin's heritability—not in the sense of passing sin down through procreation, but in the sense of pattern and influence. (114–15)

Again, a revision of traditional Christian theology on this subject seems to be in order. After Green's essay, Riches explores a paradoxical (and less synthetic) approach to sin and death from a Roman Catholic perspective, while Waters discusses death, transhumanism, and concepts of perfection (and risks involved in pursuing it) in the modern world.

In chapter eight, "On Learning to see a Fallen and Flourishing Creation," Norman Wirzba presents a sort of theological reset regarding our entire perception of creation, humanity, Jesus, the gospel, and the meaning of life. It's an "exploration of one compelling theological framework in which creation's *fallenness,* but also its *flourishing,* becomes intelligible" (158; italics original). While not so immediately connected to the main issues of the book, it's one of the best "big-picture" essays I've read in contemporary theology—beautifully written, deeply learned in a wide variety of sources ancient and new, and profoundly relevant to Christians today. Its primary relevance is in helping the audience to rethink how we see the world—precisely because an evolutionary anthropology and its implications require us to do so on some level. In an equally fascinating essay, Cavanaugh discusses the relationship of sin and the fall to the rise of governments and coercive power, surveying how this topic has been understood throughout church history—from Augustine to Locke and Hobbes. One of his conclusions is that the "eclipse of the biblical Fall story was not simply the putting away of childish stories in favor of hard data; the eclipse of the Fall was at least in part political, not scientific" (202).

The final chapter of the book turns back to the issue of science and religion, what these terms/domains of knowledge mean, and how they relate. Peter Harrison's essay is largely based on his monograph, *The Territories of Science and Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). He appeals to Augustine in helping to sort out these matters and advocates a "soft irenic approach." In this view, "science is not consistently truth-tracking," and "genuine conflict between science and religion is *never inevitable,* but they differ on whether it is possible at all" (207; italics original). In other words, we can't know in advance (as with a "hard" position) that science and religion never conflict, but such cases "need to be considered on a case-by-case basis" (208). Augustine, he contends, "does indeed offer an exemplary model of dealing with apparent science-religion conflicts" (208–9), and he explains in detail why that is the case.

As a curious onlooker with an ongoing interest in this complicated subject, *Evolution and the Fall* unexpectedly met all of my high expectations. The essay selection was balanced and interesting. The authors got their hands dirty and directly addressed the toughest issues, offered possible answers, and guided readers frankly and honestly throughout various twists and turns. One will always find reason for disagreement here or there. But all in all, *Evolution and the Fall* makes

for an excellent transition into a "post-creationist" theological world that takes the Bible and Christian tradition seriously while bravely revamping stale doctrines.

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Reading Philippians after Supersessionism: Jews, Gentiles, and Covenant Identity. Christopher Zoccali. New Testament after Supersessionism. Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017. ISBN: 9781620329580. Pp. xvi + 172. $24.00 (USD).

Christopher Zoccali succeeds in a tricky balancing act, one that I would think all of the contributors to the New Testament after Supersessionism series would have to perform to an extent: how to offer a reading of New Testament texts in such a way as to *qualify* previous readings, *without supplanting them*, lest the author's approach appear at least as authoritarian (or even, ironically, supersessionist!) as those earlier perspectives. Zoccali shows that he's well aware of such ironies in others' work (13 n. 35, e.g.) and in this new book he steers well clear of that danger.

Zoccali's argument unfolds in five succinct chapters. In the introduction, he is careful to clarify definitions early (2–3) and often, with reminders later on ("Again, I refrain from use of the term 'Christian' in my historical exegetical conclusions only because Paul does not use the term," 57 n. 13). Labels like "caricature" and "anachronism" are necessarily frequent, as he explains, in keeping with the goals of the series, what supersessionism does (and does not) mean. This gently, implicitly challenges any assumptions that readers may find themselves carrying about the term and related issues, and that challenge grows as the author outlines "scholarly views vulnerable to supersessionism": the Old Perspective, New Perspective, and "Imperialist Perspective" on Paul (11–14; the last is Zoccali's label for the "aggressive hermeneutic of suspicion" against Paul's "engendering of 'sameness' within the community," as typified by Joseph Marchal, 13). Zoccali's overall thesis is "that through various discursive measures Paul fundamentally seeks to intensify the saliency of the Philippians' 'in Christ' identity," such that "their prior ethnic identities—though subordinated, relativized, and transformed—nevertheless remain salient and enduring in light of the Philippians' offering of allegiance to Jesus Christ . . . and consequent entrance into the people of God" (5).

Chapter two uses Phil 1:1, Paul's first mention of the Philippians as God's "'holy ones,'" as a locus for discussion of both covenant identity and first-century expectations for what Zoccali summarizes as "the eschatological restoration of Israel and consequent pilgrimage of the nations" (18). I enjoyed tracing the book's implicit biblical theology and missiology, hinted at as early as Zoccali's own acknowledgments (mentioning "God's redemption program," xi) and woven through this chapter's probing of Paul's "gospel message and mission" as

predicated on "the larger scriptural narrative of God's relationship to God's people" (21). Philippi's "Christ allegiant gentiles," the author finds, "as members of the nations living in the eschatological age, in embracing Paul's gospel are envisaged by him as those anticipated throughout Isaiah, and similarly understood elsewhere in the relevant Jewish literature" (44).

Chapters three and four comprise an exploration of "Paul's Intra-Jewish Rhetoric" in Phil 3, expanding upon some of Zoccali's relevant publications, while making good on his earlier promise to revisit "key interpretive points that while often used in support of supersessionist conclusions, actually point in the other direction" (19). The first part further undermines the "Imperialist Perspective" outlined above, determining that Paul's rhetoric is "*not*, then, fundamentally grounded upon an appeal to his authority and presumed domination over the community," but instead "upon the eschatological orientation of the Philippians' *own* 'in Christ' identity, and its salvific implications"; so "Phil 3:1–9 might be best understood as a cautious, preventative measure" against gentile Christ allegiants' potential departure from the movement, rather than against Jewish missionary-proselytizers or Jews as "a negative object lesson" (77, 82; italics original).

Chapter four, completing this two-part argument, contains welcome reminders of the book's thesis: for one, the Philippian Christ community's place within Judaism, "regardless of the lack of a sizable presence of Jews in Philippi, should be the starting point for understanding Paul's exhortation" toward a united commitment to the gospel (85). Zoccali can be commended for meeting potential counter-arguments head-on here. As Paul has both stated and flushed away his earlier achievements (Phil 3:8), "it is important for any post-supersessionist reading to explain the way in which Paul could maintain the importance and abiding salience of his Jewish identity, while also regarding his 'in Christ' identity to be exceedingly more important" (102). A concluding chapter then rehearses the book's findings as might be expected, but also drives home other concerns, such as the book's thoroughgoing interest in intertextuality (127, e.g., linking Paul's Philippian discourse to Rom 8, to the calling of Israel in Exod19, and to the "ordering of the other nations" in Genesis 10 and Acts 17:26).

One standout feature not previously mentioned is the author's application of postmodern methodologies to Paul's first-century rhetoric and social context. Zoccali's use of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (observing and predicting intergroup behaviour and individual self-definition in social contexts, respectively, first introduced on p. 4) is economical, allowing insight without falling into the traps of making his methods bear too much weight, or of overusing unfamiliar technical terms. When he resorts to such terms, he does so in ways that build the reader's self-confidence and comprehension, such that Zoccali can afford to emphasize *important* words more than *new* ones: "What is found

in Paul's autobiographical account is *not* the *abandoning* but rather the *subordination* and *alteration* of his Pharisaic-Jewish identity to the new superordinate identity he has attained" (104; italics original).

My caveats concerning the book may seem only cavils, though I believe both are more significant than that. First, Zoccali's references to the Roman Empire are sporadic. Granted, Rome is not foremost in Paul's mind as he writes (unless one follows Gordon Zerbe's reading, in his 2016 Believers Church Bible Commentary volume and elsewhere, of Phil 3 as a masked critique of pride in imperial citizenship). But if Zoccali wants to emphasize features like the Philippian Christ community's *"eschatological hope"* that constitutes *"the very antithesis of the eschatology of the Empire"* (78; italics original), then might we not expect to find more than a few sentences and footnotes in support of same, if not some excurses on such points? By the book's end, we may not doubt that Paul's gospel should be for the Philippians "a story of the world and their place in it that was superior to that put forward by the Empire" (135), but we have had to work harder to piece together the Empire-specific threads than we have on others in Zoccali's argument. Second—and perhaps less of a hobbyhorse—Zoccali's repeated description of gentiles as "'pagan' idolaters" and such like seems similarly lacking in support and explanation. As with the empire question, I'm sympathetic: I grant the connection between gentile status/practice and idolatry from the perspective of first-century Jews and Jewish Christ allegiants. I'm just surprised that Zoccali's label of "idolaters" is so consistent, if occasional ("having attached themselves to the God and people of Israel, they were no longer 'pagan' idolaters," 39; cf. 52–53 nn. 81–82; 86; 120), without explanation—assuming I did not miss one. Zoccali rightly focuses on the former idolaters' new commitment to, and self-redefinition within, the Christ community. I only wish that he'd developed somewhat further the discussion of the selves and practices that they shelved. Without such development, we're left tantalized by points such as "any compromising move towards idolatry or Jewish proselytism is not acceptable; it is a *de facto* departure from the *ekklēsia"* (117)—even if we're more than satisfied with the rest of the book.

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For the Life of the World: Jesus Christ and the Church in the Theologies of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Stanley Hauerwas. Robert J. Dean. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016. ISBN: 9781498233194. Pp. xiii + 302. $35.00 (USD).

In *For the Life of the World,* Robert Dean, currently Associate Professor of Theology and Ethics at Providence Seminary, offers his readers an in-depth comparison of two of the past century's leading voices in theological ethics, Stanley Hauerwas

and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. While the choice of these twin subjects is not particularly daring, one of the blurbs on the book's back cover only slightly exaggerates in claiming that "Hauerwas and Bonhoeffer are *the* major forces in contemporary theological ethics in North America." Dean's five-chapter book, originally a doctoral dissertation, is an attempt to work out some of the similarities and differences between these two important theologians.

I must admit to taking it for granted that people who are interested in the work of one of these theologians are usually interested in the work of the other. Part of this assumption might be drawn from the fact that both Hauerwas and Bonhoeffer tend toward a similarly stern, almost trenchant, style of writing. Both advocate against war in unsentimental terms. Both place much emphasis on the role of the church, which is no small thing for a seemingly irrelevant audience of pastors. Both see themselves as minority voices decrying the dominant ethos. That is my analysis, however, not Dean's.

For Dean, the two voices are linked contextually by worries about the church's performance of the gospel in corrosive environments. In terms of theological genealogy, they are linked by a debt they both owe to Karl Barth: while neither built a career on exegeting the Barthian canon, both were deeply influenced by the Swiss theologian. Both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas, have, as Dean says, "come away from their engagement with Barth firmly convinced that God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ is the presupposition of all Christian thought and action." In response to the apocalyptic character of God's act in Jesus Christ, "the task of the church is not to change the world, but to witness to the fact that the world has already been definitively changed" (12).

What makes the work of Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas intriguing for many of us is the fact that neither settles nicely into a conservative or liberal theological camp. This is partly a function of their Barthian attention to the particularity of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. This unwillingness to relegate Jesus to a simple trope of one sort or another cuts against the common tendency to reduce the particularity of Jesus to either the idea of "incarnation" or the machinations of "justification." Thus, what Dean calls the "animating center" of both Bonhoeffer's and Hauerwas's work "is nothing other than the person of Jesus Christ in the irreducible uniqueness of his personal presence" (71). The Barthian through-line in Dean's comparison carries on to the way the latter positions both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas in critical relationship to their mentor on matters of the church.

In Dean's view, both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas "understand that soteriology is inseparable from ecclesiology and that both soteriology and ecclesiology are properly predicates of Christology" (151). Or, to put it more squarely, both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas affirm *extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* Barth would not. Even when reduced to aphorisms, Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas appear to part ways in

their description of the church's mission in the world. The former emphasizes that "the calling of the church is to be for others." The latter wants us to believe that the "church's calling to be itself" (224). However, Dean is right to recognize this as a difference in accent and not a difference in substance, as both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas believe that the church exists for the world and serves this purpose by being itself.

Dean's comparison is necessarily focused on the two doctrinal categories of Christology and ecclesiology; for reasons of economy, space, and centrality his decision makes sense. However, the drawback of this is that it obscures further important distinctions between Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas. For instance, though Bonhoeffer is obviously critical of aspects of the church and German politics, he retains a deep love for his national culture that has no parallel in Hauerwas's work. Though Hauerwas will speak positively of certain types of art, of baseball, of specific works of literature, his work lacks convincing evidence that he loves a particular place or culture. In addition, the fact that both Hauerwas and Bonhoeffer carry the title "theologian" in Dean's comparison allows us to miss the vast differences in how these two men expressed this vocation. Unlike Hauerwas, Bonhoeffer was ordained, served specific congregations, and taught candidates for ministry in costly and difficult contexts. Dean rightly emphasizes the importance of sermons for both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas; nevertheless, preaching on occasion is vastly different than preaching week-after-week and being immersed in the life a congregation, as required by pastoral ministry. These differences are important and, had he attended to them, I think Dean's analysis could have been deepened.

Finally, though *For the Life of the World* contains an historical appendix on the ethics of tyrannicide, it would have been interesting for Dean to have applied the theologies of Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas to a problem of some contemporary Canadian—or, a little more broadly, North American—importance. Most of us, whatever our views of various presidents, prime ministers, or provincial premiers, are not contemplating tyrannicide. What then, for instance, would Bonhoeffer or Hauerwas likely say about the church's role in reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous communities within Canada? What possibilities might they voice to congregational leaders in First Nations communities? Both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas did most of their work in the heart of nations with imperial ambitions, but how might their theological convictions be differently inflected in the context of a middle power? Or what wisdom might they offer to churches considering greater involvement in environmental work?

Obviously, the list could go on, and the fact that Dean's book raises such questions is a good thing. He has laid out the architecture of the theology of both Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas in such a way that we can begin to see how their work

would engage other ethical matters. That is a testament to the clarity of Dean's writing and his immersion in the work of these two theologians. Even so, some kind of constructive engagement relating to questions like those raised above would have been a welcome way to illustrate still further the function of Christology and ecclesiology in the work Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas. It would also have given us a better sense of why their work might endure and why future readers should be interested in the substance of Dean's already thorough study.

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Know How We Got Our Bible. Ryan Reeves and Charles E. Hill. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018. ISBN: 978-0310537205/ Pp. + 197. $16.99 (USD).

Know How We Got Our Bible is the fourth volume in the new intro-level "Know Series" written by (primarily Reformed) conservative evangelicals. It's a quick introduction to the Bible, including both Testaments, the Septuagint and Apocrypha, Vulgate, and evolution of Bible translations throughout history to the present day.

A quick 200-page read, the book boasts very clear and concise English and concludes each chapter with study questions and recommended reading. The authors have little time to elaborate on specific ideas or make arguments, so mainly aim to convey basic points. Their purpose is clear: to answer the popular questions, "how did a series of ancient texts, written mostly on papyrus in two old languages, get into our hands? How did we get the Bible in *this* format with *these* translations?" (20).

As such, much of the book's content tends to be unoriginal, superficial, and often misleading. The perspectives themselves are highly opinionated, largely isolated from the larger academic community, and based on extremely selective areas of research. In short, the quality, content, and approach couldn't be more different than that of, for example, *Scripture and Its Interpretation* (also reviewed in this journal).[1]

The first chapter (on the Old Testament) serves as a fair case study. The opening sentence is noticeably loaded: "As the New Testament was being written, the Jews already possessed books written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit" (29). Triangulated with later portions of the chapter(s), this suggests that the canon of the Old Testament was fixed and identical to ours today in the first-century

1 Michael J. Gorman, ed., *Scripture and Its Interpretation: A Global, Ecumenical Introduction to the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017). For other excellent introductions to the Bible, see Andrew Arterbury, W. H. Bellinger, Derek Dodson, *Engaging the Christian Scriptures* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014); Joel Kaminsky, Mark Reasoner, Joel Nohr, *The Abingdon Introduction to the Bible* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2014).

believing communities (and that the opinions of "the canon" were the same then as they are today). Beckwith is well known for making this argument—and McDonald for repeatedly laying it to rest,[2] but here it is without qualification. On the next page, we read that the role of the Masoretes "cannot be overstated, since the Masoretes were the link between earlier versions of the Old Testament, now mostly lost, and the medieval copies of the Hebrew Bible used today when scholars translate the Bible" (30). But, as textual scholars have argued for decades now, the role of the Masoretes and Masoretic text *can and has been* overstated in a variety of ways, such as dominating textual decisions over readings of the Septuagint and DSS.[3] A couple pages later, the authors (predictably) cite the DSS in favor of OT reliability without noting either (a) the hundreds of instances of agreeing with the LXX over the MT, or (b) the misleading nature of these claims in the context of an apologetic argument.[4] On the next page, Moses is said to have authored the Pentateuch (33), and on the next page, the Pharisees and Sadducees are said to have affirmed the same Torah ("All Jews looked to the Torah," 34) without mentioning the unique version(s) of the Samaritan Pentateuch, or the DSS and the Qumran community. The remaining pages of the chapter are filled with equally outdated and/or misleading ideas.

As are, unfortunately, most of the other chapters.

Indeed, as much as I was looking forward to perusing it, *Know How We Got Our Bible* was generally a disappointment. First of all, it does not actually address what it is supposed to—how the bulk of the Bible was written. Nothing is said about scribal culture, the nature of ancient writing and concepts of authorship, the dates and origin of narrative and historical literature, sources and their use, why a group of scribes explicitly compiled Proverbs (or anything else) and how they saw the nature of their work, etc. Readers are given the impression that God gave the Ten Commandments and the rest of the books of the OT were generally written after that in the same chronological movement, brick by brick like a wall being built, and finally the "Bible" emerged. Also, the whole idea that some writings were written after the exile (other than the handful that could not possibly have been written before the exile) is pushed out of sight and, evidently, considered irrelevant for either the origin of the Bible or its interpretation. Many of the same problems taint the New Testament section.

2 See Roger Beckwith, *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008), and Lee Martin McDonald, *The Formation of the Biblical Canon,* 2 vols (New York: T&T Clark, 2017); *idem., The Biblical Canon* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011); idem., *The Formation of the Bible* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007).

3 See the many works of Emanuel Tov, as well as Timothy Law, *When God Spoke Greek* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

4 Robert Ward (graduate student at McMaster Divinity College) gave a presentation at the 2018 Spring CATA conference specifically highlighting the problematic nature of these claim.

All of this leaves laypeople in a particularly vulnerable position when real questions are asked, and when the Bible is being studied carefully. Are Christians supposed to believe that dead people write their own obituaries (in a Moses authorship view of the Pentateuch)? Are they supposed to ignore the specific, repetitive editorial remarks such as "to this day" and "when there were no kings in Israel" and pretend the author(s) do not have a specific audience and implied readership in mind? Are readers supposed to believe that the Hebrew Bible is more important than the Septuagint, even though most of the quotations in the New Testament follow the Septuagint? And are Christians supposed to believe that the Bible is useless to them unless adopting a verbal plenary inspiration perspective? In short, all of the problems that plague Piper's *A Peculiar Glory* (reviewed earlier in this journal) plague the book.[5]

Though the intentions appear good (to help the church), *Know How We Got Our Bible* turns out to be a work of shameless theological propaganda. As with similar books on canon and bibliology by this particular school of thought,[6] recommendations are made only to books that come from the same ideology—not books that are the most significant, in-depth, or reputable by Christian and non-Christians alike. Readers are left in the dark to know what the main contributions in each field actually are. The book generally propagates a bibliology that neither informs the church honestly nor inspires them to engage the biblical story (which is really "the point" anyway). Instead, the volume constitutes a collective codification of some of the least credulous ideas about the Bible wrapped in a package of dubious propositions, superstition, and artificial certainty and confidence.

For better or worse, we can all expect the list of subscribers to Pete Enns' "The Bible for Normal People" podcast to continue growing by the droves.[7] In the meantime, there are thankfully many better alternatives.[8]

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5 John Piper, *A Peculiar Glory: How the Christian Scriptures Reveal Their Complete Truthfulness* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2016) reviewed in *Canadian American Theological Review* 5:1 (2016): 91–95.

6 E.g., Steven Cowan and Terry Wilder, eds., *In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture* (Nashville: Broadman and Holman Academic, 2013); Craig Blomberg, *Can We Still Believe the Bible?: An Evangelical Engagement with Contemporary Questions* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2014); Wayne Grudem, Thomas Schreiner, and John Collins, eds., *Understanding Scripture* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2012).

7 See https://thebiblefornormalpeople.podbean.com/ or https://peteenns.com/podcast/.

8 See the already-cited books in n. 1.

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